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PREFACE 
Preserving natural resources and environmental issues have long been topics for the 
planning bodies.  New methods and ecological approaches are being developed due 
to the increasing environmental problems. Environmental problems which have 
undergone diverse dimensions in developing or underdeveloped countries are 
shaping national economies. Turkey also follows the global developments in 
environmental issues and improves its environmental policies as well as considering 
environment in planning strategies. One of the most difficult aspects has been fast 
changes in environmental planning and its management. Although there have been 
numerous authorities, laws and regulations; these have been revised and new ones 
are formed. In 2004, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry passed 54 new 
regulations. “Public Administration Reform” which proposes fundamental changes in 
administrative terms is being discussed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
Due to this new regulation, Metropolitan Municipalities’ Law was revised in 2004.  
In this thesis, “game theory” is used as a new approach to environment protection 
problems and for planning decision making process.  “Game theory” is a 
mathematical model which regained importance in recent years. Its popularity is 
derived from the interesting life story of Jr. John Nash who shared a Nobel Prize 
together with Selten and Harasani. Von Neumann who is one of the first to apply this 
theory in economics has stated “If people do not believe that mathematics is simple, 
it is only because they do not realize how complicated life is." We believe that this 
theory is an efficient analytical method for solving complicated planning problems.  
First of all I would very much like to thank my thesis advisor, Prof. Dr. Fulin Bölen 
who has inspired and supported me about working on the game theory. She has been 
not only an advisor but a real guide for me, always. I would also like to thank Prof. 
Dr. Bilsen Beler Baykal, Prof. Dr. Yücel Ünal, Asis. Prof. İlker Topçu and Prof. Dr. 
Benan Zeki Orbay for their help and their opinions on my work. This thesis is a real 
multidiscipline work, and all the members of the examining committee have been a 
valuable piece for me to get my puzzle together. I also appreciate my mother and my 
father who have taught me the virtuousness of knowledge. Finally I would like to 
thank my husband, Can Devrim Uysal, who has supported and encouraged me during 
the preparation of this thesis.   
 
July, 2005       Arzu Başaran Uysal 
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NEHİR HAVZALARINDA SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR GELİŞME İÇİN BİR 
YÖNTEM: OYUN TEORİSİ 
ÖZET   
1950li yılların sonunda “çevre”,  hem bilimsel alanda, hem de politik alanda önemli 
bir gündem olarak tartışılmaya başlandı. II. Dünya savaşı sonrası endüstriyel 
kalkınma yarışı sonucu, özellikle nüfusun ve sanayinin yığıldığı büyük kentlerde, 
çevre sorunları ilk sinyallerini vermeye başladı. Doğal çevre ve insan arasındaki 
ilişki her zaman bölge bilimi ve şehir planlamasının konusu olmuştur, ancak çevre 
sorunlarındaki artış ve problemlerin boyutu planlamada “çevre” kavramının daha 
etkin olarak ele alınmasını zorunlu kılmaktadır. Değişen ihtiyaçlar ve hedefler 
doğrultusunda planlama disiplini de gelişmektedir ve çevrenin korunması ilkesi yeni 
planlama yaklaşımlarında yerini almaktadır.  
Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, artan çevre sorunları karşısında, dünyada değişen 
çevre kavramı, geliştirilen çevre politikaları ve Türkiye’ye yansımaları 
tartışılmaktadır. Çevre -su, orman, toprak gibi- içerdiği doğal kaynaklar nedeniyle 
ekonomi ile doğrudan ilişki içindedir. Doğal kaynaklar ekonomik değer 
taşımaktadırlar ve sonsuz değillerdir. Bu nedenle ekonomik kalkınma ve çevre 
arasında iki yönlü bir ilişki bulunmaktadır; birincisi kıt kaynakların paylaşımı ve 
tükenmesi, ikincisi ise ekonomik faaliyetler sonucu oluşan negatif dışsallıklardır.  
Çevre sorunlarının kamuoyuna yansımasında 1960lı yıllarda yapılan çalışmaların ve 
yayınların etkisi olmuş, çevre kirliliğinin doğal yaşamı ve insan sağlığını tehdit 
etmesi, nüfus artışının ve tüketim alışkanlıklarının yaratacağı olumsuz etkiler 
tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu yıllarda yaşanan bazı çevre kazaları bahsedilen 
tehlikenin boyutlarının anlaşılmasını sağlamıştır. Ayrıca çevre felaketleri, çevre 
sorunlarının ulusal sınırlar ile sınırlı olmadığını göstermektedir. 1960lı ve 1970li 
yıllar özellikle gelişmiş ülkelerin çevre mevzuatlarını ve çevre yönetimlerini 
oluşturdukları yıllar oldu. Çevre politikalarının oluşturulması konusunda ilk büyük 
uluslararası adım 1972 yılında Stokholm’de yapılan Birleşmiş Milletler Çevre 
Konferansı’dır.  
Ekonomik gelişme ile birlikte çevrenin korunması ilkesini benimseyen 
“sürdürülebilir kalkınma” kavramı, içerdiği çelişkilere rağmen, 1980li ve 1990lı 
yıllarda en çok tartışılan ve çevre politikalarını etkileyen kavram oldu. 1992 yılında 
Rio de Janerio kentinde yapılan Birleşmiş Milletler Çevre ve Kalkınma Konferansı 
ve 2002 yılında, Johannesburg kentinde yapılan “Birleşmiş Milletler Sürdürülebilir 
Kalkınmada Dünya Zirvesi”, sürdürülebilir kalkınma yaklaşımlarının uygulamaya 
geçirilmesinde etkili oldular. Sürdürülebilir kalkınma politikaları “kirleten öder 
pensibinin” yanında “tahmin ve önleme” yaklaşımlarının da geliştirilmesini 
önermektedir. Bu nedenle “çevresel etki değerlendirmesi”, “stratejik planlama” gibi 
yaklaşımlar çevrenin korunmasında önem kazanmaktadır.  
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İkinci bölümün sonunda, Türkiye’deki planlama sistemi ve havza planlama 
tartışılmaktadır. Dünyadaki gelişmelere paralel olarak Türkiye de 1970li yıllardan 
itibaren çevre politikalarını oluşturmaya başladı. 1983 yılında Çevre Kanunu 
yürürlüğe girdi ve çevre kirliliğini önlemeyi amaçlayan birçok yönetmelik çıkarıldı. 
1991 yılında Çevre Bakanlığı kuruldu. Bu gelişmelerin yanında “çevre” kavramının, 
planlama mevzuatındaki yeri hala tartışılmaktadır. Planlama mevzuatında tanımlanan 
plan türleri ve yetkili kurumlara rağmen, “çevre (düzeni) planları” kurumlar arası 
çatışmaya neden olmaktadır. Ayrıca dünyada doğal kaynak olarak suyun korunması 
ve kullanımına dair geliştirilen “entegre havza planlama ve yönetimi”, Türkiye’de 
henüz kurumsallaşmamıştır. İçme suyu havzalarının planlanmasından ve 
korunmasından sorumlu olan Devlet Su İşleri Bölge Müdürlükleri bile havza 
ölçeğinde örgütlenmemiştir. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı ve Metropoliten Belediyeler 
de su havzaları ile ilgili planlama yetkisine sahiptirler. Yetkili kurumların varlığına 
rağmen su havzalarının birden çok il, ilçe ve belediyeyi kapsaması, havzaların 
planlanmasını ve korunmasını zorlaştırmaktadır.       
Tez çalışmasının üçüncü bölümünde, planlamada çok sayıda aktörün karar verme 
sürecini analiz etmemezi kolaylaştıracak bir matematiksel yöntem olarak “oyun 
teorisi” incelenmiştir. Karar ve fayda teorileri temelinde gelişmiş olan oyun teorisi, 
tarafların karşılıklı etkileşimli karar verme süreçlerini analiz etmektedir. Teoride, 
karşılıklı çıkarları çatışan oyuncular rasyonel davranarak, kazançlarını maksimize 
ederler. Yani her oyuncu kendisi için en iyi olan stratejiyi seçer.  
Oyun teorisinin temelleri 18.yüzyıla kadar uzansada, 1920li yıllarda Fransız 
matematikçi Emile Borel’in yaptığı çalışmalar ilk modern çalışmalar olarak kabul 
edilmektedir. Ancak teorinin sosyal bilimlerde kullanılmasını sağlayan en önemli 
çalışma Von Neuman ve Morgenstern (1944) in “Oyun Teorisi ve Ekonomik 
Davranış” adlı eserleri olmuştur. Teoride “oyuncu”, “strateji”, “kazanç”, “bilgi”, 
“denge” gibi temel elemanlar bulunmaktadır. Teori, “iki kişili oyunlar” ve “çok 
sayıda oyuncunun bulunduğu oyunlar”da “işbirliğinin olduğu” ya da “işbirliğinin 
olmadığı” durumlarda, her oyuncunun kazancının maksimum olduğu “denge” 
noktasını araştırmaktadır. Oyunda, oyuncuların seçtikleri stratejiler sonucunda 
kazanmayı bekledikleri fayda, kazanç olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Oyunlar “sıfır 
toplamlı” olabilecekleri gibi “sıfır toplamlı olmayan” oyunlar da olabilir. Oyuncular 
işbirliği (ya da pazarlık) yaparak kazançlarını artırabilirler. Bunun yanında oyun 
teorisi, oyuncuların işbirliği olmayan durumlarda nasıl karar vereceklerini de 
araştırmaktadır. İşbirliğinin olmadığı durumlarda, sıfır toplamlı olmayan oyunlar 
sosyal bilimlerde en çok modellenen oyunlar olmaktadır.    
Her oyunda bazı temel kabullerin yapılması gerekmektedir. Oyuncunun hangi şartlar 
altında karar verdiği bu kabuller ile belirlenir. Her bir oyuncunun diğerinin 
stratejilerini ve seçecekleri strateji sonucu elde edecekleri kazancı bilmeleri 
durumunda oyun “mükemmel bilgili” oyun olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Ayrıca, oyunun 
kuralları tüm oyuncular tarafından biliniyorsa bu oyun “tam bilgili oyun”dur. Oyun 
teorisi ayrıca, statik-dinamik, bir kere oynanan-tekrar eden, oyuncuların aynı anda 
karar verdikleri-sıra ile karar verdikleri oyunlar gibi farklı yaklaşımları da analiz 
etmektedir. Bir oyunun en iyi strateji çifti, o oyunun denge noktası olarak 
tanımlanmaktadır. İki kişili oyunlarda minimax, baskınlık ve Nash dengesi gibi 
oyunların çözümlerine ilişkin yaklaşımlar bulunmaktadır.   
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Oyun teorisi geniş olarak ekonomide kullanılmakta olsa da, uluslararası ilişkiler, 
politika, hukuk, sosyoloji, psikoloji, yönetim bilimleri ve biyoloji gibi alanlarda da 
uygulanmaktadır. Oyun teorisi planlamada 1960lı yıllarda yer seçimi problemlerinde 
kullanılırken, 1990lı yıllardan itibaren hava kirliliğinin azaltılması, su havzalarında 
suyun paylaşımı gibi çevre problemlerinde kullanılmaktadır. Oyun teorisi, 
çatışmanın yaşandığı ve işbirliğinin olmadığı ortamlardaki karar verme sürecini ve 
denge noktalarını araştırması nedeniyle, planlamada yaşanan benzer sorunların 
çözümünü kolaylaştıracaktır. Ayrıca, stratejik planlama yaklaşımında, stratejilerin 
değerlendirilmesinde yardımcı bir yöntem olarak kullanılması faydalı olacaktır.  
Dördüncü bölümde, bir su havzasındaki stratejik karar verme sürecinin incelenmesi 
amacıyla alan analizi yapılmıştır. Türkiyenin üçüncü büyük sanayi şehrinin 
bulunduğu Nilüfer Çayı Alt Havzası çalışma alanı olarak seçilmiştir. Nilüfer Çayı 
Alt Havzası gelişen sanayinin yanında sahip olduğu verimli tarım toprakları 
nedeniyle de, Türkiye ekonomisinde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bursa kentinin 
karakteristik yapısının önemli bir parçası olan Nilüfer Çayı, Bursa metropolü ve alt 
havzada yer alan diğer yerleşmelerin evsel, endüstriyel atıksuları ve tarımsal sulama 
sularının tekrar çaya dönmesi sonucu kirlenmektedir. Bursa kentinin 2000 yılı nüfusu 
2 milyonu aşmıştır ve yapılan nüfus projeksiyonu çalışmalarına göre metropoliten 
alanda 2020 yılında 3.3 milyon insanın yaşaması beklenmektedir.  
Alt havzada tüm yerleşmelerde kanalizasyon sistemi bulunmasına karşın, yalnızca 
Bursa kentinin evsel nitelikli arıtma tesisi bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca sanayi tesislerinin 
de büyük çoğunluğunda (%58.5) arıtma tesisi bulunmamaktadır. Nilüfer Çayı Alt 
Havzası’nda 6 organize sanayi bölgesi ve 2 küçük sanayi sitesi ve çok sayıda dağınık 
olarak yerleşmiş sanayi tesisi bulunmaktadır. Yalnızca bir organize sanayi 
bölgesinde genel arıtma tesisi bulunmaktadır.  Organize sanayi bölgeleri, genellikle 
ilçe ve belde belediyelerinin plan kararları ile oluşan sanayi alanlarının daha sonra 
organize sanayi bölgesi haline getirilmesi ile oluşmuştur. Bu nedenle planlı ve 
altyapısı gelişmiş sanayi alanları değillerdir. Arıtma tesisi olmayan kuruluşların 
çalışmaya devam etmesi, alt havzada aktörlerin çevre mevzuatına uygun hareket 
etmediklerini göstermektedir. 
Alt havzada, gelişmekte olan bir diğer sektör tarımdır. Bursa’da tarımsal üretim, 
tarıma dayalı sanayinin gelişmesi ile birlikte artmıştır. Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü 
verilerine göre sanayi ve hizmet sektörlerinde işgücü artarken, tarımsal işgücü 
azalmaktadır, ancak sulama olanaklarının artması, teknolojik yenilikler ve pazarın 
genişlemesi nedeni ile tarımsal üretimin ve buna bağlı olarak gelirin arttığı 
görülmektedir. Alt havzada su temini ve suyun sektörler arasında paylaşımı temel 
problemdir. Bu problemin kısa vadede çözüldüğü görülmektedir; Bursa kentine içme 
suyunu sağlayan Doğancı Barajı korunmaktadır, yeraltı su rezervleri sanayiye tahsis 
edilmiş ve tarımsal kullanım için göl ve göletler inşa edilmiştir. Nilüfer Çayı bu 
sektörler tarafından kullanılamamakta ve kirletilmeye devam etmektedir. Ancak bu 
çözüm sürdürülebilir değildir. Devlet Su İşleri tarafından 1979-1982 yılları arasında 
ve daha sonra 1998-1999 yılları arasında 18 yıl ara ile yapılan iki çalışma Nilüfer 
Çayı’nda kirliliğin artarak devam ettiğini, suyun artık hiçbir amaçla 
kullanılamayacağını göstermektedir. Ayrıca, kirliliğin akarsu yoluyla taşınması, 
kullanıcılar arasındaki çatışmayı artırmaktadır. 
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Alt havzada planlama ve çevre konusunda karar veren 45 resmi kurum (bakanlıklar, 
bölge ve il teşkilatları ve belediyeler) tespit edilmiştir. Bu kurumlar birbirlerinden 
bağımsız olarak karar alabilmekte, strateji geliştirebilmekte ve plan 
yapabilmektedirler. Alt havzada karar veren kurumlar arasında koordinasyon ve 
işbirliği bulunmamaktadır. Çok sayıda karar veren kurum olması ve aralarındaki 
çatışmalar, çevrenin olumsuz yönde etkilenmesine neden olmaktadır. 1998 yılında 
onaylanan, Bursa 2020 Strateji Planı’nda, bölgede gelişen sanayinin yer seçimi ve 
sanayi kaynaklı kirliliğin en temel problem olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Bu planda, 
kentin gelişmesi, sanayinin yapılanması gibi stratejilerin yanında tarım alanlarının 
korunması, su kirliliğinin önlenmesi gibi korumaya yönelik stratejiler de 
geliştirilmiştir. Dördüncü bölümün sonunda, alt havzada karar veren aktörler, 
stratejileri ve çatışma konuları tespit edilmiştir.   
Çalışmanın son bölümü olan beşinci bölümde, alt havzada Büyükşehir 
Belediyesi’nin yeni sanayi alanlarının oluşturulması ve sanayi kaynaklı su kirliliğinin 
önlenmesi stratejilerine karşılık, küçük ölçekli bir sanayi yatırımcısının alt havzadaki 
yer seçme stratejileri, oyun teorisi yardımı ile modellenmiştir. Büyükşehir Belediyesi 
(A oyuncusu) için altı (6) strateji tanımlanmıştır ve bu stratejilerinin tamamı, Bursa 
2020 Strateji Planı’nda yer almaktadır. Diğer yandan sanayicinin (B oyuncusu) 
stratejileri alt havzada seçebileceği yer alternatiflerinden oluşmaktadır. B oyuncusu 
için yedi (7) strateji tanımlanmıştır.  
Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve sanayi yatırımcısı arasındaki etkileşimli karar verme süreci 
iki durum için analiz edilmiştir. Birinci oyunda (Oyun I) mevcut durum, yani 
oyuncuların çevre maliyetlerini düşünmeden karar vermeleri, analiz edilmiştir. Oyun 
I’de, A oyuncusunun kazancı, iki kritere göre belirlenmiştir, (a) seçtiği strateji sanayi 
gelirlerini arttırıyor mu?, ve (b) B oyuncusunun tercihine bağlı olarak stratejisi 
gerçekleşiyor mu? B oyuncusunun kazancı ise, sanayi alanı olarak seçtiği yerin arazi 
fiyatı, altyapı katılım bedeli ve izin alma süreci ile belirlenmiştir. İkinci durumun 
analiz edildiği Oyun II’de ise, tüm oyuncuların mevcut plan kararlarına ve çevre 
mevzuatına uygun davranmaları halinde, kazançlarındaki değişim irdelenmektedir. 
Oyun II’de, çevre maliyetleri üçüncü kriter olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Her iki 
oyunda da oyuncuların işbirliği yapmadan karar verme durumları analiz edilmiştir. 
Oyunlar sıfır toplamlı olmayan ve tam bilgili oyunlardır. Oyunların sunumunda 
stratejik form kullanılmıştır.  
Çalışmanın sonucunda, birinci oyunda beş tane en iyi strateji çifti (Nash dengesi) 
tespit edilmiştir; (SA1, SB7) (SA2, SB7) (SA3, SB7) (SA5, SB7) and (SA6, SB7). Nash 
dengesine göre, Büyükşehir Belediye’sinin seçtiği strateji ne olursa olsun, sanayici 
yatırım maliyetlerini en aza indirdiği, sanayi alanlarına yakın ancak planlı alanlar 
dışındaki ucuz arazileri seçmektedir. Bu durumda sanayici ve yerel yönetim arasında 
çatışma devam etmektedir. Ayrıca, birinci oyunda, sanayici maksimum kazancı 
sağlarken Büyükşehir Belediyesi daima kaybetmektedir.  
Çevre maliyetlerinin üçüncü kriter olarak değerlendirildiği ikinci oyunda ise, 
Büyükşehir Belediyesi sanayi gelirlerini arttırırken aynı zamanda çevre 
maliyetlerinin de arttığını kabul etmektedir. Diğer yandan, sanayici çevre mevzuatına 
uygun hareket etmez ise tesisinin çalışmasına izin verilmeyeceğini bilmektedir. Oyun 
II’de 11 tane Nash dengesi bulunmaktadır. Bu en iyi strateji çiftlerinden dördü, her  
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iki oyuncunun da maksimum kazancı elde ettiği kararlardır. Yani, Büyükşehir 
Belediyesi çevrenin korunması ile ilgili dört stratejiyi de benimsemesi halinde 
kazançlı olmaktadır. Üstelik sanayici de birinci oyundaki kadar kazanmaktadır.  
Sonuç olarak, birinci oyunda büyükşehir belediyesi daima kaybederken, çevre 
maliyetlerinin dikkate alındığı ikinci oyunda kazanmaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, bu 
oyunda büyükşehir belediyesi kazançlarını artırmaktadır. Üstelik sanayici de birinci 
oyundaki kadar kazanmaktadır. Özetle, mevzuata uygun haraket edildiğinde her iki 
oyuncu da kazanacaktır ve sürdürülebilirlik mümkün olacaktır. İkinci oyun 
sürdürülebilir gelişmenin mümkün olduğunu göstermektedir.   
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A METHOD FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN A RIVER BASIN: 
GAME THEORY 
SUMMARY 
Towards the end of the 1950s, the concept of “environment” started to appear in the 
agenda of scientific and political environs. As a result of economic development after 
World War II, especially in the populated and industrialized big cities, environmental 
devastation occurred. The relationship between man and the environment has always 
been a concern for regional science and urban planning. However it has become an 
obligation to handle “environment” more effectively in planning as a result of the 
increase in environmental problems. Due to changing needs and targets, planning 
disciplines also develop and environmental protection takes its place in the new 
planning approaches.  
In the second part of this study, changes in environmental concepts and 
environmental policies are being discussed with respect to the world and Turkey. 
Environment is in direct relationship with economy as a result of scarcity of natural 
resources and negative environmental externalities as an outcome of economic 
activities. Natural resources carry an important value for the economy and they are 
limited. 
In the 1960s, several studies helped environmental issues to be discussed in public 
forum. The threat of pollution on health and nature, negative effects of increasing 
population and consumption habits were discussed. Environmental disasters in the 
period have made the dimensions of this threat more visible. These accidents have 
also shown that the issue is not only limited to the national borders. Thus the 1960s 
and the 1970s have witnessed countries, especially developed ones, enacting their 
environmental legislations and establishing environmental management systems. The 
first biggest international step was taken in the United Nation’s Conference on the 
Human Environment which took place in Stockholm, in 1972.  
The concept of “sustainable development” has been an effective and widely 
discussed concept of the 80s and 90s despite its contradictory aspects. The UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) which was held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 and the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 
which was held in Johannesburg in 2002 were effective in environmental regulations 
on national laws and on the start of applications concerning sustainability 
approaches. Sustainability includes “react and cure” together with “polluter pays 
principle”. As a result approaches like environmental impact assessment and 
strategic planning gain importance in environmental preservation.  
In the end of the second part, planning system and basin planning are discussed in 
Turkey. Parallel to the developments around the world, Turkey has started to develop 
its own environmental policies since the 70s. In 1983, the Environmental Law was  
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passed and many environmental regulations have been passed. The Ministry of 
Environment was established in 1991. However, the concept of the environment has 
been still discussed in the planning legislation. Besides, in spite of the fact that many 
planning types and many authorities have been indicated in planning legislation, it is 
not clear who is in charge of environmental planning. It becomes chaotic as 
numerous institutions are authorized. Besides, basin planning and management 
which is developed to protect natural water resources and their use are not 
institutionalized in Turkey. Even the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(DSİ in Turkish acronym) is not organized according to basin scale. Other legislative 
bodies in basin planning are the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and 
Metropolitan Municipalities. However as water basins are within the territories of 
diverse provinces and districts, it is very difficult to plan and protect them.  
In the third part of this thesis, the game theory is examined as a mathematical 
method. Game theory which analyzes the strategic decision making process 
interactively, is based on decision and utility theories. It is accepted that decisions of 
the parties involved are rational ones, thus each party wants to maximize its benefits 
and chooses the best strategy in order to achieve this.  
Although the basis of game theory was established in the 18th century, Emile Borel’s 
studies in the 1920s are accepted as the first modern studies. Still, von Neuman and 
Morgenstern’s (1944) work “Game Theory and Economical Behaviour” was the one 
which let this theory to be used in the area of social sciences. Game theory has 
elements like “player”, “strategy”, “payoff”, “information” and “equilibrium”. 
Theory has two fields of analysis; “n person/two-person game” and 
“cooperative/non-cooperative game”. In the game, utility expected by the players as 
a result of their chosen strategies is named as payoff. Games might be “zero sum” or 
“non-zero sum”. Players can decide whether to cooperate or to bargain. Besides, 
game theory also explores how the players would act under non-cooperative 
circumstances. In social sciences, non-cooperative and non-zero sum games are 
mostly used as models.  
In each game, several basic assumptions have to be made. By these assumptions, it 
becomes clear under which circumstances the player decides. If each player knows 
about the others’ strategy and the benefits that will come out of these strategies then 
the game is identified as a “perfect information” game. On the other hand if the rules 
of the game are acknowledged by all the players of the game then the game is 
identified as “completed information”. Furthermore, game theory has different 
approaches such as static-dynamic game, one shot-repeated game. A game’s best 
strategy pair is considered as that game’s equilibrium. Minimax theorem, dominance, 
and Nash equilibrium are solving approaches in two-person games.  
Although game theory is widely used in economy, it is also used in international 
relations, politics, law, sociology, psychology, management sciences and biology. 
Game theory used in planning concerning location in 1960s. It is used environmental 
problems such as diminishing air pollution, water-sharing in basins since 1990s. As a 
result, game theory approach would make it easier to analyze terms like conflicts, 
strategies and cooperation in planning. Furthermore, game theory helps evaluation of 
strategies in the strategic planning approaches.  
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In the fourth part, strategic decision making process is analyzed in a watershed. The 
Nilüfer Stream watershed is chosen for case study; this region covers the third 
biggest industrial city (Bursa) of Turkey. The Nilüfer watershed has an important 
place within the Turkish economy; both as an industrial area and as an agricultural 
one. The Nilüfer Stream is part of the characteristics of Bursa city but city 
establishment and habitation in the watershed area has caused domestic wastewater, 
industrial wastewater and agricultural water discharges have polluted the stream. 
Bursa had a population of more than 2 million in 2000. By 2020, population is 
estimated to become 3.3 million in the metropolitan area. 
There is a sewerage system in all the settlements of the watershed, but Bursa 
metropolitan area has only a common domestic wastewater treatment plant. 
Furthermore, many industrial plants (%58.5) in Bursa have no industrial wastewater 
treatment plants. Today, there are 6 “organized industrial districts” and 2 “small 
scale industrial areas” which discharge their waste into the Nilüfer Stream. There are 
no industrial wastewater treatment plants in any of the districts except one. Besides, 
there are other industrial plants in the district which are spread around. Organized 
industrial districts are mostly built as industrial areas by the initiatives and planning 
of district and sub-district municipalities and then they become organized industrial 
districts. Therefore, infrastructure of these industrial districts is not completed. This 
situation indicated that actors do not behave properly according to environmental 
regulation. 
Agriculture is another developing sector in the watershed. Agricultural productivity 
has grown parallel to the industry depending on agriculture in Bursa. On the other 
hand, the labour force has increased in industry and service fields whereas it has 
decreased in agriculture. Despite this fact agricultural production and its share in 
gross domestic production proportion has increased as a result of technological 
developments, better irrigation facilities and broadening of agricultural markets. In 
the watershed, the main problem is the supply of water and its distribution among 
sectors. At present, this problem is solved on a short-term basis. Doğancı Dam which 
supplies the drinking water for the city is well preserved. Ground water reserves are 
given over to industry; for agricultural use, artificial lakes and ponds are built. The 
Nilüfer Stream can not be used by any of the sectors and it is being polluted. Present 
situation is not sustainable for long term. The DSİ has conducted two studies, one 
during 1979-1982 and the second during 1998-1999. These have shown that 
pollution in the Nilüfer Stream is increasing with time and its water can not be used 
for any sort of use. Moreover, pollution is carried by the stream which causes 
conflicts among the stakeholders.  
45 different official authorities are in charge of planning and environmental issues 
concerning the watershed. These bodies can decide, develop strategies, and make 
plan independently. Consequently, there is no co-ordination and cooperation among 
authorities. Too many authorities and inevitable conflicts among them have negative 
effects on environmental issues. The Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan which was approved 
in 1998 states that industrial location and industrial pollution are primary problems. 
City development strategies, industrial structure, as well as protection of agricultural 
terrains and prevention of water pollution are covered in this plan. In the end of the 
forth chapter, decision makers in the watershed, their major strategies and topics of 
the conflicts are determined. 
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In the fifth and last part of this study, game theory is used to analyze the location 
strategy of a small scale textile industrial investor versus the Metropolitan 
Municipality’s strategies to appoint new industrial areas and to prevent the water 
pollution caused by industry. Six strategies are determined by the Metropolitan 
Municipality (Player A) and all of these strategies are mentioned in the Bursa 
Strategy Plan. Seven location strategies are defined for industrial investor (Player B).  
Interactive decision making process between the Metropolitan Municipality and the 
industrial investor is analyzed for both cases. In the first game (Game I), the status 
quo, in other words decisions that do not consider environmental costs are analyzed. 
It is observed that plants which do not have acceptable effluent standards continue to 
function. Thus players do not act according to the existing environmental legislation. 
In the first game (Game I), payoffs of player A are determined according to two 
criteria; (a) does the chosen strategy increase its industrial income?, and (b) is player 
A’s strategy  realized in accordance with Player B’s preferred strategy? Player B’s 
payoffs are determined according to the land price, infrastructure, participation fee 
and duration for the permit. In Game II, analysis is based on players’ acting in 
accordance with environmental legislation and according to the plan decisions. In 
Game II, environmental costs are considered as the third criteria. In both games, the 
case of players’ decision making without any cooperation is analyzed. Games are 
“non-zero sum” and “complete information” games. Strategic form is used 
representation of games. 
In the result of the study, in Game I, there are five Nash equilibriums which are the 
(SA1, SB7) (SA2, SB7) (SA3, SB7) (SA5, SB7) and (SA6, SB7) outcomes. According to 
“Nash equilibrium”, free from the Metropolitan Municipality’s strategy, industrial 
investor chooses the cheapest land for which he could get the permit easily. 
Industrial investor’s decisions are for low cost and for areas which are close to 
industrial districts. However, while industrial investor wins, metropolitan 
Municipality always loses in the first game. In this sense, conflicts between the 
industrial investors and local authorities will continue and environmental problems 
will increase.  
In Game II, environmental costs are evaluated as the third criteria. Metropolitan 
Municipality foresees that while its industrial income increases, its environmental 
costs also increase. On the other hand industrial investor is also aware of the fact that 
the plant will not be permitted to function unless he fulfils the requirements for 
environmental legislations. There are eleven Nash equilibriums in Game II. Four of 
these best strategy duets are the ones in which both Players get the maximum payoff. 
Therefore Metropolitan Municipality would benefit from it if it adopts these four 
strategies about environmental preservation. In short, when Player B chooses for SB1, 
four of the strategies of Player A will bring maximum benefit.  This would also mean 
that more strategies which are needed for protecting environment will become 
acceptable for Player A.  
In conclusion, while the Metropolitan Municipality always loses in the first game, 
she wins in the second game which considered environmental costs. Namely, 
Metropolitan Municipality has increased payoff in this game. Furthermore, industrial 
enterprise can gain in the second game at least first. Briefly, both players will benefit 
if they act according to legislation, and sustainability is possible, and the second 
game demonstrates that sustainable development is possible.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: AIM AND METHOD 
An increase in the World’s population and the economic development policies after 
the II. World War sped up the consumption of natural resources and caused 
environmental pollution due to mass production (Meadows and others, 1972). 
Population growth, industrialization and rapid growth of urban areas have had major 
impacts on the environment. Environmental problems such as air, water and soil 
pollution; the loss of fertile agricultural areas and woodlands; the decrease in 
biological diversities due to the urban population increase and the development of 
industry are experienced in all developed or less developed world countries (Bartone, 
C., and others, 1995; Serageldin and others, 1995b; Brown and Mitchell, 1998). As 
the effect of environmental problems reached beyond the borders it is accepted that a 
worldwide avert program is mandatory.  
“Sustainable development” policies which target the protection of ecological systems 
have formed the basis of environmental policies of especially developed countries 
after the 1980s. Sustainable development policies were developed during the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro (1992) (Brundtland and others, 1991; Leitman, 1994; Karaman, 
1999). Ecological approaches to planning which is considered a significant 
instrument of economic growth has been discussed for a long time (Isard, 1972; 
Kozlowski and Hughes, 1972; Rodgers, 1976).  
Water, the main source of life on earth is under the threat of various types of 
pollution. These threats have been forceful in demonstrating the importance of the 
aquatic ecosystems, the economic value of water as a resource and the 
comprehensive planning and management of the drainage basins. Therefore, river 
basin planning whose borders are defined by natural resources has gained more 
importance than regional plans whose borders change with the socio-economical and 
technological development (Teclaff, 1996; Aydemir and Aydemir, 1998).  
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1.1 Aim of the Study and Discussion of the Problem 
The sustainability of water resources has become vitally important for the future of 
the world. Therefore, sustainable development policies indicate the necessity of a 
basin planning and management in which the cooperation and coordination between 
the agents is established for the conservation of natural resources. In this study, it is 
aimed the improvement of the strategic decision making process for environmental 
benefit in a river basin system. For this reason, the relationships and conflicts 
between decision makers, the decision making process and water pollution are 
explored with the help of game theory.   
In Turkey, there are a large number of institutions which are decision makers in 
planning and there are many plans which are prepared to serve different purposes. 
Again, there exist several regulations specially produced for drinking water basins. 
However, the concept of “river basin” as an integrated spatial planning unit is not 
recognized in the current planning system in Turkey even though specific river 
basins are defined by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources – the General 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ). The Regional Directorates of DSİ are 
not organized according to the borders of the basins. Some basins may be 
administered by more than one Regional Directorate. Besides, basins may include 
many municipalities, district, village and province. Despite the global developments 
about integrated basin planning and management, the approach to the planning and 
management of water resources has not been improved. Apart from the debates on 
the difficulties of the implementation of sustainable development policies, it is 
observed that sustainable development policies in Turkey are not being implemented.  
In Turkey, approximately, a total number of 36 public agencies take part in the 
decision making process within a drainage basin (Daşöz, 1995). Decisions, taken by 
these agencies with respect to the use of land and water, affect the quality and 
sustainability of water as a natural resource. These agencies act under a legal 
structure comprised of 100 different laws and regulations which are related to the 
environment (Daşöz, 1995); this creates additional confusion in the planning 
practice. The absence of basin planning and management makes the solution of 
environmental problems difficult. Water-sharing among settlements, agriculture and 
industry is a crucial problem and the absence of planning causes over usage and the 
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contamination of water. Industrial development and urbanization increase the 
consumption and the pollution of water. Besides, pollution is spread through the 
rivers. For this reason, the location of industry is important and this results in a 
severe conflict between the up-stream polluters and the ones who are affected by 
pollution down-stream.  The question is who should pay the costs which have been 
incurred because of pollution.  
In conclusion, a watershed is studied as a case to demonstrate the conflicts among 
decision makers. The Nilüfer Watershed within the borders of Susurluk Basin, which 
has been deeply affected by the increasing environmental pollution, is selected. 
Bursa, the third biggest industrial city of Turkey, is situated the fact that the DSİ has 
done two regular water pollution researches (DSİ, 1984 and DSİ, 2000) in this area 
was an important reason in the choice of the watershed as the study area. In addition, 
the Bursa 2020 Strategy Plan which has been put to force since 1998 has affected the 
choice.   
Decision makers in the Nilüfer Watershed, their strategies, conflicts and 
environmental infrastructure of the settlements, industrial areas and industrial plants 
are examined. Most of the industrial facilities –both public and private- have no 
wastewater treatment plants. With no regard to regulations, they discharge 
wastewater onto surface water which shows that sustainable development policies 
are not applied. The inefficiency of authorities, which are monitoring pollution and 
which officially permit industrial activities; and their intension to accept economic 
development as a primary strategy are other significant problems. In the recent 
system of planning and management, decision makers do not primarily adopt the 
conservation of the environment. Additionally, the costs of the environmental 
infrastructure are not considered as criteria in terms of industrial actors’ choices of 
location. Moreover, local governments are not capable of improving environmental 
infrastructure. In addition, municipalities which seek to increase their income, 
compete amongst each other for industrial investments. 
In this thesis, it is argued that in a particular watershed, decision makers have no 
coordination between them but if they had such coordination, sustainability would be 
possible. Besides, in the current situation, the agents decide without considering 
environmental costs whereas they would choose different strategies if they took 
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environmental costs into consideration. The present situation in which the players 
choose the best strategies and the second situation in which the agents consider 
environmental infrastructure costs are both discussed. The aim of this thesis, to 
improve the decision making process for sustainability in a watershed.  
1.2 The Method  
When there are many decision makers (players) as in the case of watershed, the 
rivalry between them increases deeply. Ministries and municipalities are usually in 
conflict with each other. Each decision maker would like to realize own strategies 
and plan decisions, and they cannot cooperate. Consequently, some environmental 
strategies cannot be achieved and it becomes difficult to protect the environment. 
Therefore, game theory is chosen as a method to resolve problems.  
The study has four hypotheses; 
1. The abundance of decision makers, who decide on environment and planning 
and who have no cooperation or coordination among them have caused 
surface water pollution to increase.  
2. Decision makers have not been conforming to the present regulation of 
discharge, the sharing and usage of water as a natural resource is not 
sustainable.  
3. Environmental infrastructure costs are not assessed in industrial investments 
in decisions of location and feasibility. The location strategy of the investor 
will change when environmental infrastructure costs are taken into 
consideration.  
4. In the state of cooperation between the decision makers; it is possible that the 
agents acquire optimum profit and the environment is not damaged. 
The first and the second hypotheses are explored in the case study. The third and the 
fourth hypotheses are explored by using game theory.  
Game theory is a mathematical theory which aims to explain the interactive decision 
making process in situations with more than one decision maker (Luce and Raiffa, 
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1967; Myerson, 1991; Aumann and Hart, 1994). Players are assumed to behave 
rationally, so every player tries to maximize his/her payoffs. The game theory 
analyses the behaviour of the players, their strategies and searches for maximization 
of their own utilities. Emile Borel gave the first modern formulation of game theory 
for two-person games in 1921. Another important study was published about two-
person, zero-sum games in 1928 and in 1937 by Von Neumann (Luce and Raiffa, 
1967). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) analyzed economic problems as 
games. This seminal book that was useful for social scientists as well as 
mathematicians and game theory has become important theoretical analysis in the 
social sciences (Rasmusen,1994; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996). John Nash (1950, 
1951, and 1953) made significant contributions to both non-cooperative game theory 
and to bargaining theory in cooperative game. 
Game theory is divided into two main branches; non-cooperative games and 
cooperative games. Players can negotiate before the game and players know about 
what to do in the game if the game is cooperative (Binmore, 1996). On the other 
hand, if the game is non-cooperative, commitments are not available, unless allowed 
for by the rules of the game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996). Modern applications of 
game theory, in particular to social sciences, use mainly non-cooperative games, 
because non-cooperative games are better at defining real world situations. Players, 
actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcomes and equilibrium are essential 
elements in a game (Rasmusen, 1994; Ritzberger, 2002). Furthermore, games are 
classified according to the number of participants; “two-person game” and “n-person 
game”. In a two-player, zero sum game; one player wins whereas the other loses. 
Therefore this game is also called a strictly competitive game. On the other hand, 
non-zero sum games (non-strictly competitive) provide opportunities in which both 
of the players may win and lose, at the same time (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944; Ritzberger, 2002). Therefore, non-zero sum games are a suitable real world 
situation as a model. For that reason, most games of interest in the social sciences are 
non-zero sum games. 
There are essentially two ways to represent a game; extensive form, strategic (or 
normal) form. The extensive form shows what could happen during a playing of the 
game (Ritzberger, 2002). Namely, players make sequentially decisions. Therefore, 
extensive form is known to be more detailed than strategic form. In addition, 
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extensive form shows each player’s action (move). On the other hand, if a player has 
one move, strategic form is more useful for abstraction, and players make decisions, 
simultaneously in strategic form. In addition, players’ moves are of two kinds; a 
personal move and a chance move. Strategic form games consider personal move 
because of the assumption of rationality (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; 
Luce and Raiffa, 1967; Vego-Redondo, 2003).     
Information of players about the situation is another factor which affects players’ 
choices (Luce and Raiffa, 1967). Games, in which each player knows exactly what 
has happened in previous moves, are called games with “perfect information”. By 
contrast, games in which there is some uncertainty about previous moves are called 
games with “imperfect information” (Gardner, 1995; Hart, 1992). If every player 
knows the rules of game and payoff function, a game has complete information. 
(Vego-Redondo, 2003; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996).  
Rationality and common knowledge are basically assumed in the theory. Each player 
is assumed to be “rational” in the sense that, given two alternatives, he/she will 
always choose the best strategy. If every player knows the rules of a game, every 
player knows that every player knows it, and so on…ad infinitum that is called 
common knowledge (Luce and Raiffa, 1967; Rasmusen, 1994; Harshanyi, 1992). If 
there is no element of time in game, it is called a “static game”. On the contrary, if 
time is analyzed in game, the game is a “dynamic game” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1996). Games may be played “one-shot (once off)” or they can be “repeated” (Sorin, 
1992). Decision making under certainty, risk, or uncertainty is significant for 
analysis (Luce and Raiffa, 1967; Harshani, 1992). Furthermore, players’ information 
about the rules of a game determines the solution of a game. All of the concepts have 
been discussed and developed by game theorists for solutions of games.  
The players, actions, and outcomes are collectively referred to as the rules of the 
game, and the modeler’s objective is to use the rules of the game to determine the 
equilibrium. The solution of a game requires discussing the concept of equilibrium. 
Equilibrium is a set of the best strategies. In other words, in equilibrium, each player 
is playing the strategy that is a "best response" to the strategies of the other players. 
No one has an incentive to change his strategy given the strategy choices of the 
others (Gardner, 1995; www.gametheory.net).  
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The first important equilibrium concept is the dominant-strategy equilibrium. 
Dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy profile consisting of each player’s 
dominant strategy. Indeed, a dominant strategy solution exists when every player has 
a dominant strategy (Rasmusen, 1994; Aliprantis and Chakrabarti, 2000). However, 
some games have no dominant strategy. For that reason, dominant strategy 
equilibrium approach cannot be used in such games. Thus, the process of elimination 
is used to solve these different kinds of games. The process of elimination requires 
that all dominated strategies of all players are eliminated. In other words, a player’s 
inferior strategies are dominated strategies. This process of elimination is called 
iterated dominance or iterated strict dominance. The solution of the dominant 
strategy and the iterative elimination of a dominated strategy are used to solve 
strategic form games (Fudenberg and Tirole 1996; Vego-Redondo, 2003). When 
strategies are undominated in a game, it could be solved by the Nash equilibrium 
approach.  
The central concept of non-cooperative game theory is that of the strategic 
equilibrium (or Nash equilibrium) (Ritzberger, 2002). Nash (1951) defines 
equilibrium points and proves “a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one 
equilibrium point”. The equilibrium of a dominated strategy solution is stronger than 
Nash equilibrium (Buck, 2004). 
Commonly, strategies are determined by two characters; pure strategy and mixed 
strategy. A pure strategy defines a specific move or action that a player will follow in 
every possible attainable situation in a game (Selten, 1988). A pure strategy that is 
undominated by other pure strategies may be dominated by a mixed strategy. In 
addition, in a game without a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, a mixed strategy may 
result in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a mixed strategy provides a useful approach 
for games such as Matching Pennies Game. On the other hand, Nash equilibrium 
need not be the best combination of strategies; a pair of strategies has the highest 
payoffs, but it’s not an equilibrium, absent “cooperation” behavior such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Nash equilibrium has been developed by game theorists. Selten 
(1965) introduced the idea of refinements of the Nash equilibrium with the concept 
of (subgame) perfect equilibria. Harsanyi (1990) developed the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium in games with incomplete information in 1967.  
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Game theory has been applied in many social science fields as a mathematical 
method; such as economy, political science, international relationship, law, military, 
sociology, psychology, and management sciences. Furthermore, game theory has 
been applied to the location problem of planning since 1960s. Stevens (1961) 
discussed the problem of location strategy and he used game theoretic approach in 
analysis. Isard and Reiner (1962) explore behaviours of industrialists who choose 
location for investment. Location alternatives are in an underdeveloped region, 
outside the country and in the capital city. Walter Isard (1967) studies game theoretic 
approaches in industrial agglomeration and he considered transportation costs.   
Game theory has been used in environmental problems and the planning of natural 
resources since the 1990s. Water basin planning and the water-sharing problem 
among sectors (or countries) are based on these studies. Harshadeep (1995) applied 
cooperative game theory to the water-sharing problem in the Subernarekha River 
Basin, India. Freeman (2000) used a game theoretic approach, also water-sharing 
problems according to international law in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. 
Kucukmehmetoglu (2004) discussed a coalition among countries of the Tigris-
Euphrates Basin which used Shapley Value. Cooperation and coalition situations 
among agents are discussed for optimum usage of water and its sustainability in these 
studies. Nijkamp (1980) proposed negotiations between agents for solving 
externalities in environmental problems and he added game-theoretic strategies could 
be used for negotiations.  
The problem of reducing of emission has been discussed by game theoretic 
perspective. The reduction of emissions is targeted amongst neighbouring countries 
through cooperation. Maler and Zeeuw (1998) consider an acid rain differential game 
in their paper. The Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game 
is explored in the paper. Barret (1998) emphasized negotiation to build a strategy for 
climate change. This study indicates that carbon dioxide emissions can be reduced by 
cooperation amongst countries. The purpose of the Ray’s (2000) paper is the same. A 
simple environmental game between two neighboring countries which are emitting a 
pollutant is formulated in the paper.   
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1.3 Data  
In this thesis, actors whose decisions affect the environment, the conflicts among 
them and decision making process were determined. An in depth analysis was made 
to understand the roles, preferences and attitudes of different players taking part 
within the watershed. Planning and Environmental Regulations were used to define 
the roles and strategies of the decision makers. Publications of the State Institute of 
Statistics (SIS), the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan (1998), the Bursa Wastewater Master 
Plan (2002), the Bursa Environmental Report (2000), web sites of the Metropolitan 
Municipality, the Bursa Provincial Governor and the Organized Industrial Districts 
were examined to determine the basic data an socio-economic development, land 
use, and environmental infrastructure in the watershed. Additionally, interviews with 
several authorities such as the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, the Provincial 
Directorate of Industry and Commerce, and the Provincial Directorate of 
Environment and Forestry were conducted.  
The DSİ carried out pollution measurements in the Nilüfer Stream in 1979-1982 and 
1999-2000. These pollution measurements taken at an eighteen year interval were 
compared to see the impact of the development that took place in the area. In the 
watershed, present land use and its effects on water pollution were examined. The 
sharing of the water, as a natural resource, between industry, agriculture and the 
settlements and their conflicts, were analyzed. The impacts of these sectors on water 
pollution and the existence of environmental infrastructures which prevent water 
from being polluted were determined.  
The city of Bursa is one of those rare cities with a “strategic plan” in Turkey. This 
strategic plan called “Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan” was approved in 1998 by the Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality, the Bursa Provincial Governor and the Ministry of Public 
Works and Settlement. The Strategic Plan is based on two principles; principles on 
preservation and principles on development. Strategies chosen for analysis in this 
study also take place in the strategic plan. In other words, this study will also 
question the applicability of these strategic decisions. 
When planning and environment are the subject of discussion, it becomes more 
difficult to define the agents and their payoffs. In previous studies where the game 
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theory was used it was observed that there was no problem determining the players 
(Stevens, 1961; Isard and Reiner, 1962; Maler and Zeeuw, 1998). For instance, in a 
war the enemies are defined and the main goal is victory with a minimum loss. 
Similarly, in a game among countries causing air pollution, the creators of the 
pollution are those countries, and there is no need for an analysis to determine this 
(Ray, 2000). However, Shubik (2002) indicates that in general, experimental works 
need pre-analysis before the application. In this study, a pre-analysis was required to 
determine payoffs of players. Land price, infrastructure participation fees, 
wastewater treatment cost of a small textile firm were explored in pre-analysis. The 
authorities of organized industrial districts and municipalities were interviewed to 
determine land price and infrastructure participation fees. An environmental 
engineering firm was questioned to determine wastewater treatment (both initial and 
operating) cost. 
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2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND RIVER BASIN PLANNING 
The link between the environment and economic development has discussed since 
17th century (Leiss, 1970; Capra, 1995). However, environmental economics has 
again become an important area of study since the 1970s, because of increasing 
environmental degradation (Nijkamp, 1980). Consumption of natural resources has 
rapidly increased because of population growth and economic development. Between 
1990 and 2025, the number of people who live in urban areas is expected to double 
to more than 5 billion people. Almost all of this growth will occur in the countries of 
the developing world (World Resource, 1996; Towards an Urban World, 1995). As 
recently as 1975, only over one third of the world’s people lived in urban areas. By 
2025, the proportion will have risen to almost two thirds (World Resource, 1996). 
Thus, optimum use of natural resources is vital for sustainability of economic 
development as well as human life. 
Additionally, environmental problems have reached beyond borders; during the past 
century the world has come to understand that global and local, national, regional, 
rural and urban ecosystems and environmental conditions are all connected (Bartone 
and others, 1994; Serageldin and others, 1995b; Brown and Mitchell, 1998).  
Sustainable development policies, which come with the economic growth and 
prioritize the protection of ecological systems, formed the basics of environmental 
policies of especially developed countries after the 1980s. Sustainable development 
policies also affect planning. There is no doubt that planning is the most effective 
instrument in terms of conservation of the environment and natural resources 
(Meadowcroft, 1999; Redclift, 1999; Voogd, 1994). Ecological approaches to 
planning, and the use and management of natural resources, became basic criteria of 
the planning concept. Thus, a discussion on the border of planning has started 
(Aydemir and Aydemir, 1998). Sustainable development policies indicate the 
necessity of a basin planning in which the cooperation and coordination between the 
agents is established for the conservation of natural resources. 
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This chapter aims to define the linkage between economy and the environment. 
Sustainable development policies are discussed both in the context of Turkey and the 
world in general. Water basin planning legislation and management, and their 
applications in the world and in Turkey are analyzed.   
2.1 The Environment and Development  
There is a multidimensional relationship between environment and economical 
development. Firstly, natural resources –environmental goods/ free commodities- are 
used for economical development which we need for the improvement of life quality. 
Furthermore, natural resources are not endless. The free commodity concept is an 
essential feature of environmental economic phenomena. Free commodities are 
assumed to have no price, because these commodities are not sold and bought on a 
normal market. This situation implies that in a normal competitive system of a 
market economy an over-use of environmental commodities will occur (Nijkamp, 
1980; Isard, 1972; Batabyal and Nijkamp, 2004; Turner et al, 1994). Secondly, 
economic development causes environmental degradation such as water and air 
pollution and this leads to economic loses. On the other hand, poverty also causes 
environmental problems because of insufficient service and over consumption of 
resources (Cisneros, 1995; Serageldin and Cohen, 1995; Turner et al, 1994). 
According to Leitmann (1994), economic structure of countries shapes its 
environmental problems. For these reasons, the link between the environment and 
development is very strong. 
Mankind has always struggled with nature; he has used nature and then has shaped it. 
The Free Online Dictionary (www.thefreedictionary.com) has three simple 
definitions of environment; the first definition is “the circumstances or conditions 
that surround one; surroundings”. The second definition is “the combination of 
external physical conditions that affect and influence the growth, development, and 
survival of organisms” and the third definition is “the complex of social and cultural 
conditions affecting the nature of an individual or community”. These definitions are 
different from each other. Indeed, the second definition is close to the concept of 
ecology which is defined in the same dictionary “the science of the relationships 
between organisms and their environments”. Broadly, “environment” is used to refer 
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to the whole of the natural world –from ecosystem to biosphere- within which human 
beings and all other parts of the plant and animal world exist (Kışlalıoğlu and Berkes, 
1994; Şişli, 1999). 
The concepts of the environment and environmental economics have changed 
together with environmental problems since the 17th century. Human being stood 
over and above nature, and nature was there solely for man’s use during these 
centuries. Scientists believed (such as Bacon, Descartes, Newton) that technological 
development could achieve welfare in society. This idea is frequently termed 
“anthropocentrism”. An anthropocentric ethic argues that the human species are 
morally superior to non-human parts of nature (Leiss, 1970; Capra, 1995). The 
origins of environmental economics has emerged in the beginning of the 1900s in 
Victorian England. At that time, the older classical economic theories of Smith, 
Malthus and Ricordo were investigated again by economists. Neoclassic economists 
-Marshall was the leader of neoclassic school-, focused on the measurement of 
human satisfaction which resulted from the production and consumption of goods 
and services (de Steiguer, 1997).  
Environmental science has independently advanced from ecology since the 20th 
century, because man activities have begun to impact the environment, negatively. 
Environmental problems require focus one’s attention on an anthropocentric 
approach to the environment. On the other hand, it has been understood that 
technologic development could not solve environmental problems. New research 
about ecology shows that the environment is an open system, and man is part of this 
system. Thus, an eco-centric (or life-centered) approach to environment gains 
importance (Sessions, 1995; Kışlalıoğlu and Berkes, 1994; Şişli, 1999).  
The relationship between ecology and spatial economy has been examined by 
regional scientists since the 1970s and it is still being discussed. (Isard, 1972; 
Kozlowski and Hughes, 1972; Rodgers, 1976, Hite and Laurent, 1972; Petrakis and 
Xepapadeas, 2000). Isard (1972) added the new concept of “ecology” in his book 
which is called “Ecologic-Economic Analysis for Regional Development”. He 
developed the Economic-Ecologic Models for sub-national regions. Figure 2.1 
illustrates how the model works.  
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Figure 2.1 Schematic Representations of the Isard Economic-Ecologic Models 
(Isard, 1972) 
Indeed, neoclassic economy contains some weaknesses and it causes increase in 
environmental problems. Firstly, the traditional measure for economic growth of 
countries or regions is income per capita. This measure may be a reasonable criterion 
for welfare in the case of a perfect competitive system characterized by full 
information and a fully operating price system, but it still neglects many essential 
elements of human life such as residential living conditions and the quality of 
working life (Nijkamp, 1980). Economic valuation of environmental goods and the 
economic costs of pollution have been discussed by environmental economists, and 
certain techniques have been developed for the measurement of the economic value 
(Pearce and et al., 2000). Secondly, externality arises when a non-market impact 
resulting from the consumption or production activity of one economic agent (a 
person, household, firm, state-run enterprise, etc.) affects the welfare of another 
economic agent. For example, untreated municipal sewage affects the market goods 
such as fish and drinking water, and non-market goods such as swimming and 
recreational fishing (Turgut, 1998; Turner and et al., 1994).  
The thesis explores these two essential problems. For that reason, a river basin is 
chosen as a case study. Socio-economic development and increasing of water 
pollution are examined, together. Furthermore, externality is clearly observed in a 
river basin.  Behaviours of actors in up-stream can negatively affect actors in down-
stream.    
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2.2 Sustainable Development Policies 
2.2.1 Environmental Policies in the World  
In the 20th century, as a result of development policies, the human effect on the 
environment has reached dangerous levels. The arguments on environmental 
degradation and the consumption of natural resources and its dimensions in the 
1970s started to be reflected in the environmental policies of the developed countries 
as well as on an international level. Many developed countries have enacted 
environmental legislation, especially about the protection of water since the 1970s.  
The environmental crisis gave its first alarms in industrialized countries and 
especially in the urban areas in the 1960s. Publication of Rachel Carson’s “Silent 
Spring”, which was published in 1962, is accepted to be the beginning of the modern 
environmental era by many scientists (Cech, 2003; de Steiguer, 1997; Sessions, 
1995). Rachel Carson was a biologist and her novel was about the risks posed by 
pesticides. Her book achieved public attention on environmental disasters which 
caused anthropogenic activities. The period between the 1960s and the 1970s was 
one of the most tumultuous eras in the developed world (such as the United States 
and European countries). Many studies were published about increases in population, 
economic growth, consumption habits and environmental degradation in the 1960s 
and the 1970s (Sessions, 1995; Doyle and McEachern, 1998). Furthermore, some big 
environmental accidents and disasters occurred such as; the mercury poisoning at 
Minamata Bay in Japan in 1959, oil pollution was caused by the stricken tankers 
Torrey Conyon in 1967, industrial accidents at Bhopal in India, which killed over 
3000 people and injured many hundreds of thousands, Three Mile Island nuclear 
facility in the United States in the late 1970s, Flixborough in England in 1974 and 
Seveso in Italy in 1976, Chernobyl nuclear accident in the 1980s (Connelly and 
Smith, 1999;  Garner, 2000).  
Because of a rapid increase in population growth rates and the extinction of natural 
resources, consumption habits, life styles and production based economic systems 
have begun to be criticized. Historically, economic growth has clearly been linked to 
increasing consumption. However, some scientists (Hoyer and Nass, 2001) have 
argued that economic growth does not necessarily mean increasing consumption. In 
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1963, two economists, Harold Barnett and Chandler Morse, released a new book 
entitled “Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of Natural Resource Availability”. In 
1966, University of Colorado professor Kenneth Boulding published “The 
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth”; the principal subject of this essay was 
the decreasing availability of the world’s natural resources, especially energy 
resources (de Steiguer, 1997). In 1968, Garrett Hardin published “the Tragedy of the 
Commons” and he described the human perspective that often leads to resource 
mismanagement and conflict. In his essay, the concept of competing demands on a 
resource, and the issue that personal gain often injures the common good are 
discussed (Cech, 2003; Hardin, 2000). The most influential research is “The Limits 
to Growth” which was studied by Meadows and friends for the Club of Rome, in 
1972. This report argued that the post-war rate of economic expansion and 
population growth can not be sustained without exhaustion of global natural 
resources, irreparable environmental damage and an increase in poverty and 
malnutrition (Meadows and et al., 1972; Connelly and Smith, 1999).  
The result of the increasing environmental problems, numerous publications and 
studies has helped the environmental issues to be discussed in public opinion since 
the 1960s. Environmental disasters in the period have made the dimensions of this 
threat more visible. The United Nation Conference on the Human Environment was 
the first important international meeting in Stockholm in 1972, focused on 
international cooperation for and on the environment (Doyle and McEachern, 1998). 
The conference theme was that environmental problems could be solved by science 
and technology. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was 
established in the follow up to this meeting. The UNEP was set up specifically to 
address environmental issues. It plays a vital role in monitoring and coordinating 
international action (Uslu, 1993 ; Sönmez, 1995).  
The United States Congress enacted several important legislations including the 
Clean Air Act in 1963, the Wilderness Act in 1964, the Endangered Species 
Preservation Act in 1966 and the National Environmental Policy Act  in 1970 
(Rodgers, 1976; Wolf, 1983; EPA, 1993). Many developed countries such as Canada 
and European Countries also enacted environmental protection regulation during this 
era (Garner, 2000; Couch and others, 1983). The European Economic Community 
(EEC) –established in 1957- was not originally set up with the intention of promoting 
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environmental policy. Despite this, by 1967 the Community had begun to issue 
directives concerning environmental matters; and by 1973 it had developed 
environmental policy explicitly stated in the form of the First Environmental Action 
Programme (TUSIAD, 1990). The single European market required those standards 
within and among countries to be comparable so as to ensure equality of competition. 
Between 1973 –85 there was a significant increase in the European Union (EU) 
environmental legislation –120 directives, 27 decisions and 14 regulations, to be 
exact- covering a wide range of issues such as the quality of domestic and drinking 
water, air quality and the disposal of hazardous waste. The EU’s legal competence to 
deal with environmental issues –The Single European Act- was marked in 1986 
(Garner, 2000; Arts, 1994; Budak, 1997). 
The concept of sustainable development has become more and more important 
because of the growing awareness of the global scale of the environmental impacts of 
economic development activities since the 1980s (Strigle, 2003; Bauriedl and 
Wissen, 2002). The term, “sustainability”, which was used to explain some economic 
utility such as land value, has been used since the 18th century.  The term was used 
by Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. The 19th century scientists such as William 
Paley, Harriet Martineau, Henry George, Charles Darwin, Aguste Compte who made 
important contributions, are closely related to sustainability (Lumley and Armstrong, 
2004). Despite the old research, the term became popular after 1987 when the report 
titled “Our Common Future” was published (more commonly known as the 
Brundtland Report). The Brundtland Report was prepared by the United Nations – 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), and influenced 
all countries’ environmental policies (Doyle and McEachern, 1998). Despite 
consensus about some of the aspects of sustainable development, the concept itself is 
still being discussed. Sustainable development is defined variously, some definitions 
are seen below; 
“sustainable development is a process in which economic, fiscal, trade, energy, 
agriculture, industrial -indeed, all policies- are designed to bring about economically, 
socially, politically, and ecologically desirable growth” (ul Haq, p 22, 1995),  
“sustainable development refers to a process in which the economy, environment and 
ecosystem of a region develop in harmony and in a way that will improve over time” 
(Loucks and Gladwell, 1999); and Lumley and Armstrong (p.376, 2004) adds “…the 
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concept has been often to subsume a number of the following ideas; inter- and intra-
generational equity, concern for the future, altruism, the conservation of nature, the 
protection of natural resources, balanced development.”  
General definition of sustainability from the Brundtland Report is commonly 
accepted; “sustainable development is development which meets present needs 
without compromising the ability of future generations to achieve their own needs 
and aspirations…” (http://www.ace.mmu.ac.uk/ Brundtland_Report.html ).   
The concept of sustainable development is based on justification between current and 
future generations, and it aims to provide justification among the current generation 
for usage of natural resource. The Brundtland Report (1987) emphasizes the links 
between environmental degradation and patterns of economic development; it argues 
that environment and development policies must be integrated in all countries.  
Sustainability requires guaranteeing the permanence of reproduction process in two 
areas. One of them is the “reproduction of development”, and the other is “the self 
reproduction capacity” of natural resources (Greenhuisen and Nijkamp, 1994). 
However, it is clear that much additional work on this concept is still needed.  
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2004) indicate that the measurement criterion for judging 
sustainable development is vague.  
In addition, Sachs (p.40, 1995) asks “sustainability, yes, but at what level? Where is 
the circle of use and regeneration to be closed”. Furthermore, sustainable 
development requires states to negotiate because of increasing Northern consumption 
levels, and the South’s desire for industrial development (Brown, 1996). How to 
provide justice among the generations and how to overcome the contradiction 
between developed countries/regions and less developed countries/regions is still a 
study subject (Strigle, 2003; Brown, 1996). Glasby (2003) specifies that the term 
“sustainable development” as commonly used, is a useful concept in environmental 
procedures, but we live in a markedly unsustainable world.  
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) was organized in Rio de Janeiro. The Rio Earth Summit affects 
environmental policies in the direction of sustainable development and five 
agreements were signed; Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, Declaration on Forest 
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Principles, Convention on Climate Change, and Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Application problems of sustainable development were discussed in the Rio Earth 
Summit (Loucks and Gladwell, 1999; http://www.un.org). The conference indicates 
the practical aspect of the concept of sustainable development rather than the 
theoretical part, so Agenda 21 targets authoritative ideas on how sustainable 
development is put into practice (Sönmez, 1995). Furthermore, The Rio Declaration 
endorsed both the “polluter pays principle” and the “precautionary principle”, and it 
emphasized developing environmental information, increased public participation, 
and environmental impact assessment of development schemes (Hens and Nath, 
2003; http://www.unep.org/Documents/).  
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg in 
2002, was attended by 9101 delegates from 191 governments. The WSSD Agenda 
included main issues such as water, health, rural and urban development, energy, 
science and technology, government (especially local government and authorities), 
climate, social responsibility, economics (http://www.johannesburgsummit.org). The 
WSSD reaffirmed Agenda 21 as the main pathway to sustainable development, and 
the WSSD also stressed the importance of partnerships between countries as well as 
between governments and civil society (Hens and Nath, 2003; 
http://www.worldsummit2002.org /index.htm).  
The development of environmental policies in world is shown in Table 2.1. 
During the ten years between Rio and Johannesburg, social awareness has been 
raised about sustainable development. The WSSD focused on implementation of 
sustainable development, and equal emphasis is also given to including carrying-
capacity, technology-transfer, training and education, partnerships, financial means, 
and good management (Hens and Nath, 2003; Serageldin and others, 1995a). From 
Stockholm in 1972, to Rio in 1992, and finally to Johannesburg in 2002, sustainable 
development issues have been discussed and negotiated.  
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Table 2.1.The Development of Environmental Policies in the World (adapted from 
Hens and Nath, 2003; Bauriedl and Wissen, 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1972  
• United Nation Conference on The Human Environment, Stockholm. 
• UNESCO Convention on the Protection of World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage. 
• First Report of the Club Of Rome. 
1973 
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Flora and 
Fauna (CITES). 
1976 
• Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution
1977 
• United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina.  
1979 
• Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
• The Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
• First World Climate Conference, Geneva 
1982 
• Stockholm + 10 Conference Organized by UNEP in Nairobi, 
1985  
• Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
1987 
• Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
• The Report, Our Common Future, published by The WCED 
1988 
• The World Meteorological Organization and UNEP Establish the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
1989 
• Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
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Table 2.1 The Development of Environmental Policies in the World (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1990 
• The Global Consultation on Safe Water and Sanitation, New Delhi  
1991 
• Establishment of the Global Environmental Facility with UNEP, UNDP 
and the World Bank as Partners. 
1992 
• UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio De 
Janeiro 
• The International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE), 
Dublin 
• Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution 
• Framework Convention on Climate Change 
• Convention on Biological Diversity  
1994 
• Interministrerial Conference on Drinking Water Supply and 
Environmental Sanitation, The Netherlands,  
1996 
• Habitat II Conference, Istanbul  
1997 
• The Kyoto Protocol 
2000 
• We The Peoples: The Role of The UN In 21st Century: Millennium 
Report 
• The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
2001 
• The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants  
• Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the WTO-Doha Declaration 
2002 
• International Conference on Financing for Development: Monterrey 
Consensus. 
• UN World Summit On Sustainable Development (WSSD), Johannesburg
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Environmental policies based on “polluter pays principle” and “user pays principle”, 
target reducing negative externalities by economic instruments such as fines and 
taxes. Sustainable development policies suggest that an “anticipate and prevent” 
strategy needs to be developed together with a “react and cure” strategy (Ertürk, 
1996). However, if economic instruments use a single method, they could not 
efficiently solve environmental problems. Therefore, as emphasized in the Rio 
Declaration, other alternative methods which are based on the strategy of “anticipate 
and prevent”, should be improved (Glasby, 2003). Additionally, some concepts and 
methods have been developed and proposed; such as volunteering, cooperation, 
public-private incorporating, and improvement of the decision making process, 
technological innovation for implementation of sustainable development policies 
(Harrison, 2000; OECD, 1997; Schmidt, 2001; Albrecht, 2001).     
The method of environmental impact assessment and strategic approaches to 
planning become more important. Besides, consumption habits in the world and the 
use of resources have been discussed; the importance of developing production 
technologies has been mentioned to reach less consumption of natural resources and 
to reduce waste. Recycling is supported. A voluntary approach is becoming more 
important together with taxation and fines. Higher consumer consciousness would 
force the producers to conform with environmental regulations. Parallel to the 
developments around the world, similar issues are being discussed in Turkey. 
However a strategic approach to planning and environment is not present in legal 
regulations and is applied only in a limited number of projects.   
2.2.1.1 Environmental Impact Assessment  
A method of environmental impact assessment (EIA) based on the strategies of 
“anticipate and prevent” and the EIA has been developed as an implementation 
instrument of sustainable development policies. The EIA method is “…an activity 
designed to identify and predict the impact on the biogeophsical environment on 
man’s health and well-being of legislative proposals, policies, programmes, projects 
and operational procedures and to interpret and communicate information about the 
impacts” (Munn, 1979). In other words, environmental impact assessment is “…an 
anticipatory environmental management tool which is designed to effect decisions 
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about projects which might have significant effects on the environment…” (Wood 
and Jones, p 1237, 1997).  
The United States National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the first 
comprehensive environmental legislation that was enacted in 1969, and it consists of 
a significant new term, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (Rodgers, 1976; 
Wolf, 1983). The EIA has been a topic in the legislation of many countries, 
especially European countries, since the 1980s. In 1985, “the council directive 
investigation of environmental impacts of some public and private projects” for 
which the European Economic Community (EEC) was responsible, was published 
(Budak, 1997). In 1987, UNEP expressed the purposes and basis of the EIA as a 
recommendation for countries which are members of the UN (Keleş and Hamamcı, 
1997).  
The method of the EIA is a multi-criteria and cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, the 
EIA requires a multi-discipline approach. The EIA is a method which enables one to 
evaluate the environmental impacts of different alternatives. Many techniques like 
overlays, checklists, matrices, networks / systems diagrams etc. are used. Monitoring 
and public participation after the implementation of a project is an indispensable part 
of the method (Arts, 1994; Ericson, 1994).   
The EIA method has been used in land use planning as a decision making tool 
(Jones, 1983; Brachya, 1993; Wood and Jones, 1997), and the method has been 
developed for environmental planning. In recent years, especially within the EU, the 
EIA is used to evaluate for strategic decisions that called strategic environmental 
impact assessment (SEA). The SEA follows the same basic methodology as EIA, 
although it focuses on policies, plans and programs rather than on individual projects 
(Connelly and Smith, 1999). The SEA concept takes place in the 5th Environmental 
Action Plan which was prepared in 1992 (Balfors and Schmidtbauer, 2002).  
According to Report of the 4th European Workshop on the SEA (Kleinschmidt and 
Wagner, 1997), the SEA provides a selection of alternatives so environmental 
authorities tend to focus on environmental quality. Additionally, the SEA calls for a 
closer cooperation between environmental and sectoral authorities than the EIA, so 
the SEA is a useful method that has been accepted especially for regional planning. 
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However, there is no agreement as to what kind of methods should be used in the 
SEA. Policy analysis or scenario techniques that are suitable for the SEA are 
suggested (Kleinschmidt and Wagner, 1997). 
2.2.1.2 Strategic Planning 
The concept of strategic planning develops in management science (David, 1993; 
Pettigrew and others, 2002). However, the concept is considered by urban and 
regional planners. Bilsel (p.10, 1998) defines strategic planning as “a period with 
physical, financial and institutional aspects during which different public institutions 
participate in order to make comprehensive decisions on strategical development 
targets aiming at mid or long terms”. Strategic planning has been used, especially in 
England, since the 1960s, and systematic methods have been developed in British 
strategic planning such as the interrelated decision areas technique (Batey, 1983; 
Masser, 1983).  
Planning is often short-term as with the five-year development plans followed by 
many countries. However, Barton and others (p. 71, 1994) emphasises that 
“environmental problems requires long-term strategic planning that is well-
coordinated and that is endorsed by the many actors who shape urban development”.  
For that reason, strategic planning was suggested as a tool for sustainable 
development in Rio and Johannesburg (Hens and Nath, 2003; Williams, 2002; 
Leitmann, 1994). In addition, creation of strategic vision and development of long-
term strategies are proposed for urban environmental policies by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (OECD, 1990). Strategic 
Planning has been applied in many countries and cities (http://www.cityofseattle.net 
/planning/;http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/planning/rospc-00.asp) 
Some techniques have been developed for strategic planning and management. The 
SWOTs (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis and development 
scenarios are usually used for the determination and application of strategies 
(Williams, 2002; Ildırar, 2004; Bilsel, 1998; http://www.planware.org/strategy.html).  
One of the objectives is development of strategic thinking in this thesis. In the end of 
the thesis, a method that aims to improve strategic decision making process will be 
developed.  
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2.2.1.3 Innovations  
Prevention of pollution before it occurs has been encouraged by newly improved 
techniques and forms of production. For instance, eco-innovation, re-design, product 
improvements which include less use of natural resources and cause less pollution, 
have been developed (Serageldin and others, 1995b; World Resource, 1996; 
Albrecht, 2001; Schmidt, 2001). Reduction of energy consumption is important both 
in an urban environment and in economy. Furthermore, the development of 
renewable energy technologies provides urban sustainability (Nijkamp and Pepping, 
1998; Solsbery, 1997). Another innovation is recycling for optimum usage of natural 
resources. Development of recycle technologies and encouraging uses of recycle 
productions are part of the sustainable development polices (Schmidt, 2001).  
Cooperation and co-ordination among actors -especially between the public and 
private sector- is important for the achievement of environmental policies (Marcus 
and et al., 2002; Beierle and Konisky, 2000). Marcus and et al. (p.347, 2002) claim 
that “companies would improve their environmental performance in order to enhance 
their public image” by voluntary approaches. When consumers prefer a product, 
which does not cause environmental degradation, competition among producers 
increases, positively. Therefore, the process of production and services are improved 
as in the case of Environmental Managment System -ISO 14000- (Gassner and 
Narodoslwsky, 2001).  
In addition, planned areas such as organized industrial districts, eco industrial parks, 
industrial regions and technological parks are formed in order to solve environmental 
problems caused by industrialization efforts. When industry is gathered together in 
an area, environmental effects can be controlled and infrastructure costs can be 
reduced. This also makes it easier to cooperate (Şenlier and Albayrak, 2003; Deutz 
and Gibbs, 2004). Besides, it has been an important step for the conservation of the 
environment that environmental information systems could be improved by new 
technological facilities such as geographical information systems (GIS) (Uçkaç, 
1999). 
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2.2.2 Environmental Policies in Turkey  
These developments on environmental issues in the world have had an impact on 
Turkey also. The 1980s witnessed environmental regulations in Turkey. The Third 
Five-Year Development Plan (1973-1978) which was prepared after the 1972 
Stockholm Conference mentioned environmental issues for the first time (Keleş and 
Hamamcı, 1997; Ertürk, 1996). The 1982 Constitution mentioned "environmental 
rights” that every citizen has a right to live in a healthy and balanced environment 
(article of 56th). Nevertheless, this right was restricted by the 65th section of the same 
law, which states that government is responsible for the prevention of pollution and 
the preservation of the environment as far as the budget allows it to (Turgut, 1998). 
Turkish Environmental Law (Law no: 2872) was enacted in 1983.  
There have been laws which contained environmental issues such as Municipalities 
Law (1930, this law was reconsidered in 2004, new law number 5272), Protection of 
Common Health Law (1930), Hunting Law (1937), Forestry Law (1956), Aquatic 
Products Law (1971). However, most of the environmental legislations have been 
enacted after 1980s. For instance, Environmental Law (Law no: 2872, 1983), 
National Parks Law (Law no: 2873, 1983), Protection of Natural and Cultural Assets 
Law (Law no:2863, 1983), Coastal/Shore Law (Law no: 3621, 1990), Development 
Law (Law no: 3194, 1985), Tourism Incentives Law (Law no: 2634, 1982), 
Metropolitan Municipalities Law (Law no:3030, 1980, this law was reconsidered in 
2004, new law number 5216) (Abacıoğlu, 1995; Özkaya, 1997; TUSIAD, 2002; 
www.rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr). Henceforth, some regulations have been enacted in 
accordance with the Environmental Law such as the Regulation of Air Pollution 
Control, 1986; the Regulation of Noise Control, 1986; the Regulation of Water 
Pollution Control, 1988; and the Regulation of Environmental Impact Assessment, 
1993, (Abacıoğlu, 1995; www.rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr ).  
In the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1985-1989), principles of wiping out 
existing pollution, prevention of possible pollution in future and the most effective 
use of resources for future generations was considered (Keleş and Hamamcı, 1997; 
Ertürk, 1996). It can be observed that sustainable development policy is affected by 
the fifth plan. After that, the Ministry of Environment was established in 1991 (Keleş 
and Hamamcı, 1997). However the most significant study about the environment is 
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the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). In this plan, the following targets were 
named; preventive policies were considered as a priority, national environmental 
strategy and action plan were set, reorganization of institutional structure and 
environmental management were assessed. Following this plan, “the Action Plan for 
National Environmental Strategy” were prepared by the State Planning Organization 
and the Ministry of Environment in 1998 (Yaşamış, 2001).  
Development of Turkish policy on the environment was also an outcome of the 
supranational connections and agreements. Turkey applied to become an European 
Union (EU) member state in 1959, and the Ankara Convention was made between 
Turkey and the EU on issues of membership and custom regulations in 1963. Hence, 
the Turkish economy and law would be developed in parallel to that of the EU states. 
Turkey applied for full membership to the EU in 1987, 19 commissions were formed 
to evaluate and develop different issues, among which was the environment 
commission (Budak, 1997; Yaşamış, 2001; Yenice and others, 2001; TUSIAD, 
2002). From then on, Turkey signed many agreements with the United Nations (UN), 
EU, OECD and the World Bank. These institutions required ecological evaluations in 
every project that was to be funded or co-funded by them (Uslu, 1993). Turkey 
signed many international agreements concerning the environment such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES), 1973, the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and 
Natural Habitats, 1983; the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1983; the Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, 1981; the Convention on the Protection of the 
Black Sea Against Pollution, 1992; the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
(http://www.cevre.org/Tcm/Sozlesmeler/).   
In Turkey after the 1980s, we witness the formation of environmental legislation and 
gradual arrangements concerning environmental management. The Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry is responsible for environmental management. There are 
three permanent councils which work for the Ministry; Superior Environmental 
Council, Environment Council and Local Environment Council (Özdirek and et al., 
1999). The Ministry of Environment joined with the Ministry of Forestry in 2004. 
However, the environmental management cannot be effective because of too many 
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legal arrangements and institutions -100 laws, 36 institutes, existing of confusions 
and the absence of coordination between authorities, centralist structure, lack of 
sufficient staff and technical infrastructure in the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry which is the central authority related to environmental issues (Daşöz, 1995; 
Karaman, 1999).  
2.2.2.1 Environmental Impact Assessment in Turkey 
Regulation of the Environmental Impact Assessment  (EIA) was enacted in 1993, in 
Turkey. The Regulation has been reconsidered several times in 1997, 1999 and 2003. 
EIA period in Turkey is similar to the ones in the EU, and European standards were 
taken as criteria to form the Turkish EIA (Uslu, 1993; Başaran, 1999). The EIA 
Regulation consists of two lists. The first list shows the projects where EIA will be 
implemented. The second list shows the projects which will be evaluated before EIA 
can be applied. After evaluation, in case a project has important environmental 
influence then EIA would be implemented (Regulation of EIA, 2003). On the other 
hand, the Regulation of 1993 includes a third list about sensitive environmental areas 
which were cancelled in 1997. 
The weak relationship between the process of EIA and planning negatively affects 
achievement of EIA. Especially, the EIA method could not measure cumulative 
impacts in industrial areas without master plans (Başaran, 1999; Özer and others, 
1996). Therefore, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has developed the 
strategic environmental impact assessment (SEA) to application on environmental 
plan decisions. Çanakkale is a chosen pilot study for environmental structure plan by 
the Ministry (Aydemir and Aydın, 2002). In addition, a draft regulation about the 
SEA has been prepared and discussed by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
(http://www.cedgm.gov.tr/taslak_scdyon.doc). 
2.2.2.2 Strategic planning in Turkey 
Although, strategic planing has not been defined in the Turkish planning system, 
strategic approach has been appropriated especially in metropolitan cities, recently. 
New Municipality Law (Law no: 5272, article 17, 38, 41, 2004) and Metropolitan 
Municipality Law (Law No: 5216, article 7, 18, 2004) consist of strategic plan 
approach. These laws consider to develop strategic plan of municipalities (population 
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over 50 000), and the term of the strategic plan mentions the balance between the 
targets of municipalities and its budget. Nevertheless, relationship is not established 
between spatial planning and strategic plan.      
On the other hand, Development Law (Law no: 3194, 1985) determines planning 
scale on 1/200 000 and 1/100 000 as environmental structure plans. Ünal (2003) 
defines these plans as strategic plans. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement 
makes the plans if it is necessary. Furthermore, nowadays, the Ministry of Public 
Works and Settlement has developed provincial strategic plans which enclose 
provincial borders such as Bursa 2020 Province Strategic Plan (Bursa Strategic Plan, 
1998).  As few existing examples are looked over, it is seen that these do not have 
the management structures that strategic planning requires. There is no management 
model for national strategies to be applied regionally. For instance, Bursa 2020 
Strategic Plan is prepared by the participation of the Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlement, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and the Bursa Provincial Governor 
and was approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. A separate 
institutional regulation was not made for preparing the strategic plan (Bademli, 
2001).  
2.2.2.3 Innovations in Turkey 
Turkish industry is working towards global integration. Therefore global 
technological improvements are also followed by Turkey. Recent environmental 
legislation supports technologies which use less environmental resources and cause 
less pollution.  For instance, according to “the Regulation for Packing Waste” which 
was passed in 2004 (http://www.cevre.gov.tr) packages used for industrial purposes 
should be recycled and deposit-returned to some extent. Environmental management 
system -ISO 14000- is applied by the industrial entrepreneurs on voluntary bases and 
is important in the preventive sense. Nevertheless companies with ISO 14000 
certificates are a lot less in number than their counterparts in other countries (Tüzün, 
1999).  
In recent years supporting industrial developments with planned industrial areas have 
gained importance and three laws have been enacted. In 2000, the Law of Organized 
Industrial Districts (Law no: 4562); in 2001, the Law of Technology Development 
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Regions (Law no: 4691); and in 2002, the Law of Industrial Districts (Law no: 4737) 
(www.rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr). With these three laws, control of industrial waste, 
problems of locating plants and infrastructure expenses are expected to be settled.  
2.3 River Basin Planning 
All through history, cultural, social and economic centers were aware of the need to 
control water and use it to their advantage. Therefore, the using and sharing of water 
resources have been a fundamental topic in both national and international law. The 
Riparian Doctrine (also called the common law of water) was developed in the 6th 
century and provided the framework for water allocation throughout the Roman 
Empire (Cech, 2003). Moreover, one of the first “modern” environmental laws was, 
in many industrialized countries, a “water quality law” (Teclaff, 1996; Krairapanond 
and Atkinson, 1998). However, water will be one of the most important natural 
resources of the world in the future. Water use in 2025 is going to be shaped by 
several major driving forces; population increase, trade policies and global climate 
change (Le Moigne, 1995; Hens and Nath, 2003). The potential for international 
conflict over water is great.  Some scenarios about water wars for the future are 
formulated (Cech, 2003). The fresh water resources of a nation will affect national 
economy, and it may shape the role of the nations in the world. Therefore, optimal 
use of water as a natural source, just distribution and its sustainability are important.  
Although there is an abundance of water on earth, 97,4% of it has a high salt content 
and is not generally usable. Only about 0,6% of the total water volume on earth is 
freshwater in the liquid state -inland surface waters and ground waters- (Malkina-
Pykh and Pykh,, 2003; World Resources, 1996). Furthermore, water resources are 
not distributed equally on earth. Ranges of river runoff per capita per year could be 
seen in Figure 2.2 
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Figure 2.2 Ranges of River Runoff per Capita per Year on Earth (Loucks and 
Gladwell, p13, 1999) 
Water resources are also key parts of sustainable development, and sustainable 
development can not succeed without sustainable water resource systems supporting 
that development (Hens and Nath, 2003; Loucks and Gladwell, 1999). Thus, river 
basin planning and river basin management, whose borders are defined by natural 
resources, have gained more importance as an ecologic approach (Teclaff, 1996; 
Aydemir and Aydemir, 1998). If natural protection is a goal, a regional or global 
approach to planning should be considered, not national (Krairapanond and 
Atkinson, 1998). Therefore, water basin approach at a regional level to planning has 
been developed in sustainable development policies.  
Each river basin has its own sensitive and subjective problems. Climate, geology, 
topography, soils, flora and fauna all interact with the basin’s waters, and if there is a 
change in any of these factors, either naturally or by human action, the watercourse 
system reacts (Teclaff, 1996; Cech, 2003). Therefore, planning and management 
should be held in the scale of the river basin with consideration of those 
characteristics of the river. For instance, Meşhur (1995) suggests that discharge 
standards should be determined according to their individual features.  
Teclaff (p. 360, 1996) defines the river basin and watershed as “a river and all its 
tributaries (branches) make up a river system, and the area from which a river system 
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drains is called the river basin. A basin is usually delimited on the surface by a 
natural boundary called the watershed or drainage divide”. Cech (p.59, 2003) 
describes watershed as “the total land area that contributes water to a river is called a 
watershed (also called river basin, drainage basin, and catchments). Reimold (1998) 
classified management units of a water basin as basin, sub-basin, watershed, sub-
watershed and catchment.   
2.3.1 River Basin Planning in the World 
Water resources have been planned and managed since ancient times such major 
basins as the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, the Indus, the Yellow and the Yangtze 
rivers. The first modern river management authorities were established in the early 
19th century in the United States. The first legislation (the Flood Control Act) about 
the usage of the river was enacted in 1917 (Chech, 2003). The Tennessee Valley 
Authority (federal regional agency), which tries to improve transportation facilities, 
agricultural and irrigation facilities, flood control, reforestation, marketing of power, 
and industrial development of the basin, was established in 1933 (Wagner, 1972). 
Since 1960, river basin planning and management has taken place in many countries’ 
planning legislations. Today, the concept of integrated water resources management 
is developed because of the cooperation among stakeholders.   
By 1960, eight departments and some 40 agencies in the federal government were 
involved in some phase of water resource planning, and the Water Resource Planning 
Act enacted in 1965 in the United States (Don Maughan, 1972). Planning, 
development, and management of water and land resources took place under a 
federal system of government, and the responsibility for managing the water (and 
related land resources of river basins) is shared among federal, state and local 
governments and private enterprise in the United States (Smith, 1972).  
Nowadays, in the United States, various watershed management approaches are in 
place to address small streams and major river and lake basins. Examples of 
watershed management organizations are the Great Lakes Commission, the Ohio 
River Valley Water Sanitation Commission and on a more local scale, the Anacostia 
River Restoration efforts in Washington, D.C. (Victory and Tennant, 1998). EPA 
(Environmental Protection Agency of the United States)'s vision for watershed 
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approaches and builds upon the Office of Water “Watershed Protection Approach 
Framework”, endorsed by senior EPA managers in 1991. Watershed approach is 
defined as “…is a coordinating framework for environmental management that 
focuses public and private sector efforts to address the highest priority problems 
within hydrologically-defined geographic areas, taking into consideration both 
ground and surface water flow” by EPA (www.epa.gov/owow/watershed). 
Development of water resource planning and legislation in Canada is similar to the 
United States. The Canada Water Act passed in 1970. This Act embodies the concept 
of an integrated approach to water management, and it was developed also within the 
Canadian system of shared jurisdiction between federal and provincial governments. 
The Great Lakes-St.Lawrence system is important for Canada and the United States, 
it is especially vital to Canada, and this region is threatened by the pressures of 
rapidly increasing urban areas and the growth of new industry. The Great Lakes-
St.Lawrence system has been shared in harmony since the early 19th century by 
Canada and the United States. They have signed series treaties, and established the 
International Joint Commission (Austin, 1972; Tinney and van Loon, 1972).    
In the United Kingdom, river authorities have been established with broad powers to 
manage both the quality and quantity of rivers. Further east, in Germany, national 
legislation has established self-administration water associations for the management 
of the Emscher and Ruhr river basins. In France, six water agencies corresponding to 
the country’s six large hydrographic regions have been created; they have been 
effective in developing and executing policy decisions to enhance water resources 
(Reimold, 1998). France updated its water legislation in 1964 and its model of basin 
administration which continues to gain adherents in Eastern Europe, the former 
USSR, southeastern Asia and Latin America. Furthermore, many metropolitan 
authorities have also developed their water managements like New York, London, 
Los Angeles, and Paris (Teclaff, 1996).  
Projects for transfer of water across large regions, and even across continents were 
on the drawing board. They included the Pacific Southwest Water Plan to divert 
supposedly “surplus” water from northern California to the lower Colorado basin, the 
north American water and power alliance scheme to interlink river basins from 
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Alaska and Canada southward to Mexico and the Siberia project for a canal link 
between Siberian rivers and Soviet Central Asia (Teclaff, 1996).  
The International Law Association (ILA) endorsed the integrated basin principle, 
closely followed by the International Law Institute in its Salzburg declaration of 
1961. The most comprehensive and detailed elicitation of principles for cooperation 
of states in developing shared water resource was clearly illustrated in the ILA’s 
Helsinki rules, adopted in 1966 conference (http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org / 
IntlDocs/Helsinki_Rules.htm;http://web.idrc.ca/es/ev-29787-201-1-DO_TOPIC). In 
1977, in Argentina, the United Nations Water Conference resulted in an “action 
plan”; including recommendations targeted at meeting the goal of safe drinking water 
and sanitation for human settlements by 1990 (Cech, 2003).  
The International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin in 
1992 indicated that “freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to 
sustain life, development and the environment” and “water development and 
management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners 
and policy-makers at all levels” (Malkina-Pykh and Pykh,, 2003). The ICWE 
reflected in Agenda 21 and river basin planning and managing are stressed for 
sustainability. After the Rio Conferences and the ICWE, the World Bank has 
developed a policy on sharing and conserving the resources of international rivers 
(Serageldin and others, 1995b). Ten years later, the water problem was at the top of 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and integrated water basin 
management principle was agreed to be accepted until 2005 (http://www. 
johannesburgsummit. org/; http://www.un.org/events/wssd/statements/). The EU has 
announced that they have agreed upon the “water framework directive” 
(2000/60/EC) which was implemented in 2000 (Eroğlu, 2004, http://europa.eu.int 
/comm/ environment /wssd/water).  
Today there is a trend towards an ecosystem approach that is considered some form 
of integration. The concept of integrated water resources management has developed 
especially river sustainability (Kirby and White, 1994; Toope and et al., 2003). 
Integrated water resources management includes a number of approaches: integration 
of water sources (mainly ground and surface water source), linkage of social and 
economic development, land and water uses within the context of watersheds, 
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stakeholder participation in decision-making and involvement in protection planning 
and implementation, integration of water resources planning and management into 
the framework of national planning process, consideration of the needs of aquatic 
ecosystems for water, and prevention and reduction of pollutant discharges (Malkina-
Pykh and Pykh,, 2003; Heathcote, 1998).  
2.3.2 Planning System and River Basin Planning in Turkey 
2.3.2.1 Administrative System 
Administrative institutions in Turkey may briefly be classified under two groups; 
central administration and local authorities. “Central administration represents the 
organization that makes up the main administrative structure of the state. It takes and 
implements political, administrative and economic decisions about the general 
administration of the country” (www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr). In addition, central 
administration is composed of two branches; central administrative organizations in 
Ankara and the provincial administration. “The provincial administration is 
comprised of provinces and districts established to take and implement decisions on 
behalf of the Centre. These units are headed by provincial and district governors” 
(www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr). In other words, provincial administrations carry out 
their responsibilities in coordination with the main bodies of the Ministry and under 
the supervision of the respective Governors. 
There are three types of local authorities in Turkey; special provincial 
administrations, municipalities, and villages. “Central administration exercises 
administrative guardianship over local authorities. Tutelage is exercised over the 
decisions, acts and omissions, organs, and personnel of local authorities” 
(www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr ; Keleş, 1994). 
Special provincial administrations are field administrations which are established to 
carry out tasks in the regions beyond municipal boundaries, within their respective 
provinces. Municipalities are a form of local authority, which are established to 
function in areas with dense population. It is possible to establish municipalities in 
the settlements of more than 5,000 inhabitants according to the Municipalities Law 
(Law no: 5272, 2004). A metropolitan municipality is a superior local body which is 
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formed to regulate the entire metropolitan area. Reference law for the metropolitan 
municipalities is the Metropolitan Municipalities Law (Law no: 5216, 2004).  
2.3.2.2 Planning System 
Development Law (Law no:3194, 1985), which regulates the Turkish planning 
system, defines planning levels as regional plans and development plans. 
Furthermore, development plans divide into two major parts as master plans and 
implementation plans (Law no 3194, article 6, 1985). The State Planning 
Organization is responsible for setting regional plans in accordance with the socio-
economic conditions of the region (Law no: 3194, article 8a, 1985). Nevertheless, no 
regional plans are being prepared except from a few such as The Southeastern 
Anatolia Project, The East Black Sea Region Project (www.dpt.gov.tr).  
There are the regulations which include the rules of planning such as “the Regulation 
of Implementation for Helping Municipalities”, 1983; “the Regulation of Planning in 
Unplanned Areas”, 1985; “the Regulation for Plan Preparation”, 1985. The last 
regulation was reconsidered in 1999, 2000 and 2001 (www.rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr). 
However, there are confusions about scale, definition and the name of plans. “The 
Regulation for Plan Preparation” (1985) defines various plans types such as the 
environmental structure plan (1/200 000, 1/100 000, 1/50.000 and 1/25.000), 
metropolitan plan, revision plan, supplement plan, local plan (the Regulation for Plan 
Preparation, 1985). Furthermore, plans of scale 1/50 000, 1/25 000, 1/10 000, 1/5000 
and 1/2000 are defined as master plans by the Bank of Provinces (1990). 
1/200 000 and 1/100 000 scale plans which are called the environmental structure 
plans are prepared and approved by the Ministry of Public Works And Settlement. 
Ünal (2003) points out that “environmental structure plans are unique tools for 
application of sectoral development policies within the state’s spatial development 
plans”. Furthermore, environmental structure plans of 1/50 000 and 1/25 000 scale 
are prepared and approved by the Ministry of Public Works And Settlement. Master 
plans of 1/5000 and 1/2000 scale and implementation plans of 1/1000 scale are 
prepared and approved by municipalities or provincial governors (Ünal, 2003; 
Tunçer, 2001; Law no:3194, 1985; the Regulation for Plan Preparation, 1985).  
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If there is a higher scaled plan, the plan should be made according to that one but 
higher scaled plans are not obligatory. For this reason, when settlements have no 
environmental structure plans, master plans and implementation plans are prepared in 
local scale.  
In addition, there are various plans which have special purposes in the Turkish 
planning system. Each plan might be made by different authorities, and this situation 
can cause confusion and conflict in planning. For example, the Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism makes “tourism development plans” and “conservation plans”. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has authority to make 
“special environmental conservation plans”, “environmental structure plans” and 
“drinking water basin plans”. However, in reality, “drinking water basin plans” have 
not been prepared or actioned. Moreover, there are industrial development plans such 
as “organized industry districts plans”, “technological region development plans”, 
and “industrial development plans” (Ünal, 2003; Çubuk, 1999). Different types of 
the plans in the Turkish planning system and component authorities are shown in 
Figure 2.3  
Preparation of 1/25 000 scaled environmental structure plan causes conflicts between 
the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and the Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlement, and also between these ministries and municipalities. The Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry passed a legislation in 2000 and announced that it has the 
authority to conduct environmental structure plans. In the Regulation (article 4, 
2000), environmental structure plan is defined as “1/25.000, 1/50.000, 1/100.000 and 
smaller scaled plans which are prepared to determine land use of housing, industry, 
agriculture, tourism, transportation etc. according to regional and national plan 
decisions”. Additionally, some responsibilities of the Ministry of Environmental and 
Forestry are classified as “determination of policy, plans and projects for the 
conservation of the environment, prevention of environmental pollution and 
improving the environment; improving environmental standards; monitoring and 
controlling; coordination of environmental authorities and institutes; and preparing 
environmental structure plans that achieve a balance between economic and 
ecological factors and the rational use of natural resources” (Law no: 4856, article 2, 
2003).  
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 Figure 2.3 Types of the Plans in the Turkish Planning System and Approval Authorities (adapted from Ünal, 2003) 
Types of Plans and Hierarchical System  Approval Authorities 
Socio-Economic Plans 
Country Plan 
Regional Plan
Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
The State Planning Organization 
Spatial Plans  
Special Purposes 
Plans  
Conservation Plan,   
1/5000, 1/1000
Special Environmental Conservation 
Plan 1/25000, 1/5000, 1/2000, 1/1000
Tourism Development Plan  
1/5000, 1/1000 
Improvement Plan  
1/5000, 1/2000, 1/1000
Rural Area Plan   
1/5000, 1/2000, 1/1000
Region of Technology Development 
Plan 1/5000, 1/2000, 1/1000
Organized Industrial District Plan  
1/5000, 1/2000, 1/1000
Committee of Conservation, 
Municipality, Provincial Government  
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of 
Public Works and Settlement 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry  
 
Provincial Government  
Municipality, Provincial 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
and Provincial Government 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Industrial Development Plan  
1/5000, 1/2000, 1/1000 Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Supplemental Plans  
Revision Plan
Supplemental Plan
Local Plan
Ministry, Municipality,  
Provincial Government 
Ministry, Municipality,  
Provincial Government 
Ministry, Municipality,  
Provincial Government 
Master Plans 
Environmental Structure Plan, 1/25 000
Metropolitan Plan, 1/50 000
Strategic Plan  1/100 000 Ministry of Public Works and Settlement 
Local Plans 
Implementation Plan, 1/1000
Local Master Plan, 1/5 000, 1/2000 Municipality or Provincial Government 
Municipality or Provincial Government
Ministry of Public Works and Settlement 
Ministry of Public Works and Settlement or 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
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On the other hand, the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement that had been in 
charge for so many years, took legal action, and in 2001 broadened the definition of 
“environmental structure plan” within the renewal of the “Regulation for Plan 
Preparation”, and the environmental structure plan is defined as “a plan that should 
provide balance among sectors like housing, industry, agriculture, tourism, 
transportation, urban, rural, and natural-cultural values” (Regulation for Plan 
Preparation, article 3, 1985). In addition, these plans should be made according to the 
decisions of a regional plan if a regional plan exists. With this new regulation, a new 
term was introduced to the environmental structure plans, “conservation and usage 
balance” which was not used before. In conclusion, terms like conservation of 
natural values and balance have started to be mentioned in planning legislations.  
Metropolitan Municipalities make and approve plans of 1/25000 and 1/5000 scale 
(Law no: 5216, article 7-b, 2004). However, if a metropolitan area which consists of 
more than one municipality and a metropolitan municipality is not established, the 
Ministry of Public Works and Settlement is able to prepare an environmental 
structure plan. Furthermore, if a city grows beyond metropolitan municipality area, 
an environmental structure plan can be prepared by a provincial government, the 
metropolitan municipality, the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, together. 
After that, the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement approves the environmental 
structure plan (Law no: 3194, articles 8 and 9, 1985). Usually administrative 
boundaries and metropolitan boundaries intersect. Because of this the Ministry of 
Public Works and Settlement holds the authority for planning although 
municipalities also have the right to do so. This situation causes conflicts but with the 
new regulation (Law no: 5216, 2004), Metropolitan Municipality boundaries can 
coincide with the city borders.  
Master plans (1/5000, 1/2000) and implementation plans (1/1000) are defined in a 
hierarchical planning system. These plans are prepared and approved by 
municipalities within the municipality’s borders, otherwise the provincial 
government prepares and approves implementation plans outside of the 
municipality’s borders. Implementation plans have to coincide with master plans. As 
for district municipalities of a metropolitan municipality, they make their 1/5000, 
1/2000 and 1/1000 scaled plans according to the bigger scaled plans and 
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metropolitan municipalities have authorities to inspect their district municipalities 
(Law no: 3194, 1985; Law no: 5216, 2004; Regulation for Plan Preparation, 1985). 
However, the main problem in metropolitan area planning is the settlement that gains 
a sub-district status after the establishment of metropolitan municipalities. These sub-
districts’ municipality do their own 1/5000 and 1/1000 plans independent from the 
metropolitan municipalities according to Municipalities Law (Law no: 1580, 1930). 
This situation is changed new municipality law (Law no: 5272, 2004).  
Furthermore, nowadays, the Government of Turkish Republic is studying a draft of a 
proposed law about public management structure and local management. Drafts of 
local management, development and urbanization laws are being discussed in the 
National Assembly. These laws are expected to prevent the authoritative 
complexities, and local management will gain importance. Plans for special purposes 
are expected to be abolished. The planning and management system of Turkey is 
being changed by these draft laws. These studies proposed to cancel provincial 
directorates of ministries whereas duties of these authorities will be transferred to 
municipalities and local authorities such as special provincial administrations. The 
General Directorate of Rural Services is being closed (Declaration of The Chamber 
of City Planners, 2003; Tanık and others, 2003; Dünya, 2004b; Dünya, 2004c). 
2.3.2.3 River Basin Planning  
In Turkey, there’s a common misconception that the water resource is fairly 
abundant. Eroğlu (2004) defines the geographical location of Turkey as a semi-arid 
region. Conversely, as it is seen in above Figure 2.2 ranges of river runoff are not 
that high in comparison to world. Moreover, some writers (Şaylan and Kadıoğlu, 
2004) claim that climate changes on a global scale would inevitably affect Turkey 
and in conjunction with the rain system, these changes would impact our water 
resources.  
There is no water or river planning in the current planning system of Turkey. 
However, water basin development plans also take place within special purposed 
physical plans and special location plans. Ünal (2003) points out that these plans can 
be made on 1/5000, 1/2000 and 1/1000 scales by municipalities and provincial 
governments regarding the legislation rules. Still there are also no clarified 
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arrangements for basin management, yet. However, the General Directorate of State 
Hydraulic Works (DSI) is a noteworthy institution which plans drinking water basins 
(together with the provincial governors). The DSİ was established in 1954, and it is 
organized on a regional scale. Besides, it is responsible for the production of energy, 
agricultural irrigation and the acquisition of drinkable water to cities whose 
population is over 100.000 (www.dsi.gov.tr). On the other hand, in rural areas, water 
supply for irrigation and drinking is provided by General Directorate of Rural 
Services. In addition, metropolitan municipalities are responsible for planning and 
investments concerning drinking water (Law no: 5216, 2004). Turkey consists of 26 
different river basins which are defined by the DSİ that are shown below Figure 4.1. 
The DSİ gives priority to the planning of water resources which are used for the 
production of drinking water and rivers on which dams are constructed for irrigation 
and production of energy. In addition, it has conducted research on rivers where 
water pollution is dense (www.dsi.gov.tr; DSİ, 2000). However, the Regional 
Directorates of DSİ are not organized according to the borders of the real 
hydrological basins. Some of the basins are managed by more than one Regional 
Directorate. Furthermore, river basins contain several administrative units (Başaran, 
1997).  
In fact, the current legislation refers only to the drinking water basin in Turkey.  If 
rivers are not used for supplying drinking water, they may not be subject to planning. 
Drinking water basin plans are made by the DSİ and the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry (Regulation of Water Pollution Control, article 5, 2004). Furthermore 
metropolitan municipalities can make drinking water basin plans (Law no, 5216, 
2004). Moreover, standards of drinking water are determined by the Institute of 
Turkish Standards (TSE); classification of surface and ground waters are determined 
by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry; discharge limits are determined by the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and the metropolitan municipalities. In 
conclusion, there are different authorities that are responsible for supplying drinking 
and domestic water, determination of the classifications, monitoring, controlling 
discharge, and basin plans.  
In addition, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry is responsible for the 
protection of surface waters which are outside the borders of a metropolitan 
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municipality. It determines quality guidelines of surface waters and their “protection 
zones”. This guidelines, which is regulated by the Regulation of Water Pollution 
Control (2004) and “protection zones” are the same for all surface waters in the 
country. The Regulation (2004) consists of a decision which restricts the pollution of 
inland surface waters which are sources of drinking and domestic water. 
Metropolitan municipalities also make basin protection plans within their own 
borders. 
Although, river basin planning does not exist in the current Turkish planning system, 
there are a few projects which have a watershed approach. “The Southeastern 
Anatolia Project” is an important example of regional planning which is based on 
river system, but this plan is not made on a watershed scale. The project area covers 
9 administrative provinces in the basins of the Euphrates, the Tigris and in Upper 
Mesopotamia. It was supervised by the State Planning Organization and then “The 
Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration” was instituted 
in 1989. The project is identified as “a multi-sector and integrated regional 
development effort approached in the context of sustainable development.” The 
Southeastern Anatolia Project had originally been planned in the 1970s, consisting of 
projects for irrigation and hydraulic energy production on the Euphrates and the 
Tigris, but has transformed into a multi-sector social and economic development 
program for the region in the 1980s (www.dpt.gov.tr).  
Another planning study of the State Planning Organization, which was made at the 
scale of river basin, is “Yeşilırmak Watershed Development Project” concerning 
regional problems such as flooding, erosion and environmental pollution. 
“Yeşilırmak Provinces Joint Public Services Union” which include the provinces in 
the geographical field of the project, was founded in 1997 (Yıldırım and others, 
2001; http://www.dpt.gov.tr/bgyu/). In addition, Ergene River Environmental 
Structure Plans (1/100 000), and Sakarya Lake Basin Environmental Structure Plans 
(1/25 000) were developed by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
(http://www.cedgm.gov.tr/cdplanlari.htm). Furthermore, the DSİ prepares plans on 
river basins. “B. Menderes River Basin” was chosen a pilot region and “integrated 
basin management plan” was prepared by the DSİ (Eroğlu, 2004). 
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2.4 Conclusion  
Optimal use of water as a natural source, just distribution and its sustainability are 
important for both present and future generations. On the other hand, environmental 
problems (i.e. surface water pollution and water-sharing problems) require planning 
at a regional and international level. Therefore, a water basin approach to planning is 
developed for optimum usage and the protection of a water resource.  
Although Turkey is classified as having an insufficient natural water reserve, the 
Turkish planning system does not include basin plans. However, watershed 
development plans are classified under special purpose physical plans or special 
areas plans. The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) is a noteworthy 
institution which plans consumption of water basins with the provincial 
governments. Moreover, metropolitan municipalities are responsible for planning 
and investments concerning drinkable water. Additionally, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry is responsible for the protection of surface waters which 
are outside the borders of the metropolitan municipality. The Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry and metropolitan municipalities determine the quality 
guidelines of surface waters.  
Complexities are caused both by disagreements on the basin planning approach and 
many institutions authorized for the planning. According to Development Law (Law 
no: 3194, 1985), levels of planning in the Turkish planning system are listed as 
regional plans, environmental structure plans, master plans and implementation 
plans. The State Planning Organization is responsible for regional planning, but no 
regional planning was made apart from several sample plans. Therefore, 
environmental structure plans are physical plans on large scales which would bring 
policies and strategies down to spatial. On the other hand, environmental structure 
plans (1/25 000) can be prepared and approved by the Ministry Public Works and 
Settlements, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and metropolitan 
municipalities. 
A major problem in basin planning is that natural boundaries do not match with 
administrative boundaries. Even the Regional Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
which is responsible for drinking water basins is not organized on a water basin 
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level. Furthermore, a basin can be covered by more than one province, district and 
municipality. This also means many authoritative bodies concerning that basin. Thus, 
lack of basin and environmental management causes increasing environmental 
problems.  
On the other hand, nowadays, the Government of the Turkish Republic is studying a 
draft of proposed law about local managements, public management and 
urbanization structure. Local authorities (metropolitan municipalities, provincial 
governors and special province authorities) will be authorized by new draft law about 
public management. Furthermore, metropolitan municipalities of borders will be 
expanded. However, unfortunately, basin planning and basin management 
approaches did not appropriate in the draft.  
The watershed approach, strategic evaluation, and integrated water resource planning 
have not been developed in the current Turkish management and planning system. 
However, studies and implementations in the world are indicated to the obligation of 
a watershed approach to planning and integrated water resource management for the 
protection of water. Additionally, basin management by co-ordination and 
cooperation among stockholders should be resolved for sustainability. Therefore, the 
watershed approach and the strategic approach should be integrated in to the spatial 
planning system.  
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3. THE METHOD: GAME THEORY 
3.1 Aim of Game Theory 
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics. The word “game” is inspired by 
parlor games such as chess and poker, or field games such as football and basketball. 
Rules of parlor games and players’ behaviours are modified in the game theory. For 
instance, the act of bluffing in poker is quite similar posturing of nations about their 
military strength (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996; Gardner, 1995). We make decisions 
every day about whether a situation is important or not. Game theory deals with the 
choices of people in the real world (Ray, 2000). Players would like to gain the best 
profit for themselves in the game theory. Therefore the theory is based on decision 
theory and utility theory (Ritzberger, 2002). 
According to Selten (in introduction, 1988), most of the strategic decision problems 
occur in human life and they are quite complicated. Usually, rational solutions are 
not easily available. Selten (1988) defines game theory as follows; “a game is a 
mathematical model of a situation where several actors with different goals are 
engaged in strategic interaction. Game theory explores the nature and the 
consequences of rational behavior in games”, and according to Rasmusen (p.9, 1994) 
“game theory is concerned with the actions of decision makers who are conscious 
that their actions affect each other”. Möbius (p.2, 2004) explains “game theory is a 
formal way to analyze interaction among a group of rational agents who behave 
strategically”. Game theorists emphasize “interactive decision” in a decision making 
process. Luce and Raiffa (1967) define the term interactive as a situation where 
“each player attempts to maximize her utility in a situation where her outcome 
depends not only upon her choice, but upon the choices of each of the other players; 
in turn, their choices are influenced by the choice they think she is going to make, for 
they too are attempting to maximize a function over which they do not have full 
control”. Otherwise the game is a simple series of independent decision problems. 
Namely, decision makers act in an environment where other players’ decisions 
 46
influence their payoffs and every action has a reaction. Furthermore, the reaction is 
not programmed to be equal and opposite (Luce and Raiffa, 1967). 
Myerson (1991) indicates that “conflict analysis” or “interactive decision theory” 
might be more descriptively accurate names for the subject. Another definition of 
game theory is “the study of rational behavior in situations involving 
interdependence” (McMillan, p.6, 1992). Rationality is basically assumed in the 
theory. Every decision maker chooses what is best for his/her and expects the best 
response. In short, game theorists try to understand conflict and cooperation by 
studying quantitative models and hypothetical examples. 
3.2 Historical Background of Game Theory 
Game theory is not a new model. Walker (1995) asserts the origin of the theory 
beyond 500 A.D. The Babylonian Talmud is a compilation of ancient law and 
tradition set down during the first five centuries A.D. which serves as the basis of the 
Jewish religious, criminal and civil law. One problem discussed in the Talmud is 
called the marriage contract problem. A man has three wives whose marriage 
contracts specify that when the man died they would receive the estate. In brief, the 
problem deals with sharing the estate amongst his wives.  In 1985, it was recognized 
that the Talmud anticipates the modern theory of cooperative games (Walker, 1995).  
First studies of games in economics literature on oligopoly pricing and production 
were the papers by Cournot in 1838, Bertrand in 1883, and Edgeworth in 1925. A 
natural generalization of the equilibria studies in specific models by Cournot and 
Bertrand, and it is the starting point for most economic analysis (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1996). Cournot discusses the special case of duopoly and utilizes a solution 
concept. Edgeworth proposed the contract curve as a solution to the problem of 
determining the outcome of trading between individuals in 1881. The concept of the 
core is a generalization of Edgeworth's contract curve (Kiannai, 1992). At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Zermelo asserted the first theorem of game 
theory that was about chess. He proved that chess is “strictly determined” (Hart, 
1992). 
Borel who was a French mathematician, studied a mixed strategy along with finding 
the minimax solution for two-person games in 1921. Von Neumann published papers 
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about two-person, zero-sum games in 1928 and in 1937. They state that every two-
person, zero-sum game with finitely many pure strategies for each player is 
determined (Luce and Raiffa, 1967). Besides these precursor studies, the book of the 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) is 
generally accepted as the first comprehensive academic study into game theory (Luce 
and Raiffa, 1967, Rasmusen, 1994; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996).  They proposed 
“minimax theorem” for the solution of two-person, zero-sum games in non-
cooperative game theory. (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  
Game theory has attracted the attention of the business world since the late 1950s. 
The Ford Foundation and the University of Michigan sponsored a seminar on the 
"Design of Experiments in Decision Processes" in 1952. This was the first 
experimental economics / experimental game theory conference. On the other hand, 
after the world experienced an economic crisis in the 1970s, the game theory rapidly 
gained importance in economy during the 1980s. Game theoretic concepts have been 
applied to model the interactions of economic agents (Berkovitz and Dresher, 1959; 
Eichberger, 1993).  
John Nash (1950a, 1950b, 1951 and 1953) made significant contributions to both 
non-cooperative game theory and to bargaining theory in cooperative game; 
“Equilibrium Points in N- Person Games” (1950a), “The Bargaining Problem” 
(1950b), “Non-cooperative Games” (1951) and “Two-Person Cooperative Games” 
(1953). Nash’s contributions created significant approaches to how equilibrium could 
be achieved in the game theory, and Nash shared the 1994 Nobel Economy Prize 
with Harsanyi and Selten (Walker, 1995). 
Nash’s papers on the definition and existence of equilibrium (Nash,1950a and 1951) 
laid the foundations for modern non-cooperative game theory. At the same time, 
cooperative game theory reached important results in the papers by Nash (1950b) 
and Shapley (1953) on bargaining games. Aumann and Hart (1992) define the 
bargaining theory as a “bridge” between the non-cooperative and the cooperative 
game theory. Shapley (1953) helped the theory by his significant contribution “A 
Value for N Person Game”. The notion of the “core” as a general solution concept 
was developed by Shapley. This solution is called the Shapley Value. The concept of 
core is used as balance (or coalition) in the cooperative game. Kannai (1992) 
describes the concept of core as “it is the set of all feasible outcomes (payoffs) that 
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no player or group of participant (coalition) can improve upon by acting for 
themselves. Put differently, once an agreement in the core has been reached, no 
individual and no group could gain by regrouping”.   
Selten (1965) introduced the idea of refinements of the Nash equilibrium with the 
concept of (subgame) perfect equilibria. Harsanyi (1990) developed the Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete information in 1967. Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium is the cornerstone of many game theoretic analyses. Aumann (1974) 
proposed the concept of a correlated equilibrium and Myerson (1994) has developed 
this equilibrium concept. Kreps and Wilson (1982) extend the idea of a subgame 
perfect equilibrium to subgames in the extensive form that begin as information sets 
with imperfect information. They call this the extended idea of equilibrium 
sequential. Rubinstein (1982) considered a non-cooperative approach to bargaining 
in his paper “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”. Harsanyi and Selten 
(1988) produced the first general theory of selecting between equilibria. They 
provide criteria for selecting one particular equilibrium point for any non-cooperative 
or cooperative game.  
If there is no element of a time in game, it is called a “static game”. On the contrary, 
if time is analyzed in game, the game is a “dynamic game” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1996). Games may be played “one-shot (once off)” or they can be “repeated”. Sorin 
(p.72, 1992) explains differences between a “repeated game” and a “one-shot game”; 
“a repeated game is concerned with analysis of behavior in long-term interactions as 
opposed to one-shot situations. A repeated game results when a given game is played 
a large number of times and when deciding what to do at each stage, a player may 
take into account what happened at all previous stages”. Additionally, decision 
making under certainty, risk or uncertainty is significant for analysis. Furthermore, 
players’ information about the rules of a game determines the solution of a game. All 
of the concepts have been discussed and developed by game theorists for the solution 
of games.  
3.3 Basic Concepts and Elements of Game Theory 
Games have main basic elements such as players and strategies. Rasmusen (1994) 
has determined the essential elements as the players, actions, information, strategies, 
payoffs, outcomes and equilibria, and adds that a game’s description must include 
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players, strategies and payoffs. On the other hand, Ritzberger (2002) determined 
three main ingredients; players, rules and outcomes.  
Decision making with “complete information” or “incomplete information” 
determines game forms. On the other hand, games are divided into two parts; zero-
sum and non-zero sum games. Solution of the game depends on determination of the 
rules.    
3.3.1 Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Games  
Non-cooperative games and cooperative games are two main branches of the game 
theory. Cooperative means a coalition of two or more individual players to act 
together with a common purpose (Myerson, 1991). In other words, coalition is 
emphasized and commitment is available in cooperative games. Players can negotiate 
before the game and players know what to do in the game if the game is cooperative 
(Binmore, 1996). The main discussion about a grand coalition in a cooperative 
solution is the kind of coalition among players and the sharing of the benefits by each 
player in a satisfactory way (Ray, 2000). 
On the other hand, if the game is a non-cooperative game, commitments are not 
available, unless allowed for by the rules of the game. However, modern applications 
of game theory, in particular to social sciences, use mainly non-cooperative games, 
because non-cooperative games are better at defining real world situations. (Gardner, 
1995; Ritzberger, 2002). Fudenberg and Tirole (p.xviii,1996) define “non-
cooperative means that the players’ choices are based only on their perceived self-
interest, in contrast to the theory of cooperative games, which develops axioms 
meant in part to capture the idea of fairness”. On the other side, they (1991) add that 
“non-cooperative does not mean that the players do not get along or that they always 
refuse to cooperate”.  
The situation of non-cooperative is different from decision making under uncertainty 
or risk. When a player makes decision under certainty, game can be a non-
cooperative game (Luce and Raiffa, 1967). Harshanyi (p.671, 1992) defines decision 
making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty as “We speak of certainty when the 
decision maker can uniquely predict the outcomes of any action he may take. We 
speak of risk when he knows at least the objective probabilities associated with 
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alternative possible outcomes. We speak of uncertainty when even some or all of 
these objective probabilities are unknown to him”.  
3.3.2 Games in Strategic (Normal) Form 
Game theory is symbolized by extensive form and strategic form (also known as 
“normal form” or “matrix form”) (Hart, 1992; Ritzberger, 2002). However, some 
authors specify a third form that is called characteristic function forms (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1967), coalitional forms (Vega-Redondo, 2003), or coalition function form 
(Gardner, 1995). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced the ideas of the 
extensive form and strategic form representations of a game. According to Ritzberger 
(2002), representation theory is based on game theory beside decision and utility 
theories.   
The extensive form is a graphical representation of a sequential game. It provides 
information about the players, payoffs, strategies, and the order of moves. While 
extensive form could be called game tree, strategic form represents matrices. The 
game tree consists of nodes which are decision points. (www.gametheory.net, Vego-
Redondo, 2003; Eichberger, 1993; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Hart, 
1992). According to Shubik (2002), in general, strategic form has been preferred in 
experimentation, because of its simple description. 
All games have certain assumptions and game forms are determined according to 
these assumptions. For example, if a strategic form is used, players make a decision, 
simultaneously. If a player has one move, strategic form is more useful for 
abstraction, and players make decisions, simultaneously in strategic form. However, 
games can be played sequentially. In sequential games, players take turns. Game tree 
consists of nodes (choice) and branches (different options). For this reason, if a game 
consists of moves, it is represented with extensive form. In addition, players’ moves 
are of two kinds; a personal move and a chance move. Strategic form game considers 
personal move because of the assumption of rationality (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944; Luce and Raiffa, 1967). 
Furthermore, if the set of players ( n ) and all the strategy set ( Si ) are finite, the 
game is called a finite game. In general, a strategic form game is assumed to be finite 
(Ritzberger, 2002). A game in normal form has three elements (Luce and Raiffa, 
1967; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996; Dutta, 1999);   
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i) the finite set of n players,  
ii) the pure strategy space Si, for each player, 
iii) linear payoff function ui (s) represents the expected utility payoff of player i 
Strategic form game is symbolized with “ Γ ”. Although some authors (Selten, 1988; 
Vega-Redondo, 2003) denote strategic form game as “G”, others (Hart, 1992; 
Ritzberger, 2002) use “ Γ ” symbol. Formally, a strategic form game (Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1944; Ritzberger, 2002; ) is any “ Γ ” of the form as given in 
Definition 3.1. 
A strategic form game;  Γ = (n, (Si) i = n, (ui) i = n)    (3.1) 
In general, rationality and common knowledge are basic assumptions in a normal 
form game (Luce and Raiffa, 1967; Rasmusen, 1994; Harshanyi, 1992);  
• Rationality; each player is assumed to be “rational” in the sense that, given 
two alternatives, he will always choose the better strategy. 
• Common knowledge; if every player knows the rules of the game, every 
player knows that every player knows it, and so on…ad infinitum that is 
called common knowledge. 
Harshanyi (p. 671, 1992) discusses the concept of rational behaviour and he says 
“rational behavior is not a descriptive concept but rather a normative concept. It does 
not try to tell us what human behaviour is in fact like, but rather tells us what it 
would have to be like in order to satisfy the consistency and other regularity 
requirements of perfect rationality”.   
3.3.3 Rules of the Games and Information   
Expectations or preferences are determined to be a players’ decision. At the same 
time, players’ information about the situation is another factor which affects players’ 
choices. In other words, the information of players determines the rules of the game 
(Gardner, 1995). The players, actions, and outcomes are collectively referred to as 
the rules of the game, and the modeler’s objective is to use the rules of the game to 
determine the equilibrium (Rasmusen, 1994). In addition, rules of the game which 
specify who can do what and when technically determine the “game form” 
(Ritzberger, 2002). 
 52
The behaviour of players depends on the opponent’s action, and then the player 
needs to know what the opponent knows about the game and her behaviour. There 
are two main types of factors determining a player’s decisions. One is her 
expectation or preferences; the other is her information about the situation. (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Luce and Raiffa, 1967). Therefore, the 
information of the players determines the rules of the game.  
Games, in which each player knows exactly what has happened in previous moves, 
are called games with “perfect information”. Mycielski (p.42, 1992) defines perfect 
information as “…at each time only one of the players moves, that the game depends 
only on their choices, they remember the past, and in principle they know all possible 
futures of the game.” By contrast, games in which there is some uncertainty about 
previous moves are called games with “imperfect information”(Gardner, 1995). 
Examples of games of perfect information are chess, checkers, hex, nim, go, because 
each player can observe what happened in previous moves. In contrast, poker, 
bridge, kriegsspiel are games of imperfect information (Hart, 1992). Another 
description of perfect information, if player’s information set has just one node 
(move), a player has perfect information, if there is more than one node, a player has 
imperfect information (Mycielski, 1992; Myerson, 1991; Vajda, 1966).   
Table 3.1 Information Categories (Rasmusen, p.45, 1994) 
Information categories Meaning 
Perfect Each information set is a singleton 
Certain Nature does not move after any player moves 
Symmetric No player has information different from other players 
when he moves, or at the end nodes 
Complete Nature does not move first, or his initial move is 
observed by every player 
 
Rasmusen (p.10, 1994) defines that “nature is a pseudo-player who takes random 
actions at specified points in the game with specified probabilities”. For instance, in 
OPEC game, oil producers are players. Passive individuals like the consumers who 
react predictably to oil price changes without any thought of trying to change 
anyone’s behaviour, are not players, but environmental parameters (Rasmusen, 
1994).  
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Games can be complete information or incomplete information games. The term of 
the complete information is defined as “a game is one of complete information if all 
factors of the game are common knowledge. Specifically, each player is aware of all 
other players, the timing of the game, and the set of strategies and payoffs for each 
player”(www.gametheory.net). On the other hand, a game might be “complete 
information game” and “imperfect information game” at the same time. In addition, 
the main assumption of the non-cooperative game is that it studies games of 
complete information (Vego-Redondo, 2003; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996). 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) examine games and its solution in their book as “static 
games of complete information”, “dynamic games of complete information”, “static 
games of incomplete information”, and “dynamic games of incomplete information”. 
3.3.4 Players  
Players are the participants in a game that includes one or more decision makers; a 
decision is made by an individual or a group. However, a group behaves like an 
individual, and each individual decision maker is referred to as a player (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1967). In other words, “players are the individuals who make decisions” and 
“each player’s goal is to maximize her utility by choice of actions.” (Rasmusen, p. 
10, 1994). On the other hand, the number of players in a game is a basic question. 
Games are classified according to the number of participants. If a game has two 
players, it is called a “two-person game”. If a game has “n” participants, game is 
called an “n-person game” (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). In general, a 
player is denoted by i, number of players are denoted by “n”, and set of players is 
symbolized by “ni”.  
Two-person games play a central role in the whole theory of games. Generally, two-
person games are formulated and they have become popular such as the Prisoners 
Dilemma, the Battle of the Sexes, the Stag Hunt, the Hawk-Dowe, the Matching 
Pennies, the Rock Paper Scissors etc. Ritzberger (2002) explains Stackelberg leader-
follower game in an economic problem. This is a duopoly game between two firms; a 
leader firm and a follower firm. Moreover, the game may have more than two 
players. The first player is the leader firm and other “n” firms (n  > 2) are follower 
firms. The leader chooses its output level first. Then followers hear about the leader’s 
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choice. Finally, all followers simultaneously choose their output levels and market 
forces determine the price.   
On the other hand, n-person games and its solutions are a vast area in the theory 
(Nash, 1950a; Shapley, 1953; Rapoport, 1970). Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) indicate that “n-person game” is based on the principle of coalition. Nash 
(1950a) explores equilibrium points in n-person game, and Nash and Shapley (1950) 
study the solution of a three-person game. They formulated the three-person poker 
game and analyzed players’ behaviors.   
3.3.5 Strategies and Payoffs 
Strategy may be defined as a “comprehensive plan of action” (www.gametheory.net). 
Commonly, strategies have two characters; pure strategy and mixed strategy. 
Nevertheless, Selten (1988) defines four strategies; local strategy, behavior strategy, 
pure strategy and mixed strategy. He (1988) defines that “a pure strategy is a special 
behaviour strategy”. In other words, a pure strategy defines “a specific move or 
action that a player will follow in every possible attainable situation in a game” 
(www.gametheory.net). On the other hand, there are many situations in which a 
player’s best behaviour is to randomize when making his/her choice as in the case of 
mixed strategy such as the Matching Pennies Game (Hart, 1992). Selten (p.4, 1988) 
defines a mixed strategy as “a probability distribution over a set of pure strategies”. 
In other words, moves are chosen randomly from the set of pure strategies.  
Pure strategy is denoted πi  and the set of all pure strategies of player i is denoted ∏i 
by Selten (1988). On the other hand, some writers (Rasmusen, 1994; Ritzberger, 
2002) symbolized the pure strategy by si and the set of the pure strategies by Si.  
• Player i’s strategy set or strategy space Si = { si } 
• Si is the set of pure strategies available to player i, si = Si of all players 
i=1,....,n,  and the set of all pure strategies of player i is denoted by ni 
(Ritzberger, 2002; Selten, 1988; Rasmusen, 1994).  
Goals and preferences of players are described as a utility function and every player 
wants to maximize his/her utility (Dutta, 1991). Rasmusen (1994) indicates that the 
term of payoff is used for both the actual payoff and the expected payoff in literature, 
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and he (p. 13, 1994) defines it a “the expected utility player i receives as a function of 
the strategies chosen by himself and the other players”.  
• u=(u1,....un) : S→Rn is the (expected) payoff function.   (3.2) 
There is an outcome in the game and this outcome depends on the strategies chosen 
by each of the players, a phenomenon that is called strategic interdependence. Even a 
bad strategy can win if the opponent chooses a worse one (Gardner, 1995).   
A two-person game in a strategic form of the m x n matrix may symbolically be 
represented as in Table 3.2. For games with only two players, the normal form can be 
represented by two matrices. Player 1’s pure strategies are identified with the rows of 
the matrices and player 2’s pure strategies are identified with the columns of the 
matrices. This is often called a bimatrix game. Additionally, player 1 controls the 
rows and player 2 controls the columns. Matrices simply show the outcomes, 
represented in terms of the players' utility functions, for every possible combination 
of strategies that the players might use (Vego-Redondo, 2003; Eichberger, 1993; 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004).  
A matrix game is a two player game such that (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti, p. 44, 
2000): 
• Player 1 has a finite strategy set S1 with m elements, 
• Player 2 has a finite strategy set S2 with n elements, and 
• The payoffs of the players are functions u1 (s1, s2) and u2 (s1, s2) of the 
outcomes (s1, s2) = S1 x S2 
The matrix game is played as follows: at a certain time player 1 chooses a strategy s1 
= S1 and simultaneously player 2 chooses a strategy s2 = S2, and once this is done 
each player i receives the payoff  ui (s1, s2).  
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Table 3.2 Two-Person Game in a Strategic Form  
  Player 2 
 S21 S22 … S2j … S2n 
S11 φ11 φ12 … φ1j … φ1n 
S 12 φ21 φ22 … φ2j … φ2n 
. . .    . 
. . .    . 
. . .    . 
S1i φi1 φi2 … φij … φin 
. . .    . 
. . .    . 
. . .    . 
 
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
S1m φm1 φm2 … φmj … φmn 
 
The outcome is associated with (S1i, S2j) by φij that results from these choices. The 
outcome (S1i, S2j) of a game is the set of interesting elements that the modeler picks 
from the values of actions, payoffs, and other variables after the game is played out 
(Rasmusen, 1994).  
3.3.6 Equilibrium 
The solution of a game requires discussing the concept of equilibrium. Equilibrium is 
a set of the best strategies. In other words, in equilibrium, each player is playing the 
strategy that is a "best response" to the strategies of the other players. No one has an 
incentive to change his strategy given the strategy choices of the others 
(www.gametheory.net). Gardner (p.55, 1995) defines equilibrium as “ the strategy 
that is a best response to the strategies of the other players”.  
Formally, player i’s best response or best reply to the strategies S-i chosen by other 
player is the strategy S*i that yields her the greatest payoff. The best response is 
strongly best if no other strategies are equally good and weakly best otherwise. In 
addition, “an equilibrium S* = (S*1,……, S*n) is a strategy profile consisting of a 
best strategy for each of the n players in the game” (Rasmusen, p.15, 1994).  
Rasmusen (1994) emphasizes the differences in the concept of equilibrium in game 
theory and in other areas of economics. He (p.15, 1994) indicates “in a general 
equilibrium model, for example, an equilibrium is a set of prices resulting from 
optimal behaviour by the individuals in the economy. In game theory, that set of 
prices would be the equilibrium outcome, but the equilibrium itself would be the 
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strategy profile –the individuals’ rules for buying and selling- that generated the 
outcome”  
The concept of equilibrium has been discussed and developed by game theorists. 
Nash (1950a and 1951) proved “every finite n-person game has an equilibrium point 
(in mixed strategies)”. After that Khun demonstrated that “every finite n-person 
game of perfect information has an equilibrium point in pure strategies” in 1953 
(Hart, 1992; Selten, 1988). Gardner (1995) defines pure and mixed strategy 
equilibrium as “an equilibrium in which every player plays a pure strategy. It is 
called a pure strategy equilibrium whereas an equilibrium in which at least one 
player plays a mixed strategy is called a mixed strategy equilibrium”.  
Several refinements of Nash equilibrium (perfect equilibria, proper equilibria for 
strategic form, and subgame perfect equilibria, sequential equilibria, for extensive 
form) have been developed and discussed to analyze models (Selten, 1965; 
Harsanyi, 1990; Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).  
3.3.7 Solutions of Two-Person Games 
3.3.7.1 Zero Sum Games  
In a two-player zero sum game; what one player wins is what the other loses. The 
term “zero-sum” is used because it is possible to choose the zeros and units of the 
two utility functions so that they always sum to zero (Luce and Raiffa, 1967). 
Therefore this game is also called strictly competitive game (Ritzberger, 2002) or a 
constant sum game (Gardner, 1995). Formalization is given in Definition 3.3 
(Ritzberger, 2002).      
A (finite or infinite) game is strictly competitive if it is a two-player game; Γ = (S1 x 
S2, u1 x u2) satisfying  
u1 (s) ≤ u2 (s’) if and if only u2 (s) ≥ u2 (s’) for all s, s’ = S (3.3) 
In other words, if the payoffs of two players sum to the same constant for all strategy 
combinations, a strictly competitive game occurs. By the expected utility hypothesis 
the constant is arbitrary, so it can be normalized to zero.  
u1(s) + u2 (s) = 0 for all s = S     (3.4) 
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Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) analyzed the solution of two-person, zero-
sum games in non-cooperative game theory. They proposed “minimax theorem” for 
solution of two-person, zero-sum games in non-cooperative game theory. The first 
proof of the minimax theorem was given by von Neumann in 1928. Minimax 
theorem says that “a player should choose probabilities in order to guarantee that her 
expected payoff in the game can never be less than her security level whatever the 
opponent may do” (Binmore, 1996). In other words, the strategies selected by the 
theory must have the property that the resulting utility is the maximum entry in its 
column and the minimum entry in its row (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,1944). 
In general, linear programming approach is used in two-person, zero-sum games 
(Vajda, 1966; Luce and Raiffa, 1967). The concept of transitivity is used in the 
problem of decision under uncertainty in two-person, zero-sum games (Ritzberger, 
2002). For instance, if A is preferred in the paired comparison (A,B) and B is 
preferred to the paired in the paired comparison (B,C), then A is preferred in paired 
comparison (A,C), and this holds for all possible triples of alternatives A, B and C. 
Luce and Raiffa (1967) emphasize the importance of the concept of transitivity 
which is used to solve a two-person game.   
Zero sum games always have a solution. On the other hand, equilibrium concept is 
used to solve the non-zero sum games (Buck, 2004). In general, zero sum games can 
not represent real life situations, because one player wins and other player loses. 
However, both of the players may win or lose, at the same time. Therefore, most 
games of interest in the social sciences are non-zero sum games. 
3.3.7.2 Non-Zero Sum Games 
In a two-player, zero sum game; one player wins whereas the other loses. On the 
other hand, non-zero sum games provide opportunities in which both of the players 
may win and lose, at the same time. Therefore, non-zero sum games are a suitable 
real world situation as a model. For that reason, most games of interest in the social 
sciences are non-zero sum games. The analysis of non-zero sum games (non-strictly 
competitive) is inherently different from that of zero sum games.  Players cannot 
achieve mutual benefit by cooperation in strictly competitive games whereas such 
mutual gain is always a possibility in non-strictly competitive (non-zero sum) games 
(Luce and Raiffa, 1967). 
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The special game is known as the Prisoner's Dilemma which is a two-person and 
non-zero sum game. The popular game is also a non-cooperative game (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1967; Vego-Redondo, 2003) and its scenario goes as follows; two suspects 
are arrested and they are being held in separate cells in jail with no way to 
communicate with one another. Therefore, they cannot communicate and come to an 
agreement. Each of the suspects is confronted with two choices; either to confess to 
the crime or not. If they both confess to the crime then they will both go to jail for 3 
years. If they both do not confess then they will both go to jail 1 year. If one 
confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will receive maximum 
punishment (10 years) and the other player will be free (0). Prisoner’s Dilemma 
payoffs are seen below (Table 3.3) in strategic form. Payoffs are identified with the 
negative of prison years.  
Table 3.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
                    Player (prisoner) 2 
 Confess Not Confess 
Confess -3, -3 0, -10 
 
Player 
(prisoner) 1 Not Confess  -10, 0 -1, -1 
 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we know that confess is a dominant strategy. Namely, 
“confess” is the best strategy for each player, independently of what her opponent 
does. Despite the fact that strategies of “not confess” are better “agreement” for both, 
rational players will always choose “confess”. Thus, they will both end up with 3 
years in prison instead of 1 year. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a symmetric game and it has 
a dominant strategy equilibrium (confess, confess), and equilibrium payoffs are (-3,  
-3). 
3.3.7.3 Dominance 
Dominance approach is used to solve two-person games (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944; Vego-Redondo, 2003). The first important equilibrium concept 
is the dominant-strategy equilibrium. Rasmusen (p.16, 1994) implies that “the 
strategy S*i is a dominant strategy if it is a player’s strictly best response to any 
strategy the other players might pick, in the sense that whatever strategy they pick, 
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her/his payoff is highest with S*i” and he (p.17, 1994) adds that “a dominant strategy 
equilibrium is a strategy profile consisting of each player’s dominant strategy”.  
Mathematically, a strategy si of player 1 in a matrix game is said to (Aliprantis and 
Chakrabarti, p.44, 2000); 
• dominate another strategy sj of player 1 if 
u1 (si, s) ≥ u1 (sj, s)      (3.5) 
• strictly dominate another strategy sj of player 1 if 
u1 (si, s) > u1 (sj, s)      (3.6) 
for each strategy s of player 2. 
Indeed, a dominant strategy solution exists when every player has a dominant 
strategy. However, some games have no dominant (i.e., uniformly best) strategy. For 
this reason, dominant strategy equilibrium approach cannot be used for solving these 
games. Thus, the process of elimination is used to solve these kinds of games. In 
other words, player’s inferior strategies are dominated strategies. For instance, 
solution of the two-player game with dominance approach is seen in the below 
matrix (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 A Strategic Form Game with no Dominant Strategy 
Player II 
 A B C 
X 2, 7 2, 0 2, 2 
Y 7, 0 1, 1 3, 2 
 
 
Player I 
Z 4, 1 0, 4 1, 3 
 
In this matrix, player I and II have three pure strategies: X, Y, Z and A, B, C, 
respectively. Strategy Y gives Player I a strictly higher payoff than Z does. That 
means, strategy Z is strictly dominated. Thus, a “rational” player I should not play Z. 
Furthermore, if player II knows that player I will not play Z, then C is a better choice 
than B. Finally, if player I knows that player II knows that player I will not play Z, 
then player I knows that player II will play C or A, and so player I should play Y. In 
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conclusion, we reach the result that only the profile (Y, C) may (or should) be 
played, because it is the unique outcome. 
This process of elimination is called iterated dominance or iterated strict dominance 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996; Ritzberger, 2002). Some authors use the term “strong” 
instead of “strict” such as strong equilibrium or strongly dominant.   
In a normal form game Γ= (S, u) a pure strategy si = Si of player i (=1,…,n) is 
strictly dominated if there is another strategy s’i = Si such that 
ui(s-i , s’i) > ui(s-i , si), for all s-i = S-i    (3.7) 
A strategy si = Si is undominated if it is not strictly dominated, and it is admissible if 
it is not weakly dominated (Rasmusen, 1994). 
The dominant strategy solution and iterative elimination of dominated strategy 
solution concepts are used to solve strategic form games. When strategies are 
undominated in a game, it could be solved by the Nash equilibrium approach.  
3.3.7.4 Nash Equilibrium 
The central concept of non-cooperative game theory is that of the strategic 
equilibrium (also known as Nash equilibrium or non-cooperative equilibrium) 
(Binmore, 1996; Hilas and Kohlberg, 2002). The concept of strategic equilibrium 
was suggested by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), but it was first defined by 
Nash. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)’s book contains a theory of n-person 
games which is called cooperative, and the theory is based on an analysis of the 
interrelationships of the various coalitions. However, Nash (p.286,1951) asserts that 
“our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalitions in that it is 
assumed that each participant acts independently, without collaboration or 
communication with any of the others” and he (p.288, 1951) defines equilibrium 
points and proves “a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one equilibrium 
point”.  
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium each agent plays the best response to the 
equilibrium strategies of the other agents (Eichberger, 1992). Vego-Redondo (p.44, 
2003) defines a more detailed the theorem; “in every game where there is any finite 
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number of players and these players have only a finite number of pure strategies 
available, some Nash equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies) always exists”. 
If a game has a dominant strategy, it has also Nash Equilibrium. In other words 
“every dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but not every Nash 
equilibrium is a dominant-strategy equilibrium” (Rasmusen, p.24, 1994). Hence, it is 
obvious that the equilibrium of a dominated strategy solution is stronger than Nash 
equilibrium. Buck (2004) illustrates this situation below. According to Figure 3.1, if 
a game consists of a dominant strategy, a game can be solved by dominance (Iterated 
Elimination of Dominated Strategies-IEDS) and Nash equilibrium approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium and Nash equilibrium (Buck, 2004). 
A strategy profile s* is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game if and only if 
(Möbius, 2004), 
• ui(si* , s*-i) ≥ ui(si , s-i*), for all players i and all si = Si   (3.8) 
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is strict if (Möbius, 2004), 
• ui(si* , s*-i) > ui(si , s-i*),       (3.9) 
The Battle of the Sexes and the Matching Pennies are famous two-person games 
which cannot be solved by a dominance approach. The Battle of the Sexes, which is 
given in the matrix below (Table 3.5), has two pure strategy equilibria. A husband 
and wife have agreed to attend a rare entertainment event in the evening. 
Unfortunately, the husband prefers the boxing match while the wife prefers the 
opera. They must decide simultaneously and without communication which event to 
Dominant 
Strategy 
IEDS
Nash 
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attend. A different pure strategy equilibrium is preferred by each player. Thus, this 
game cannot be solved by a dominance approach. On the other hand, a mixed 
strategy equilibrium also exists. Vego-Renondo (2003) shows a third mixed-strategy 
Nash Equilibrium in the Battle of the Sexes game.  
Table 3.5 Battle of the Sexes Game 
     Wife 
 Boxing Opera 
Boxing 3, 1 0, 0 
Opera 0, 0 1, 3 
 
Although, The Battle of the Sexes has two pure strategy equilibria, the Matching 
Pennies has no pure strategy equilibrium. The story of the Matching Pennies is as 
follows; players 1 and 2 simultaneously announce heads or tails. If the 
announcements match (heads-heads or tails-tails), then player 1 gains a util and 
player 2 loses a util. If the announcements differ, it is player 2 who wins the util and 
player 1 who loses. Namely, matching pennies game is strictly competitive. 
Table 3.6 Matching Pennies Game 
     Player 2 
 Heads Tails 
Heads 1, -1 -1, 1 
Tails -1, 1 1, -1 
 
A pure strategy that is undominated by other pure strategies may be dominated by a 
mixed strategy. In addition, in a game without a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, a 
mixed strategy may result in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a mixed strategy 
provides a useful approach for the Matching Pennies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996). 
In other words, every simultaneous move game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed 
strategies. The concept of Nash equilibrium has been developed by game theorists. 
Selten (1965) introduced the idea of refinements of the Nash equilibrium with the 
concept of (subgame) perfect equilibria. Harsanyi (1990) developed the Bayesian 
Player 1 
Husband 
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Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete information in 1967. R. J. Aumann 
proposed the concept of a correlated equilibrium in 1974.  
3.4 Applications of Game Theory to Social Sciences  
Game theory has been applied in many social science fields as a mathematical 
method such as economy, political science (on both the national and the international 
level), international relationship, law, military, sociology, psychology, evolutionary 
biology, computer science and management sciences. After the publication of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) book, game theory has become an increasingly 
important approach for theoretical analysis in the social sciences. Luce and Raiffa 
(1967) indicate that “game theory is one of the first examples of an elaborate 
mathematical development centered solely in the social sciences” and they suggested 
that the theory needed attention from social scientists. 
Game theoretic concepts have been widely used in economy. The other application 
area is military. Game theory is analyzed in decision making under uncertainty, or a 
non-cooperative situation. Therefore, the theory has been used in war scenarios, war 
tactics, attack and defense etc. (Thomas, 1966; Fain and Philips, 1966). O’neill 
(1994) indicates international relations theorists have often used 2 x 2 matrices in 
war scenarios. Furthermore, political choice problem; voting is studied in political 
science (Banks, 2002). Walker (1995) referred to the researches of Shapley and 
Shubik as the earliest applications of game theory to political science. For instance, 
the method of “Shapley Value” was used to determine the power of the members of 
the UN Security Council. 
Game theoretic approach has also been used in biology. Evolutionary game models 
are also commonly utilized within the learning literature. Some advanced 
contributions were publicated in 1950s. Originally game theory was developed as a 
theory of human strategic behaviour based on an idealized picture of rational 
decision making. However, evolutionary game theory does not rely on rationality 
assumptions but on the idea that the Darwinian process of natural selection drives 
organisms towards the optimization of reproductive success (Hammerstein and 
Selten, 1994). 
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3.4.1 Game Theory and Planning  
Although game theory applications in planning are limited in number, they are very 
important studies on location problem in spatial planning (Stevens, 1961; Isard and 
Reiner, 1962; Isard, 1967; Isard and Smith, 1967). Stevens (1961) explored the 
possibility of location strategy in game theory. His paper entitled “An Application of 
Game Theory to a Problem in Location Strategy”, deals with the strategic problem of 
two competitive sellers’ location along a line. Hotelling formulation was used to 
solve this problem as a simple two-person, zero-sum game. Indeed, space and 
location problems are topics in economy. Space is a source of market power. For this 
reason, economy interested in spatial problem such as transportation costs, location 
of consumer, neighbour companies. These studies are often called “location models”, 
which originated in the work of Hotelling in 1929 (Vega-Redondo, 2003).  
Another research that was based on decision theory and location problem was 
published by Isard and Reiner (1962). The objective of this paper (p.25, 1962) was 
“to present a concrete illustration of how these new ideas and approaches in decision 
making can be used for the projection of behavior”.  They explore behaviours of 
industrialists who choose location for investment. Location alternatives are defined 
such as underdeveloped region, outside the country and in the capital city.  
Walter Isard (1967) studied game theoretic approaches in industrial agglomeration. 
His paper “Game Theory, Location Theory and Industrial Agglomeration” 
considered transportation costs such as Webarian location problem. Isard explores 
the location of a large-scale steel plant in alternatives of three regions which desire to 
promote an industrial agglomeration. The selection procedure is an alternating 
leader-follower procedure. Industrial agglomeration is a classical problem in location 
theory and regional science. However, Isard (1967) emphasized the game element 
must also be a basic component of modern-day agglomeration theory and he (p. 10, 
1967) says “it is essential that we understand fully both the conflict and cooperative 
elements present in the interdependent decision situation associated with any given 
agglomeration problem”.   
Location models have been developed by economists, regional scientist and game 
theorists. Gabszewich and Thisse (1992) designed the model to describe spatial 
competition among firms. In this model, a population of consumers is spread out 
over a geographical area, while firms selling a homogeneous product are located in 
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the same space. Firms defined as players, and prices and/or location determined 
strategies in this model. Bagwell and Wolinski (2002) studied industrial organization 
and game theory.  
Game theory, which explains the uncertain situation that many decision makers are 
in, will affect planning discipline in a positive way. Nijkamp (1980) proposed 
negotiations between agents for solving externalities in environmental problems and 
he added that game-theoretic strategies could be used for negotiations. He indicates 
min-max models that the compromise solution for conflicting objectives is based on 
conflicting strategies from game theory. Nijkamp (1980) adds “especially in an 
interactive framework the min-max approach is very appropriate for environmental 
decision models”. He applied the model as a multidimensional approach to 
environmental planning.    
3.4.2 Game Theory and Environmental Problems  
Game theoretic approaches have been used in environmental economics since the 
1960s. Hardin (2000) published a paper called “the Tragedy of the Commons” in 
1968. This famous paper deals with “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”, and 
he applied the Prisoners’ Dilemma to the problem of population growth and natural 
resources. After that, the model of the tragedy of the commons is referred to for 
explanation in many environmental goods problems, and the concepts of the game 
theory are used in environmental economy such as cooperation, rationality, choice 
problem, and utilities (Connelly and Smith, 1999; Benson, 2000). On the other hand, 
game theory applications to environmental problems such as the reduction of 
emissions, water-sharing problems and sustainable development have vastly spread 
since the 1990s. Not only environmental scientists but also regional scientists and 
politicians have become interested in these environmental problems. Ray (2000) 
points out that environmental problem such as the transfrontier pollution are often 
multilateral, and pollution affects all the agents. It is a classical environmental 
problem in economy. The abundance of the agents in environmental problems 
requires interactive decision making, so the game theory is used for the solution of 
such multilateral problems.   
Maler and Zeeuw (1998) examined the costs of emission reductions and the damage 
to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers. Co-operation between countries is 
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important because of transboundary externalities, and the outcomes will depend on 
cooperation. The acid rain differential game is formulated and Markov-perfect Nash 
equilibria solution concepts are derived. The theory is used to analyze the acid rain 
differential game for sulphur between Great Britain and Ireland.  
The purpose of Ray’s (2000) paper also relates to emission reduction problems. A 
simple environmental game between two neighbouring countries which are emitting 
a pollutant is formulated; and the correlated equilibrium for emission levels explores. 
Ray (p.5, 2000) indicates “reducing emission reduces the environmental damage 
cost, but increases the abatement cost. So the countries have to consider the total cost 
of emission”. Ray (2000) discusses the correlation in a non-cooperative situation and 
proposes coalition-proof correlated equilibrium for environmental games.  
Verhoef and Nijkamp (2000) have studied the spatial dimensions of environmental 
policies for transboundary externalities. The performance of taxes both with and 
without optimal policy coordination is considered, and a spatial price equilibrium 
approach is used in the study. Carraro and Topa (1995) also have analyzed taxation, 
industrial organization and environmental innovation by game theoretic approach. 
The paper shows that firms’ innovation decisions are not simultaneous because of 
new technology costs, and there exists socially optimal timing of innovation. These 
incentives have to account for the presence of asymmetric information.  
Krawczyk (1995) has analyzed the dynamic game between the management of 
effluents (Regional Council) and some polluting firms. In the game, polluters are the 
“followers”, whereas the Council is the “leader”. The polluters are supposed to be 
myopic and small; the Regional Council is interested in promoting production, 
collecting taxes, and in a clean environment. Yeung’s (1995) paper also deals with 
pollution management in the industrial sector. In his paper, the industrial sector 
chooses the level of investment to maximize net income and the government imposes 
a tax and uses the tax proceeds for pollution abatement operations. The (subgame 
perfect) feedback Nash equilibrium is used for a solution in the differential game. 
Barret (1998) discusses international environmental agreements by game theoretic 
approach. In the study, international agreements are described as a process (pre-
negotiation, negotiation, ratification, implementation and renegotiation) and the 
process has an outcome. Some important conventions on climate change such as the 
Kyoto Protocol, and the Montreal Protocol are observed for analyzing behaviours of 
 68
signatories. Barret (1998) argues that the minimum participation level on treaty for 
equilibrium, and emphasizes the importance of negotiation which can build an 
optimum strategy for climate change problem among polluter countries. 
Sharing problem of a river as a natural resource is the main study area in 
environmental planning and regional science (Dinar and Wolf, 1994; 
Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldman, 2002; Rogers, 1993; Rogers, 1969). Harshadeep 
(1995) applied cooperative game theory to the water resources problem in 
Subernarekha River Basin, India. The increasing demands of agricultural, industrial, 
domestic water and a shortage of water resources are the main problems in the 
Subernarekha River Basin. The model determines the recommended sizes of the 
dams and canals, optimal cropping patterns, and a level of conservation. Freeman 
(2000) used the game theoretic approach, also for a water-sharing problem according 
to international law in Tigris-Euphrates Basin. Game theory and expected utility 
theory are used to solve the water-sharing conflict among Turkey, Syria and Iraq. 
Other research is about the Tigris-Euphrates River using game theory by 
Kucukmehmetoglu (2004). In the paper, coalition among agents is discussed and 
satisfying the level of each country is demonstrated by using Shapley Value.  
3.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, game theory is examined, and applications of game theory in 
planning and environmental problems are analyzed. In general, game theory is 
analyzed in “interactive decision making process” with more than one decision 
maker. That is to say, decision makers act in an environment where other players’ 
decisions influence their payoffs and every action has a reaction. Moreover, game 
theory analyzes conflicts and cooperation among agents.  
The cooperation of agents to maximize their benefits is a subject examined by the 
game theory. It can be criticized in game theory for the agents to cooperate in order 
to achieve maximum payoff, so in planning this cooperation would end positively for 
public interest. In recent years, the use of game theory for sharing natural resources  
and diminishing pollution is useful for achieving optimum balance for players’ 
benefits; this way the environment would also benefit.  
Problems that are subjects in the game theory and the concepts such as player, 
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strategy, conflict, utility, and cooperation are similar to those of planning. Therefore, 
game theoretic approach will make it easier for the agents to cooperate if the 
conflicts in the planned area are clearly defined. It is possible to achieve cooperative 
bargaining solutions where all agents are winners. Furthermore, decision making 
under uncertainty or decision making in non-cooperative situation is a useful 
approach to planning problems. Actually, the best response for all players is also the 
target of planning. In other words, sustainable development of a river basin depends 
on bargaining where all agents are winners.  
In general, two-person or three-person games are used in problems of planning and 
environment. Additionally, non-zero sum games are more suitable for planning and 
environmental analysis, because one player win does not require that others lose. 
Furthermore, payoffs of both the winner and loser cannot be equal. Therefore, non-
zero sum game is more appropriate for the planning decision making process.  
Basic elements should be determined in a game such as player, information, 
strategies, payoffs, outcomes and equilibrium. The determination of game elements 
will require another analysis, because we do not know which players make which 
decisions and how they affect each others’ strategies. Decision making processes 
determine the form of the games and it helps to understand individual behaviour. 
Thus, we can interpret a player’s move as cooperative or non-cooperative. Public 
institutions are also making decisions about environment and planning, so we have to 
discuses the concept of “expected utility” and “best response”, because each decision 
maker wants to maximize his/her payoffs. In conclusion, the game theory can be 
used by regional scientists and urban planners as an effective approach in decision 
making problem solving. Terms and approaches used in the game theory make it 
easier to analyze the problems in planning and increases analytical skill.  
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4. CASE STUDY: DETERMINATION OF DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
IN THE NILUFER WATERSHED 
Environmental policies have been developed as a result of increasing environmental 
problems; new environmental policies affect planning disciplines. Urbanization and 
industrialization create an increasing demand for fresh water. Therefore, water-
sharing problems cause conflicts among sectors or countries. The water-sharing 
problem and carrying-capacity of water basins have been discussed by planners and 
environmental engineers. Over use of water and pollution are vital problems in a 
drainage basin for sustainability. Therefore, sustainability of a drainage basin 
requires drainage basin planning and management. Hence, a watershed is chosen as a 
case study area. This watershed is the most polluted part of the river.  
In this chapter, the first and second hypotheses of this thesis are explored. The first 
hypothesis is defined in the first chapter as “the abundance of decision makers, who 
decide on environment and planning and who have no cooperation and coordination 
among them cause surface water pollution to increase”. Therefore, first of all, 
decision makers who make decisions about the environment and planning are 
determined. The relationships of the central government and local authorities are 
examined, hierarchically. After that the strategies of decision makers are defined and 
how one strategy affects other strategies is explored. The behaviour of decision 
makers and the decision making process are examined. Players’ preferences and 
priorities are explored, and their effects on water pollution are discussed.  
The second hypothesis is defined as “decision makers have not been abiding by the 
present regulation of discharge, and the present sharing and usage of water as a 
natural resource is not sustainable”. The pollution of the Nilüfer Stream is examined, 
and existence of wastewater treatment plants (both industrial and domestic) in the 
Nilüfer Watershed is explored. Decision making process in planning and permitting 
process for industry are searched in this chapter.  
 71
The results of these surveys are used to develop a game theoretic model. 
Consequently, the concept of conflict, competition and cooperation among players 
are discussed according to the game theory.  
4.1 Definition of the Susurluk River Basin 
4.1.1 Natural and Administrative Borders  
The Susurluk River Basin stretches over 22 399 km2 (8648 mi2) northwest of 
Anatolia. The Susurluk and other river basins of Turkey are shown in Figure 4.1. 
These borders of the river basins are determined by the General Directorate of State 
Hydraulic Works (DSI). However, some borders as defined by the DSİ are not 
always compatible to the existing hydrological borders. The Susurluk River Basin is 
surrounded by the Sakarya River Basin in the east, the Marmara Sea Basin in the 
north, the Aegean Sea Basin in the west and the Gediz River Basin in the south 
(Geographic Map of Turkey, 2004; DSI, 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The Susurluk River Basin and the other River Basins in Turkey (DSI, p 
2, 2000) 
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As the map of Figure 4.1 illustrates, the Susurluk River Basin is the one of the 
biggest river basins in Turkey. The Susurluk River Basin has 22 399 km2 (8648 
sq.mile) area. Reimold (1998) classifies watershed management units such as basin 
(1000-10 000 sq.mile), subbasin (100-1000 sq.mile), watershed (10-100 sq.mile), 
subwatershed (1-10 sq.mile) and catchment (0.05-0.50 sq.mile). According to the 
classification, the Susurluk River Basin is a “basin”, and Reimold (1998) suggests 
state, multi-state or federal planning authority for the management of this type basin. 
On the other hand, local government or multi-local government is suggested for a 
watershed and subwatershed scale.  
The highest mountains are located in the east and the south of the Susurluk River 
Basin; Uludağ (Great Mountain) (2543 m), Tepedağı (2012 m), Eğrigöz Mountain 
(2081 m), Akdağ (2089), and Ulus Mountain (1773 m). There are few plains that are 
located in the north of the basin. The most significant surface waters are the Nilüfer 
Stream, the Orhaneli Stream, the Emet Stream, the Mustafa Kemal Paşa Stream, the 
Simav Stream, the Bombay Stream, the Kille Stream, the Atnos Stream, the Üzümcü 
Stream, the Koca Stream (DSI, 2000; Geographic Map of Turkey, 2004). 
Additionally, there are two wetlands (Manyas and Apolyont) in the basin; they are 
covered by Ramsar Convention (protected wetlands that are bird habitats). These 
wetlands are administrated by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Bursa 
Environmental Report, 2000).  
Although usage of these streams is generally similar (such as domestic, industrial and 
agricultural usage), each stream has a different pollution level (Environmental 
Problems of Turkey, 1991; DSI, 2000). Moreover, the use of water supply coupled 
with poor planning decisions will cause different environmental problems on each 
stream. Therefore, restriction of a case study area is a necessity. In addition, if the 
Susurluk River Basin is analyzed as a whole system, the determination of a decision 
maker becomes difficult. Restriction of a case study area provides the practice for 
analysis of players, strategies and decision making processes. 
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Figure 4.2 The Susurluk River Basin and Jurisdictional Boundaries (DSI, p.3, 2000) 
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Three provinces (Bursa, Balıkesir, Kütahya) are located in the Susurluk River Basin. 
However, the administrative borders of the provinces and the natural border of the 
river basin do not overlap. Hence, some of the districts and municipalities of the 
provinces are outside of the river basin. The Susurluk River System and 
jurisdictional boundaries are given in Figure 4.2.   
28 district municipalities, 1 metropolitan municipality (Bursa), and 91 sub-districts 
municipalities (totally 120 municipalities) are located in the Susurluk River Basin 
(SIS, 2002a). The River Basin’s natural borders are determined by the General 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, but the Regional Directorate of State 
Hydraulic Works’ are not organized in accordance with the natural basin borders. 
The Susurluk River Basin lies under the administration of two different Regional 
Directorates of State Hydraulic Works which are; the 1st Regional Directorate 
(administration area within the borders of Bursa, Kocaeli and Yalova Provinces), and 
the 25th Regional Directorate (administration area within the borders of Balıkesir and 
Çanakkale Provinces) (DSI, 2000).  
4.1.2 Socio-Economic Development  
The Susurluk River Basin is in the south of the Marmara Region which is the most 
developed region in Turkey. Bursa is the biggest city which is located north of the 
river basin. Bursa has been known as an agricultural and commercial center since the 
Ottoman Empire, and industry has grown rapidly since the 1960s. According to the 
data of the State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey’s (SIS), 
Bursa is the third biggest industrial city according to the number of companies and 
workers in Turkey, and it is the fourth city that pays highest value-added tax (SIS, 
1993; SIS, 2002a). The second most important city in the Susurluk River Basin is 
Balıkesir where in addition to agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry has 
developed in recent years. Forestry and mining have developed in Kütahya which is 
the mountainous area in the south of the basin.  
The north of the basin comprises plains and flat places, and is close to the sea port. 
Consequently, agriculture, industrialization and urbanization have developed in the 
north. Forestry and mining have developed in the mountainous south. In conclusion, 
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the north is more developed than the south.  The Susurluk River Basin has been 
polluted as a consequence of industrial and mining activities, and urbanization. 
However, the north of the basin is more polluted than the south (Environmental 
Problems of Turkey, 1991; DSI, 2000).  
4.2 Determination of the Nilüfer Watershed 
The Nilüfer Stream Watershed is chosen as the case study area. Although a water 
basin should be taken as a whole to study, a river basin’s single branch is taken as a 
case study area in order to simplity the analysis. The selected area for the case study 
has approximately 1000 sq.mile, so it can be defined as a subbasin. However, in this 
study, the term “watershed” is prefered. The concept of the watershed is defined as 
“the land area that dains into a stream; or, the elevated boundary line separating 
drainage basins” in the Glossary of Environmental Terms (Yıldırım and Berkmen, 
1991).  
The selected watershed contains most of the Susurluk River Basin’s environmental 
problems. The Nilüfer Stream is more polluted than other streams, because of the big 
industrial city: Bursa (Environmental Problems of Turkey, 1991; Eroğlu, 2004). The 
length of the Nilüfer Stream is approximately 168 km and it is the branch of the 
Susurluk River that flows through the city of Bursa.  
On the other hand, the Orhaneli Stream and the Emet Stream are polluted because of 
mining in Kütahya, the Mustafa Kemal Paşa Stream and the Simav Stream are 
polluted because of agricultural facilities, Manyas Wetland and Apolyont Wetland 
(covered by Ramsar Convention) have lost their biological diversity (DSI, 1984; 
DSI, 2000). These surface waters are left outside the study area, but the Nilüfer 
Stream has also the same environmental problems. Therefore, the case study area 
represents typical environmental problems of the Susurluk River Basin.  The Nilüfer 
Watershed, an arm of the Susurluk River Basin is shown in Figure 4.3. As it is 
clearly seen the natural borders of the river basins do not correspond with 
administrative borders, namely the provincial borders or the district borders.  
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Figure 4.3 The Nilüfer Watershed in the Susurluk River Basin (adapted from DSI, 2000; Geographical Map of Turkey, p 20, 21, 40, 41, 2004; 
Başaran and Bölen, 2004) 
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The Nilüfer Stream is the most polluted water in the Susurluk River Basin. Thus, 
special plans and projects are developed to clean and protect it. Furthermore, there 
are several authorities who measure pollution periodically in the Nilüfer Stream 
(such as the Regional Directorate of DSI, Uludag University, and the Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality). That is the biggest reason for choosing the Nilüfer 
Watershed. Lastly, a shortage of water and pollution cause an increase in conflicts 
and competition among decision makers in the watershed. These conflicts and 
competition provide a clear definition of the decision making process. 
The borders of the Susurluk Basin are determined by the General Directorate of DSI. 
However, the Nilüfer Watershed does not have officially defined borders. Thus, the 
borders had to be determined with the help of topographic data. Although the river 
basin borders depend on climate, geology, topography, soils, flora and fauna, surface 
water and ground water (Teclaff, 1996, Oktay and others, 1997), in this study, only 
topography and surface water were taken into consideration. The geographical 
location of the Nilüfer Stream sub-basin is seen in Figure 4.5, and representation of 
the three dimensional topography in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4. Representation of the Three Dimensional Topography of the Watershed                         
(http://www.bursa-bld.gov.tr/index1.html) 
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A river’s course is generally divided into three parts –the upper, middle, and lower 
courses, each of which have their own particular physical characteristic (Malkina-
Pykh and Pykh, 2003). The Nilüfer Stream has also three parts; an up-stream part, a 
middle part and a down-stream part. The Nilüfer Stream springs from Mount Tepel 
in Kestel district and it flows in the direction of the north-west in a narrow valley 
(DSI, 1984; Geographical Map of Turkey, 2004).  Many branches join from Mount 
Uludağ and the south-west side of the valley. This part is called the up-stream in this 
study. After that, the Nilüfer Stream flows through the narrow valley, and then 
directs to the west at the end of Bursa Plain and passes through the city of Bursa. 
This part is called the middle part. After Cakırkoy Plain, the stream flows within a 
wide valley and joins the Simav Stream which flows to the Marmara Sea. This part is 
the down-stream of the Nilüfer Stream. 
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4.3 Land Use and Environmental Infrastructure in the Watershed 
4.3.1 Settlements 
The Nilüfer Stream and Mount Uludag determine the macroform of Bursa city. 
Mount Uludag sharply borders the south of Bursa. Therefore, urban growth is in the 
north, the easth and the west. Settlements are located alongside the Nilüfer Stream. 
The boundaries of the Bursa Province do not correspond to the natural boundaries of 
the Nilüfer Watershed. However, the Bursa Province contains all of the Nilüfer 
Watershed. Some of the Bursa districts are outside the watershed. Although the 
Province of Bursa has 17 districts and 38 sub-districts, there are only 10 districts (3 
of them metropolitan municipality) and 11 sub-districts in the watershed.  
There has been an increase in the population growth rate within the area due to 
industrial development since 1960s. In 2000, population of the Bursa Province was 
over 2 million and the annual population growth rate was 2,86 %  between 1990 and 
2000 (Figure 4.6).  
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Figure 4.6 Population Growth in the Nilüfer Watershed’s Districts (1990-2000),  
(adapted from SIS, 2002a) 
The annual population growth rate of the metropolitan area, which contains 3 
districts, is 3.59 %. The population density in the province is 204 persons per square 
km. While the population density in Nilüfer district, which is one of the three 
districts of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, is 371 persons/sq.km, and 1085 
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persons/sq.km in Osmangazi district, it is 7504 persons in Yıldırım. 465 out of a total 
of 719 villages in the province have populations below 500, and it is observed that 
most of the villages have a low population (SIS, 2002a). These facts show that 
Bursa’s center is under the pressure of urbanization. 
According to the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan (1998), population has increased in the 
east (Kestel and Gürsu) and the north (Demirtaş) of the Bursa city because of 
industrilazation. However, the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan (1998) restricts the growth 
in the east and the north, because these areas have fertile agricultural land. 
Furthermore, water pollution caused in these areas is carried along to the city of 
Bursa by the Nilüfer Stream.  
Migration is both from the rural area of Bursa and the rural areas of other regions 
because of industrialization. According to the Bursa Environmental Report (2000), 
52262 persons (total population of 4%) moved to another place in Bursa between 
1985 and 1990. That means migration from rural areas of Bursa to the inner city of 
Bursa. Migration have caused unplanned urbanization, unhealthy residential areas, 
and the destruction of green areas. Additionally, transportation is the main problem 
in Bursa city (Bursa, 2003).  
The population growth projections show the number of people who are expected to 
live in the metropolitan area in 2020. Three population growth projections are made 
for Bursa metropolitan area by the Metropolitan Municipality. The first projection is 
made for environmental infrastructure and it shows that 2.26 million people will live 
there. The second projection is made for transportation, and it predicts that the 
population will decrease 1.81 million (Report of Wastewater Master Plan, 2002). 
Lastly, the third projection that is made for the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan estimates 
that 2.8 million people will live in the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and 3.3 
million people will live in the metropolitan area. It is said that approximately 3.3 
million people are expected to live in the Nilüfer Stream Watershed in 2020 (Bursa 
2020 Strategic Plan, 1998).   
Clean water demand depends on population growth. For this reason, domestic 
wastewater also increases. The Water and Sewage Administration of the Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality, which is responsible for water supplies and 
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environmental infrastructure, continues its work with the possibility that its authority 
will be enlarged beyond the metropolitan municipality borders (Report of 
Wastewater Master Plan, 2002). There are sewerage systems in all the settlements 
that have a municipal government, but septic tanks are used in villages. Local 
Agenda 21 - Action Plan of the Blue Nilüfer (1997) that was prepared by Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality claims that leachate waters do not cause ground water or 
soil pollution because of small dosage. 
Urban population is significantly higher than rural population. Therefore, it can be 
interpreted that domestic wastewater of rural areas do not affect the environment as 
much as the domestic wastewater of urban areas. The population of urban and rural 
areas is given in Figure.4.7.   
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Figure 4.7 Populations of Urban and Rural Areas in the Watershed, 2000                   
(adapted from SIS, 2002a) 
The domestic wastewaters of Bursa, Kestel, Demirtaş and Görükle have caused 
pollution in the Nilüfer Stream that is emphasized by the Action Plan of Blue Nilüfer 
(1997). None of the settlements have a wastewater treatment plant except the Bursa 
metropolitan city.  The Bursa metropolitan city, which has more population density 
in the watershed, has only a common treatment system for domestic wastewater, and 
the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has received the European Bank Credit to 
develop and rehabilitate two current treatment plants and sewerage systems. 
Unfortunately, the others settlements’ domestic wastewaters are discharged directly 
into the Nilüfer Stream or its branches (Report of Wastewater Master Plan, 2002, 
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Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 1998). Land use of 
the Nilüfer sub basin is given in Figure 4.8.   
The other important environmental problem is the sanitary landfill of domestic solid 
waste. Its leachate causes ground water pollution. The domestic solid waste of 
settlements of Bursa and Demirtas has been stored in sanitary landfills. Leachate is 
collected by drainage canals. Collected leachate waters are treated and then 
discharged to the sewerage system. On the other hand, unfortunately, domestic 
wastes of other settlements spill out imprudently onto the natural environment. 
Moreover, Gürsu solid waste dump site is close to an irrigation canal. Therefore, the 
surface water and the ground water are polluted (Action Plan of Blue Nilüfer, 1997).  
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Figure 4.8 Land Use in the Nilüfer Watershed (Başaran, 2003; Başaran and Bölen, 2004) 
 85
4.3.2 Industry 
Bursa has tried to integrate with world trade (especially the textile sector) since the 
Ottoman period (Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, 2003). Small companies were 
developed after the 1950s, and two big public textile factories were established in 
Bursa. The Bursa Organized Industrial District (BOSAB) was the first Organized 
Industrial District of Turkey established in 1961. The government has encouraged 
industrial development with “The South-East Marmara Development Project”. The 
main objective of the project was to decentralize industry and population from 
Istanbul. Due to the low land prices and low wages, proximity to Istanbul, and 
transportation facilities, industries have developed rapidly in Bursa since the 1960s, 
and not only in the textile but also automotive and food sectors (Bursa Province, 
1982).   
Today, Bursa is the third largest industrial city in Turkey. The number of employee 
shows this situation. In central Bursa, the share of industrial sector was 51%, the 
service sector was 45%, and agriculture was 4% (Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, p.67, 
1998). Municipalities, which have industrial facilities are economically developed, 
whereas undeveloped areas with geographical barriers have no industry. Gross 
national income share and development per capita by districts of Bursa are given in 
Table 4.1. As the table show, the District Municipalities of the Metropolitan 
Municipality (Nilüfer, Osmangazi, and Yıldırım) have the highest percentage of 
gross national product in the watershed. The districts of Mustafa Kemal Paşa and 
Karacabey follow these districts. The south of the watershed, which has mountainous 
areas, has not developed economically.   
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Table 4.1 Gross National Income Share and Development Index in the Districts of 
Bursa (www.bursa.gov.tr) 
Districts of 
Bursa 
Gross National Income 
Share per Capita ( % ) 
Development  
Index 
Nilüfer * 1.08 15 
Osmangazi * 0.77 27 
Yıldırım * 0.48 48 
M.K.paşa** 0.29 85 
İnegöl 0.27 92 
Gemlik 0.26 95 
Karacabey* * 0.25 101 
Orhangazi 0.18 134 
Mudanya ** 0.12 154 
Gürsu *** 0.08 232 
Yenişehir 0.08 233 
Kestel *** 0.07 252 
İznik 0.07 270 
Orhaneli*** 0.04 370 
Keles*** 0.03 426 
Harmancık 0.02 502 
Büyükorhan 0.02 503 
  *   Districts of the Metropolitan Municipality 
 **  These districts in the down-stream of the Nilüfer Watershed.  
*** These districts in the up-stream of the Nilüfer Watershed. 
        Other dirticts are not located in the watershed 
 
There are 6 organized industrial districts and 2 industrial areas in the watershed (see 
in Figure 4.8). There are 2 more organized industrial districts and 9 industrial areas 
that are under construction. The BOSAB, which is located in the Metropolitan 
Municipality, has 176 firms and 35 000 workers. Nevertheless, a common 
wastewater treatment plant was built in 1998 (www.bosab.org.tr). The Demirtaş 
Organized Industrial District (DOSAB), which is located outside the Metropolitan 
Municipality, was established legally in 1990 in the watershed. However, 
industrialization has developed in this region since 1968, because a great investor is 
(called Tofaş Automotive) located in this area.  
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Today, 26 000 workers work in the Demirtaş Organized Industrial District. It has no 
wastewater treatment plant (www.dosab.com.tr). The existence of common 
wastewater treatment plants in Organized Industrial Districts is given in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 The existence of Common Wastewater Treatment Plants in the Organized 
Industrial Districts,  (adapted from Başaran and Bölen, 2004; Bursa Environmental 
Report, 2000, Dünya, 2004a) 
 Organized 
industrial 
districts 
Establishment 
date  
Number of 
companies 
Common 
wastewater 
treatment plant 
1 Bursa  1963 171 Exsit-1998 
2 Demirtaş  1990 255 Building  
3 Nilüfer  2001 116 Non-existent   
4 Gürsu  2001 59 Non-existent   
5 Hasanağa  2003 32 Non-existent   
6 Kestel 2004 170 Non-existent   
 
There are many factories – 89 leather and 69 textiles- which are separately located in 
Bursa. These factories only remove some of the solids from the waste water before it 
is discharged into the Nilüfer Stream (Action Draft of Blue Nilüfer, 1997). The Bursa 
Master Plan, which was appoved in 1995, restricted the spatial expansion of these 
factories. Additionally, moving the leather industy from the inner city to the outside 
of metropolitan area is decided by the Bursa Strategic Plan. The organized industrial 
district is being built for leather firms that move from center to industrial area (Bursa 
2020 Strategic Plan, 1998; Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, 2003).   
On the other hand, there are textile plants in Kestel and Gürsu which are located on 
the up-stream. The Kestel Municipality and the Barafaki Sub-District Municipality 
have planned new industrial areas (Kestel 190 ha, Barafaki 130 ha) in the up-stream 
(Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 1998). Although Kestel has domestic wastewater 
treatment, it does not work efficiently. The Cooperative, which aims to build a 
common wastewater treatment plant for industrial and domestic wastewater of 
Gürsu, Barafaki and Kestel, was established by the Bursa Provincial Government 
(Action Plan of Blue Nilüfer, 1997). Furthermore, the industrial area of Kestel was 
accepted to be an organized industrial area in 2004, but it has no environmental 
infrastructure (Dünya, 2004a).    
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The Bursa Environmental Report (2000) determines that 588 plants are established in 
Bursa Province (Table 4.3). 50 % of the plants are textile and leather industries 
which are in need of fresh water and they cause water pollution. 58,5 % of the 
establishments in Bursa Province do not have a wastewater treatment plant. Both 
public and private companies in Bursa Province and their individual wastewater 
treatment plants are given in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Private and public companies’ wastewater treatment plants in Bursa, 1998 
Bursa Environmental Report, p.71, 2000 
Number of companies  Number of companies which 
have insufficient wastewater 
treatment  
Sectors 
Sum Public Private Sum Public Private 
Food 205 8 197 187 8 179 
Textile 128 2 126 59 - 59 
Paper 3 - 3 - - - 
Leather 162 - 162 58 - 58 
Petrol 12 - 12 - - - 
Chemistry 5 - 5 5 - 5 
Cement, soil 13 - 13 - - - 
Fertilizer 2 1 1 2 1 1 
Mine 10 - 10 10 - 10 
Glass 2 - 2 - - - 
Energy 2 2 - - - - 
Metal 4 1 3 - - - 
Forest 16 - 16 - - - 
Machine, 
automotive 
24 - 24 23 - 23 
SUM 588 14 574 344 9 335 
 
On the other hand, the Action Plan of Blue Nilüfer (1997) determined that 254 plants 
are discharged to the Nilüfer Stream or the sewerage system of Bursa city. Most of 
the plants have no wastewater treatment system that is known. Due to the increasing 
production costs, the existing ones are not working effectively (Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality, 2004; Bursa Environmental Report, 2000). According to SIS data 
(1998), there were only three plants which had discharge licences in Bursa in 1992. 
Therefore, many factories are discharged without treatment to surface water in the 
watershed. Furthermore, some factories’ wastewaters pump up ground water and that 
causes ground water pollution (www.buski.gov.tr). The quantity of industrial effluent 
and its discharge destinations are given in Table 4.4.    
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Table 4.4 Quantity of industrial effluent and its discharge destinations in Bursa, 
1992 (adapted from SIS, 1998) 
Sewerage System  6 946 738 m3/year 
Sea 9 386 592 m3/year 
Lake 2 138 000 m3/year 
River 14 387 086 m3/year 
Land 18 800 m3/year 
Septic tanks  240 374 m3/year 
Sum 33 626 375 m3/year 
 
Another main problem is the lack of environmental inventory. The Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality and the Provincial Directorate of Environment and 
Forestry emphasize that industrial investors do not declare the correct information 
about the quantity of wastes (Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; Report of 
Wastewater Master Plan, 2002).  
In recent years, unplanned industrial areas around Bursa are increasing. As planned 
industrial areas are fully occupied and price of industrial land is high, investors 
choose settlements where land is cheaper. Industrial companies are willing to be 
close to these settlements, thus they choose to be close to Bursa (Bursa 2020 
Strategic Plan, 1998). As industrilization increases, conflicts on the use of natural 
sources such as agricultural land and fresh water rise between industry and 
agriculture.  Districts of the city consider industry as a step towards development and 
progress; therefore they want industrial terrains within their territory.  
4.3.3 Agriculture  
Although the number of people employed in agriculture is low, Bursa is one of the 
major agricultural cities in Turkey according to agricultural income. Agricultural 
products have always been considered important for the economy of Bursa city 
because of fertile lands. The income of Bursa from different sectors in Turkey is 
given in Table 4.5. While Bursa is the third city in the manufacturing sector, she is 
the thirteenth city in the agricultural sector.  
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Table 4.5 Bursa’s Income from some Sectors in Turkey (www.bursa.gov.tr) 
Sectors Share of Bursa 
Province ( % ) 
Rank within Turkey  
Manufacture 5.9 3 
Construction 3.4 4 
Commerce 2.4 5 
Mining 2.5 8 
Agriculture 2.2 13 
 
The industrial and service labour forces are increasing in contrast to the agricultural 
labour force which is decreasing (SIS, 1993; SIS, 2002a). When sector share is 
analyzed on a metropolitan level, an increase in agriculture has been observed since 
1970. In 1970, the share of agriculture was 30% - 40% in the districts and in 1990 
this value decreased to 20%- 25% (Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 1998). Despite this 
fact improvement in irrigation possibilities, technological innovation, and marketing 
have increased the agricultural products and the income gained from them. The 
increase in agricultural products, which is given in Figure 4.10, depends on the 
development of agricultural industries. Bursa has over seventy factories which 
produce agricultural products such as fruit juice, and tomato sauce.  
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Figure 4.10 Increasing Agricultural Products in Bursa (1980 – 1996),                     
(SIS, 1982; SIS, 1998) 
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The Karcabey district, which is located down-stream, has the highest number of 
agricultural products (except fruit) in the watershed. Additionally, the plains of Bursa 
and Çakırköy, which are located in the middle part, are very fertile. If they have 
efficient irrigation, there can be three harvests a year. However, the Nilüfer Stream 
cannot be used for irrigation because it is polluted (Bursa Environmental Report, 
2000). The thirty-five percent of agricultural lands in Bursa have irrigation 
possibilities. There are two dams and two ponds (Demirtaş Dam, Gölbaşı Pond, 
Burcun Pond, Hasanağa Dam see in Figure 4.8) and four new irrigation projects. 
However, the Plains are being negatively affected by urbanization and 
industrialization (Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 
1998). Furthermore, each plain has wealthy ground water resource, and they are 
threatened by industrialization.  
On the other hand, the most important pollutant, besides the settlements and 
industries in the watershed, is agricultural facilities. Chemical pollution and 
pesticides are not measured in the watershed, but the General Directorate of State 
Hydraulic Work research (DSI, 2000) indicated that the irrigation water which 
rejoins the water cycle system is already polluted. 
4.4 Usage of Water in the Nilüfer Watershed 
According to the surveys (DSI, 1984; DSI, 2000), consumption of fresh water has 
increased in the watershed due to industrial development and population growth. It 
can be stated that supplying fresh water and sharing it among domestic, agricultural 
and industrial usage are two main problems in the watershed. The consequences of 
the economic impact of existing water pollution in the watershed are very interesting. 
The first problem is supplying clean water and providing it to all sectors. This 
problem is solved in a short time and in a particular way. There is one point on which 
all stakeholders agree; that is the protection of the dam which provides potable water 
for Bursa city. The ground water is reserved for industrial use and ponds are built for 
agricultural use. The treatment expense of industrial and domestic wastewater is 
saved. On the other hand, according to SIS data (2002b), 30% of the agricultural land 
of Bursa was being irrigated by the stream and its branches.   
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There are dams, ponds and water channels which have been under construction since 
the 1970s. 6 irrigation projects, 1 pond (Gölbaşı), 1 dam in order to supply drinking 
water in 1985 (Doğancı 1) and 2 dams for irrigation (Hasanağa, İznik) were built by 
the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works in 1979. Pollution of the Nilüfer Stream 
creates an increasing demand on ground water. A shortage of fresh water causes 
competition among settlements, industry and agriculture. There was a conflict 
between industry and agriculture because of ground water usage in Demirtaş. 
Therefore, the Demirtaş dam was built for irrigation purposes. As a result, the ground 
water of Demirtaş can only be used for industrial plants. Flood control of surface 
water and changing the direction of the stream are two of the projects that are applied 
by the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works in the watershed. Dams and canal 
projects for irrigation are especially considered for the other branch of the Susurluk 
basin (Emet, Orhaneli) (DSI, 1984; DSI, 2000). 
Table 4.6 Usage of Ground Water in the Bursa Plain (DSI, 2000) 
 Purpose of the 
ground water  
usage  
Quantity of 
usage  
hm3/year 
Percent of 
usage 
% 
Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality 
Domestic 33 28 
Industries Industrial 36 31 
Villagers Irrigation 43 36 
Demirtaş Subdistrict 
Municipality 
Domestic + 
industrial 
6 5 
SUM  118 100 
28 % of the ground water is provided for the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality for 
drinking and domestic water, 31% is supplied for the industrial waters, 36% is used 
for irrigation, and 5% is provided for the Demirtaş Sub-District Municipality for 
drinking and industrial water (see Table 4.6). Although the Regional Directorate of 
State Hydraulic Works does not give new permission for the usage of ground water, 
the usage of ground water is increasingly illegal (Bursa Environmental Report, 
2000); according to the same Report, the increase of new industries in up-stream 
(Gürsu district) causes negative environmental effects such as water pollution.  
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4.5 Water Pollution in the Nilüfer Stream 
Some physical, chemical, and bacteriologic parameters are used for the 
determination of water pollution. For instance, color, temperature, total dissolved 
solids are physical parameters. Chemical parameters divide into two parts such as 
organic and inorganic parameters. Biochemical oxygen demand and chemical 
oxygen demand are organic chemical paremetres, whereas hardness, Ph, iron, 
manganes, sulfhate, and orthophosphate are inorganic chemical parameters (Uslu, 
1993). These parameters indicate water pollution levels. According to the Regulation 
of Water Pollution Control (2004), high qualified 1st class waters; drinking water can 
be used for recreational, fishing and other purposes. 2nd class less polluted water can 
be used as drinking water after a treatment, as well as fishing, recreational watering, 
and in all activities which do not require 1st class water. 3rd class polluted water can 
be used as industrial waters (excluding textile and food industries) after a suitable 
treatment method. 4th class polluted waters cannot be used for any purpose. On the 
other hand, the classification and protection of surface waters are not sufficient 
according to the Regulation of Water Pollution Control. Pollution parameters are 
measured in a water resource according to the Regulation. However, pollution should 
be evaluated not only for water resource but also for whole drainage basin (Baykal 
and et al., 1997).     
4.5.1 Regulations of Effluent Standards  
There are three authorities that control wastewater quality standards in the watershed. 
The Regulation of Water Pollution Control was accepted by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry in 1988. This Regulation was reconsidered in 2004. The 
effluent (wastewater discharge) standards for domestic and industrial discharges have 
been determined in the Regulation of Water Pollution Control (2004). Industrial 
effluent standards are identified according to sectors (such as textile, food, mining 
etc.). According to the Regulation (2004), all wastewater discharges –industrial and 
domestic- have to suit these standards, but the Metropolitan Municipalities’ areas are 
exceptions.  
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Secondly, the effluent standards of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipalities are 
determined by the Regulation of Metropolitan Municipalities Wastewater Discharge 
(The Regulation of Water Pollution Control, 2004). Standards are divided into two 
parts; pretreatment (discharge to a sewerage system) and disposal in nature in 
accordance with the Regulation. The Metropolitan Municipalities can accept a low 
quality of pretreatment standard because they aim to build a wastewater treatment 
plant at the end of the sewerage system. Thirdly, effluent standards are controlled by 
Aquatic Products Law (Law no, 1380, 1973). Effluent standards are high according 
to this Law, because it evaluates water quality by taking only aquatic life into 
consideration. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs evaluates all surface 
water according to Aquatic Products Law. All three authorities can give “discharge 
licenses” to an investor according to their regulations.  
On the other hand, the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) is 
another authority that responds to conserve ground water and drinking water basin 
(Law no: 167, 1960; http://www.dsi.gov.tr/mission.htm). It has no effluent standards 
or effluent regulation, but it can regulate drinking water basins. 
The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, the Provincial Directorate of Environment and 
Forestry, the Regional Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, the Provincial 
Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and the University of Uludag have 
studied the water pollution in the Nilüfer Stream. Additionally, the Provincial 
Directorate of Health has also analyzed stream water for public health. However, 
these studies are not coordinated. In this study, the surveys of the DSI are used.   
4.5.2 Analyses of Pollution of the Nilüfer Stream  
The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) has observed the water 
quality in the Nilüfer Stream between 1979 and 1982; a study called “Research of 
Water Resource Pollution in Bursa Region” was published in 1984. This study 
includes only physical and chemical parameters. Bacteriologic parameters and 
fertilizers were not measured, because the DSI and the Ministry of Health could not 
be coordinated (DSI, 1984). Parameters were evaluated as the lowest value, the 
highest value and average value, but the water quality was not classified. The second 
survey is between 1998 and 1999 which is called “Water Quality Management in 
 96
Susurluk River Basin” (2000). The second survey contains more sampling points, 
and more water pollution parameters than the first. Additionally, results of the 
measurements were classified according to the Water Pollution Control Regulations 
(2004) in the second one.        
Although four (N1, N2, N3, N4) sampling points were chosen in the first survey 
(1984), there were twenty-one sampling points in the second research (2000). Thus 
the results of four (4) stations can be compared. These stations are shown in Figure 
4.11. The “N1” station is before the Doğancı Dam that supplies drinking and 
domestic water to the Bursa metropolitan area. The “N2” station is after the Bursa 
residential area. The “N3” station is after industrial and residential areas which are 
up-stream.  The “N4” station is at the end of the Bursa metropolitan area. The last 
measurement point (N4) shows cumulatively the pollution of up-stream and middle 
stream. After the last sampling point (N4) polluted stream flows down stream 
through the agricultural areas.    
As the survey (DSI, 1984) results of the years 1979-1982 are investigated, it is 
possible to say that the surface water used to flow quite clean from the spring to 
Bursa; but quantity of suspended solids, ammonium nitrogen, iron was seen take 
over standard values because of erosion and structure of solids (see Table 4.7).  
Although Bursa has a domestic wastewater treatment system, the pollution in the 
surface water started mainly due to the Bursa sewerage wastewaters. After the 
domestic wastewater discharge to the surface waters, the water quality became 4th 
class according to the physical parameters (DSI, 1984). First survey shows that the 
quantity of ammonium nitrogen, nitrate, biochemical oxygen demand, and 
orthophosphate increases from N1 to N2 (Table 4.7). These values indicate the 
negative effects of the Bursa domestic wastewater (DSI, 1984).  
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Table 4.7 The Values of Measured Parameters, 1st Survey (adapted from DSI, 1984 
and Regulation of Water Pollution Control, Table 1, 2004) 
Sampling Points Parameters of water 
quality 
Unit 
N1 N2 N3 N4 
A-Physical and Inorganic Chemical Parameters 
Q Stream flow m3/sn 8,256 3,16 15,66 24,68 
T  Water 
temperature 
oC 12,6 15,2 13,3 15,6 
pH - - 8,2 8,2 7,9 7,8 
EC Electrical 
conductivity 
μmhos/c
m 
388 461 539 573 
TDS Total dissolved 
solids 
mg/l 299 441 - - 
SS Suspended 
solids 
mg/l 61 108 148 160 
Cl Chloride mg/l 3,2 6,3 29,0 30,7 
NH3-N Ammonium 
nitrogen 
mg/l 0,45 2,7 5,68 3,37 
NO2-N Nitrite  mg/l 0,009 0,278 0,30 0,297 
NO3-N Nitrate  mg/l 0,36 0,482 0,786 0,78 
DO Dissolved 
oxygen 
mg/l 10,3 10,3 7,2 5,8 
SO4 Sulfate mg/l - - - - 
Na Sodium mg/l 4,7 - - - 
B- Organic Parameters 
M-Al Total alkalinity mg/l 
CaCO3 
168,7 209 201,1 217,6 
P-Al Phenolphthalein mg/l 
CaCO3 
6,9 10,1 2,34 3,26 
pV Permanganate 
value 
mg/l 2,19 8,6 9,98 15,6 
BOD5 Biochemical 
oxygen demand 
mg/l 1,5 3,8 11,4 12,8 
TH Total hardness mg/l 
CaCO3 
172 185 181 200 
o-PO4 Orthophosphate mg/l 0,057 0,88 0,656 1,0 
COD Chemical oxygen 
demand 
mg/l - 37,8 53,6 58,2 
C- Inorganic Parameters 
Fe Iron mg/l 1,97 - - - 
Mn Manganese mg/l 0,03 - - - 
K Potassium mg/l 1,1 - - - 
Ca Calcium mg/l 40,8 - - - 
Mg Magnesium mg/l 20,2 - - - 
B Boron mg/l - - - - 
D- Bacteriologic Parameters  
 Fecal Coliform EMS/ mg/l - - - - 
 Total Coliform EMS/ mg/l - - - - 
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Before the N3 sample point, industrial wastewater of Demirtaş, Kestel, Gürsu and 
one of the main collectors of Bursa sewerage system, and main irrigation discharge 
channel of Bursa plain join the Nilüfer Stream. The quantity of ammonium nitrogen, 
nitrate, and orthophosphate were measured over the standards in N3 whereas 
biochemical oxygen demand values were not measured high. This situation can be 
explained by industrial wastewaters which contain heavy metals and toxic matters 
(DSİ, 1984).  
Finally the wastewater of the BOSAB is discharged to the Ayvalı stream which is the 
branch of the Nilüfer Stream before the N4 sample point. The Ayvalı Stream’s 
natural flows are dried up, so only industrial wastewaters flow in summer time.  The 
measured value of chemical oxygen and orthophosphate in N4 point shows industrial 
pollution. After the N4 point, the Nilüfer Stream is used for agricultural facilities. 
However the Nilüfer stream is not suitable for irrigation and animal husbandry 
according to the value of ammonium nitrogen, biochemical oxygen demand, 
orthophosphate, and chemical oxygen (DSI, 1984).  
The survey (DSI, 2000) results of the years 1998-1999 show no significant difference 
in the water quality of the stream from the Doğancı Dam which supplies fresh water 
to Bursa. The sampling point “001”(N1 in the first survey) shows that surface water 
is 2nd water quality according to A and B parameters, and 3rd water quality according 
to D parameter. The changing of water quality according to A (physical), B (organic) 
and D (microbiological) parameters are given in Figure 4.12.  
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After the Bursa sewerage discharge to the stream the water quality becomes 4th class 
according to A and B parameters, and 2nd class according to D parameter in the N2-
130 sampling points. When the waters do not leave the dam, the stream seems like a 
wastewater channel. When the industrial wastewater joins the stream, the water 
quality moves beyond the 4th class in the stations 040 and 004 (N3 and N4 in the first 
survey) according to the A, B and D parameters. After the 040 sampling point stream 
seems like a wastewater channel every season (DSI, 2000). 
It is compared pollution values taken at eighteen year intervals to see the impact of 
the developments that took place in the area. Results of both surveys are classified 
according to the Regulation of Water Pollution Control, and the Quality Criteria of 
Inland Water (see in Table 4.8).   
Table 4.8 Changing the Classification of the Nilüfer Stream Water                      
(adapted from Başaran, 2003; Başaran and Bölen, 2004; DSI, 1984; DSI, 2000, 
Regulation of Water Pollution Control, Table 1, 2004) 
Station T pH TDS Cl NH3-N NO2-N NO3-N DO 
N1 1-1 2-3 1-1 1-1 x-2 2-4 1-1 x-1 
N2 1-1 2-1 1-2 1-2 x-4 4-4 1-1 x-1 
N3 1-1 1-4 x-2 2-2 x-4 4-4 1-1 x-2 
N4 1-1 1-1 x-2 2-3 x-4 4-4 1-1 x-2 
  BOD5 o-PO4 SO4 Fe Na T-coli CN COD
N1 1-2 x-2 x-1 3-3 x-1 x-2 x-1 4 
N2 1-4 x-4 x-1 x-3 x-3 x-1 x-4 2-4 
N3 3-4 x-4 x-1 x-3 x-1 x-2 x-4 2-4 
N4 3-4 x-4 x-1 x-3 x-3 x-1 x-4 2-4 
x ; the parameters were not measured between 1979 and 1982.                                   
First value is classification in 1984 and second value is classification in 2000.   
The results of the surveys indicate that the pollution rate is increasing in the Nilüfer 
Stream except for the Doğancı Dam. It is possible to say that biological balance is 
totally destroyed in the stream, as well as biological diversity. The Nilüfer stream is 
the most polluted part of the Susurluk River System. Dissolved oxygen value was 
measured as zero in most of the sampling points in second survey. The Nilüfer 
stream has become an open channel which carries the wastewater of Bursa through 
the Simav Stream to the Marmara Sea. In conclusion, the whole region suffers deeply 
from water pollution (DSI, 1984; DSI, 2000).  
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4.6 Planning Process in the Nilüfer Watershed 
4.6.1 Decision Making Process  
There are many authorities which make decisions on planning and environmental 
issues in the watershed. These decision makers (both central administration and local 
authorities) and the hierarchical relationships between are given in Figure 4.13 
All provincial directorates and regional directories are coordinated by the Local 
Environment Council (see in Figure 4.13). The council applies decisions of the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry. The Provincial Governor is the president of 
the Council, and all provincial authorities of ministries, the mayor of the 
metropolitan municipality, the chamber of industry, the chamber of agriculture and 
the Provincial Gendarmerie Command are members of the Council (Law no: 4856, 
2003).  Furthermore, ministries are coordinated by the Superior Environmental 
Council.  
There are abundant authorities for monitoring, controlling and permitting. For 
example, if industrial investments are located in a metropolitan municipality area, the 
Metropolitan Municipality controls them with the exception of food sectors which 
are controlled by the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs. If industrial investments are outside the borders of the Metropolitan 
Municipality, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and the Ministry of Health 
control them. Controlling contains many processes such as environmental impact 
process, opening license, discharge license, emission license etc. Decision makers 
according to industrial location alternatives are given in Figure 4.14.  
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Figure 4.13 Public Authorities and their Relationships (Başaran, 2003; Başaran and Bölen, 2004) 
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The Regulation of Unhealthy Establishment (1995) classifies industrial plants as 
first, second, and third class. According to this classification; first class plants within 
the borders of a metropolitan municipality would receive their operational permits 
from the metropolitan municipality, otherwise they would receive it from the 
Ministry of Health. Second and third category plants would receive their licences 
from district municipalities, if they locate in district municipalities borders; otherwise 
they would get them from the Provincial Directorate of the Ministry of Health. The 
Commission of Unhealthy Establishment Licence (opening licence) includes 
members from the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry, the Governor 
of District, District Municipality, other members that the Ministry of Health finds 
necessary (Regulation, 1995).  
A discharge license is supplied by the metropolitan municipality if the plant is within 
city boundaries or by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry if otherwise.  In 
particular areas inspected by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, discharge 
licences are supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (Regulation of 
Water Pollution Control, 2004; Law no:5216, 2004; Law no:1380, 1973). 
The Regulation of Industrial Air Pollution Control (2004) divides industrial plants 
into two categories; A and B. A category receives permits from the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry while B category is permitted through the Provincial 
Directorate of Environment and Forestry, and the Provincial Government. 
Furthermore, according to the Regulation of EIA (Regulation, 2003), plants are 
classified into two categories. The first category is evaluated by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry while the second category is evaluated by the Provincial 
Directorate of Environment and Forestry, and the Provincial Government.  
In 2004, the Law on Metropolitan Municipalities was reorganized (Law no:5216, 
2004). It anticipated that with this law the Metropolitan Municipality of Bursa will 
enlarge its area of coverage. This way several organized industrial districts 
(Demirtaş, Batı, Gürsu and Leather Organaized Industrial Districts) and industrial 
areas will come under the authority of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality (Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality, 2004). This situation will effect the decision making 
process and will also strengthen the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality as the planning 
body.  
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 Figure 4.14 Decision Makers according to Industrial Location Alternatives 
E.I.A. 
Process 
Discharge 
permission 
Opening 
permission 
Building 
permission 
Planning 
decision 
 
Industrial 
Investor 
 
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Forestry  
Organized 
Industrial District 
in Metropolitan 
Municipality 
Industrial  
Area in 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
Industrial Area 
in a District or 
Sub-District 
Municipality 
 
Unplanned area  
 
Authority of 
Organized 
Industrial 
District 
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Forestry  
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Forestry  
Authority of 
Organized 
Industrial 
District 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
 
Metropolitan 
or District 
Municipality  
 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
 
Metropolitan 
or District 
Municipality  
 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
 
District 
Municipality  
 
District 
Municipality  
 
Ministry of 
Health or 
District 
Municipality  
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Forestry  
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Forestry  
Ministry of 
Public Works 
and Settlement or 
District 
Municipality  
Ministry of 
Health or 
District 
Municipality  
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Forestry  
Ministry of 
Public Works 
and Settlement or 
District 
Municipality  
Location 
Alternatives 
 106
The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, is also responsible for preparing and 
approving “environmental structure plans” on 1/25 000 scale (Law no: 3194, 1985). 
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry and Metropolitan Municipalities are other 
authorities which respond to the environmental structure plans. Implementation plans 
are prepared and approved by the district municipalities and the provincial 
government (Law no: 2872, 1983; Law no: 4856, 2003; Law no: 5216, 2004). The 
Bursa Metropolitan Municipality was established in 1987 and it contains three 
districts.  Decision makers who decide about land use planning, and their authority 
areas are shown in Figure 4.15. 
Besides all these different authorities, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources have authority for preparing master plans. There are many archeological 
and natural sites in the watershed –there are 10 natural preserved areas-, so the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism responds to land use decisions in these areas. The 
part of the Nilüfer Stream which is inside the Metropolitan Municipalities is a 
preserved area (Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; Law no: 2872, 1983).  In 
addition, industrial areas such as organized industrial districts or industrial regions 
are planned by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Regulation of Industrial 
Regions, 2004).  
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Figure 4.15 Decision Makers about Land Use Planning and their Authority Areas (Başaran, 2003; Başaran and Bölen, 2004) 
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4.6.2 Strategic Planning Decisions  
The first master plan (1/25 000) for Bursa’s city centre was made in 1976. In 1992, 
1/25000 scaled Coastal Plan which covers the Nilüfer Stream bank up to the seafront 
and the surroundings of Gemlik were approved. In 1993, 1/25000 scaled Uludağ 
Environmental Structure Plan was approved. This plan covers Uludag National Park, 
forests and the settlements around it (Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, 1998). These plans 
were prepared and approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. These 
planning areas are not under the authority of the Metropolitan Municipality.  
The Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan was prepared together by the Bursa Province 
Government, the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, and the Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality. Bursa is one of the cities which went through a 
strategical planning experience. This strategic plan of 1/100 000 scale covers the 
whole provincial boundaries of Bursa and was approved by the Ministry of Public 
Works and Settlement in 1998. While this plan was being prepared, a “master 
development planning office” was established within the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality. Representatives of the economic sectors were consulted to establish 
sector based distinctions. The Chamber of Industry, Chamber of Commerce, diverse 
ministries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and city council of Agenda 21 
were contacted (Bademli, 2001). The Bursa Municipality has set its geographical 
information system during the strategic planning process.  
The principles of Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan (1998) are divided into the principles of 
protection and the principles of development (see in Table 4.9). In the planning 
phase, natural datas, industry, trade and services, population, technological 
infrastructure and transportation sectors were taken into account. Determination and 
evaluation were made in four steps: Turkey and East Marmara Region (1/250 000), 
Bursa Metropolitan Region (1/100 000), Bursa Metropolitan Area (1/25 000), and 
Metropolitan Municipality (1/5000). The target is set for 2020 for regularity plans 
but 2005 is designated for short term plans.  
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Table 4.9 Principles and Strategies of Bursa Strategic Plan (adapted from Bursa 
2020 Strategic Plan, 1998) 
 
Protection Principles   
To protect all agricultural lands that have high fertility  
• To protect the plains of Bursa, M.Kemalpaşa, Karacabey, Yenişehir and 
İnegöl, 
• To ensure the agricultural lands that have irrigation facilities, 
• To protect the forestry,  
• To protect the water basins, dams and ponds which are used for drinking 
water and irrigation purposes, 
• To protect the important natural, archeological and urban areas,  
 
Development Principles  
• Development areas should not destroy agricultural areas, 
• Expected population should be evenly distributed,  
• Sub-centers should be developed, and population should be decentralized,  
• Industry should be developed in organized industrial districts, and organized 
industrial districts should be located in unfertile agricultural areas,  
• Special regions should be planned for polluting industy and environmental 
preventive measures should be taken,   
• Common wastewater treatment has to be built in organized industrial 
districts,  
• Organized industrial districts should be supported by new small and medium 
industrial regions,  
• Service sector should be developed, 
• Local planning decisions on a parcel scale should not be made about industry 
and settlement,  
• Application strategies should be developed for the tourism sector, 
• Population growth should be restricted in historical protection areas.  
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The Metropolitan Region, which is determined in the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan 
(1998), is divided into five planning regions; Inegol Planning Region, M.Kemalpaşa-
Karacabey Planning Region, İznik-Orhangazi Planning Region, Yenişehir Planning 
Region, and Metropolitan Area Planning Region. Decisions are developed for each 
planning region. In addition, the Metropolitan Area Planning Region, which contains 
most of the watershed, is also divided into six planning regions such as Mudanya-
Gemlik Planning Region, East Planning Region, West Planning Region, Uludağ and 
Alaçam Planning Region, North Planning Region, and Centeral Area Planning 
Region.  
Detailed decisions were made on these planning areas according to main strategies. 
According to these decisions, the city will expand towards the west. Moreover, the 
leather industry, which is located in the centre, will be moved to an organized 
industrial district for leather on the west side. It is emphasized that environmental 
problems increase with the decisions of district municipalities concerning industry; it 
is decided that industry should be located in organized industrial districts. Industrial 
activity will not be allowed by local planning decision. New industrial areas will not 
be allowed in Kestel and Gürsu but the existing ones will be rehabilitated. It is 
pointed out that the organized industrial districts in Bursa and Demirtas will establish 
their common wastewater treatment plants.  
In the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan (1998), cooperation among the different agencies is 
mentioned but a solid management system is not mentioned. It is well known that the 
cooperation was achieved between the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and the 
Provincial Government. However, the conflicts came into existence between these 
two and the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement in approval process of the 
Strategic Plan. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement is a unique authority to 
approve the strategic plans. Bademli (2001) criticizes this situation and emphasizes 
that an independent agency should be producing strategical plans. On the other hand, 
the new Metropolitan Municipality Law gives the Metropolitan Municipalities an 
authority for the strategic plans (Law no:5216, 2004).    
Bursa Metropolitan Municipality (Bursa, 2003) indicates the problem of cooperation 
among authorities. Coordination on environment issues is the main target among 
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municipalities, the Provincial Directorate of Health, the Provincial Directorate of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs, private sectors and Local Agenda 21. However, the 
Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry are outside of this coordination.   
Bursa is a member of the World Health Organization (WHO) Healthy Cities 
Network, so the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has some strategies such as the 
strategy of improving quality of life and environment, and the strategy of 
sustainability of an ecologic system. Moreover, the strategy of protecting the Nilüfer 
Stream considered in Local Agenda 21 (Bursa, 2003). Improving environmental 
infrastructure and municipal wastewater treatment is another strategy. Hence, the 
Bursa Metropolitan Municipality is using World Bank credit for the environmental 
infrastructure of Bursa city (www.buski.gov.tr). In addition, improvement of the 
Nilüfer Stream water quality is targeted by the Wastewater Master Plan (2002) and 
the Action Plan of Blue Nilüfer (1997).   
Industrial development versus protection of environment is the biggest conflict in the 
watershed at the moment. For this reason, the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan involves 
protective and development principles. According to the Bursa Strategic Plan, 
density in the city centre will be diminished and Bursa will expand towards the west. 
At the same time, industrial development towards the up-stream is restricted in the 
plan. As a result of the aforementioned reasons, leather industries and dyehouses are 
scheduled to be moved to an organized industrial district at the watershed away from 
the city centre. Improving environmental infrastructure and municipal wastewater 
treatment is also the main strategy. It is a very important problem that pollution is 
carried by water and local authorities are not willing to take responsibility for the 
cost of the pollution. The Metropolitan Municipality does not want to be held 
responsible for water pollution caused by up-stream industrial plants. The same 
situation is the case for the down-stream areas of the watershed. This shows that the 
basin should be considered and treated as a whole to overcome these problems. All 
agents are linked and the decision of one would influence the other and vice versa.  
 
 
 112
4.6.3 Decision Makers and their Strategies 
There are 8 local units of central authorities and 21 municipalities that decide on 
planning and environmental issues in the watershed (see in Figure 4.13); 6 local units 
(provincial directorate of ministries) and 1 Regional Directorate of State Hydraulic 
Works, 1 Provincial Authority (Bursa), 1 Metropolitan Municipality (Bursa), 3 
District Municipalities within of Metropolitan Municipality (Nilüfer, Yıldırım, 
Osmangazi), 4 District Municipalities (Keles, Gürsu, Mudanya, Karacabey) and 13 
Sub-District Municipalities. There is no unique decision maker among official 
authorities (such as government and municipalities). There are several players who 
affect the decision making process in the watershed such as private enterprises and 
residents. Moreover, NGOs, the news media, the scientific and engineering 
community should be accepted as key actors (Bartone and others, 1994). 
Planning and Environmental Legislations are examined to understand the roles and 
strategies of the authorities. The strategies of public authorities are formulated 
according to the publications in which ministries and local administrations explain 
their plans, programs and goals. In addition, the local authorities and the directors of 
the organized industrial districts were interviewed to determine the conflicts among 
them. The results of the analysis are seen below in Table 4.10.  There is no doubt that 
every player has many strategies but they are chosen that affects the environment.  
All players have strategies about environment and planning such as land use 
decision, waste water standard and discharge permitting etc. Some strategies conflict 
with the other players’ strategies. Public authorities’ roles are defined by laws and 
public agencies are all acting on behalf of the public benefit. However, they may not 
always take public benefit into consideration. For instance, the Regional Directorate 
of State Hydraulic Works trys to use surface water as drinking water whereas 
municipalities allow it to be used for industrial facilities, because they strive to 
increase industrial incomes. Furthermore, when players have the same strategies, it 
may cause conflicts. For example, authorities (the Ministry of Reconstruction and 
Settlement, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the Metropolitan 
Municipality) aim to prepare environmental structure plan, so they have conflict with 
each others.    
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Table 4.10 Roles of Public Authorities, Strategies and Conflicts in the Watershed (adapted from Başaran, 2003) 
 
PLAYERS ROLES STRATEGIES CONFLICTS  
Bursa 
Metropolitan 
Municipality  
                  
Urban services and  
metropolitan area 
planning (Law no: 5216, 
2004)  
(1) to develop life quality  
(2) to increase municipality 
income 
(3) to solve environmental 
problems 
(1) With the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Affairs about the “discharge standard” and 
“discharge permission”.  
(2) Concerning the protection of water resources, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry who has the authority to prepare special 
plans, the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism and municipalities have conflicts, 
District 
Municipalities of 
Metropolitan 
Municipality  
Urban services and  
Land use planning (Law 
no: 5216, 2004) 
(1) to develop of life quality  
(2) to increase municipality 
income 
(3) to solve environmental 
problems 
(1) The conflicts increase when the Metropolitan Municipality and 
their district municipality belong to different political parties. They 
generally contradict and do not conform with planning decision.  
 
District 
Municipalities  
Urban services and land 
use planning (Law no: 
5272, 2004) 
(1) to develop life quality  
(2) to increase municipality 
income 
(3) to solve environmental 
problems 
(1) Between municipalities that are willing to develop their industrial 
activities and agencies that prepare special purpose plans. (such as 
environment, housing, industry),  
(2) With the Ministry of Health concerning 2nd class "working 
licenses" for industrial plants,  
(3) Municipalities have conflicts concerning the responsibility of the 
pollution treatment costs. 
Sub-District 
Municipalities 
Urban services and land 
use planning (Law 
no:1580, 1930; Law no: 
5272, 2004) 
(1) to develop of life quality  
(2) to increase municipality 
income 
(3) to solve environmental 
problems 
(1) There are authorization problems between sub-district 
municipalities and the Metropolitan Municipality especially when 
sub-district municipalities are within the metropolitan borders. Sub-
district Municipalities want to act independently, so they do not 
follow the decision of master plans of metropolitan municipality.  
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Table 4.10 Roles of Public Authorities, Strategies and Conflicts in the Watershed (continue)  
 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
Forestry and  
Provincial 
Directorate  
 
To protect environment 
and natural resource, to 
improve environment, 
Environmental planning 
(Law no: 2872, 1983; 
Law no: 4856, 2003)  
 
 
 
(1) to protect  environment 
and natural resources  
(2)  to develop standards of 
environmental quality   
(3) to monitor  
(4) to develop waste 
management systems 
(1) With municipalities that avoid environmental infrastructure expenses,  
(2) With the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement concerning 
environmental master plan,  
(3) With municipalities concerning the “working licenses” for new 
investments with the environmental impact assessment process,  
(4) With the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs concerning the soil 
pollution,  
(5) With the Metropolitan Municipality and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs concerning discharge standards,  
(6) With the Ministry of Industry and Commerce who does not oblige 
industries for developing infrastructure in the Organized Industrial Districts.  
1st Regional 
Directorate of 
State Hydraulic 
To plan surface and 
ground water resources, 
management and 
development 
(www.dsi.gov.tr) 
(1) to supply drinking water  
(2) to develop dams and 
ponds  
(1) With all the players who cause pollution, concerning the protection of 
water sources. 
 
 
 
Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs,  
and Provincial  
Directorate 
To develop agricultural 
lands (Law no: 1380, 
1973; Regulation of 
Protected of Agricultural 
Lands, 2005)   
(1) to increase agricultural 
income  
(2) to develop harvest health 
standards 
(1) With the municipalities that give housing and industrial permission for 
the agricultural lands,  
(2) With the Metropolitan Municipality and the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry concerning “discharge criteria”.  
Ministry of 
Industry and 
Commerce and 
Provincial  
Directorate 
To develop industry and 
commerce (Law no 4562, 
2000) 
(1) to increase industrial 
income  
(2) to develop product 
standards and encourage 
exportation  
(1) The Ministry of Industry and Commerce which supports and builds 
Organized Industrial Districts, under the pressure of the municipalities 
concerning the location for Organized Industrial Districts. 
 
Ministry of Public 
Works and 
Settlement, 
and Provincial 
Directorate  
To define construction 
standards and planning in 
outlying municipalities 
areas (Law no:3194, 
1985) 
(1) to define and development 
construction, 
(2) to monitor  
(3) to develop of settlements  
(1) With the Ministry of Environment and Forestry concerning 
environmental structure plans,  
(2) With the municipalities that do not follow environmental structure plans. 
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Figure 4.16 Conflicts among Authorities Regarding the Decision Making Process 
 
It is indicated in Table 4.10 that there are conflicts among official agencies. Figure 
4.16 ilustrates conflicts between decision makers.  
 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
District 
Municipalities 
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Forestry 
Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs 
Ministry of 
Industry and 
Commerce 
Ministry of 
Public Works 
and Settlement 
Ministry of 
Culture and 
Tourism 
Ministry of 
Health 
Conflict  
 
Conflicts about planning decision, 
environmental impact assessment decision 
and discharge decision 
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Most obvious conflicts are about authority in preparing plans, and they are 
competing to be the approving authority. Moreover procedures related to discharge 
permits, emission permits and working licences have a complex decision making 
process. As we see in Table 4.10 and in Figure 4.16, conflicts among the public 
authorities occur at three levels. The first level of conflicts is between the central 
authorities (ministries) and the local authorities (municipalities). Municipalities want 
to have an affect on the decisions of central authorities, because they target rapid 
economic development. The second level of conflicts is among the central 
authorities. There are many authorities with the same power; they do not want to 
share it, and they do not want to lose it. The third level of conflicts is among local 
authorities because of competition among municipalities. However, the number of 
conflicts increases on decisions of the Metropolitan Municipality and the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry. This situation is defined in Figure 4.16.    
Land is expensive in the city centre; entrepreneurs tend to look for land outside, but 
yet still close to the centre. This increases the demand for industrial land within the 
boundaries of district municipalities and this situation brings with it the demand for 
housing. These district municipalities are competing with each other for more 
income so they can give permit to industry even though they do not fulfil the 
environmental legislation.  
In 2004, with the revision of the law on municipalities, the Bursa Municipality is 
expected to enlarge its area of authority. If this happens, nearby industrial areas will 
be in the borders of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality. This will effect the 
decision making process in a positive way. The Metropolitan Municipality will be 
the only decision making authority. Still, even then it is possible that industry grows 
unplanned outside the new area of coverage.  
4.6 Conclusion 
There are 45 authorities who make decisions on the environmental issues and 
planning in the watershed. It has been observed that there is a non-cooperative 
situation in the watershed, because a watershed planning and management system 
does not exist. All of them have their own tasks and each develop its strategy 
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according to its own task. This situation has threatened the sustainability of water as 
a natural resource. These results confirm the first hypothesis of this study.  
Environmental infrastructure in the Nilüfer Watershed is not even sufficient to fulfil 
the needs of its present population. There are sewerage systems in all the settlements 
that have municipality, but cesspools are used in villages. Furthermore, none of the 
settlements have wastewater treatment plants except the Bursa metropolitan area. 
Unfortunately, domestic wastewaters of other settlements are discharged directly into 
the Nilüfer Stream or its branches. The Bursa Organized Industrial District has only 
wastewater treatment plant. Approximately 588 plants are established (as of 2000) in 
Bursa Province, and 58,5 % of establishments –neither private sector nor public 
sector- do not have a wastewater treatment plant. Due to the increasing product costs, 
existing ones are not working effectively. Therefore, it can be proposed that 
authorities who are in charge of inspecting water pollution do not fulfil their duties. 
The second hypothesis is verifed according to these results. 
Bursa is one of the rare cities in Turkey that has a strategic plan. However, despite 
the plan, cooperation among actors cannot be established and pollution cannot be 
prevented. Increasing pollution in the Nilüfer Stream stands as a proof. Therefore, 
new methods should be developed that confirm to the strategic plan and the 
determination of new strategies.  One of the main reasons for not applying these 
strategies is conflicting benefits among agents and sectors. For this reason game 
theory can be used as an analysis method for the decision making process as this 
theory focuses on maximizing the benefit for all sides. Game theory can also be used 
to question the success of strategies beforehand and to develop effective strategies.   
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5. APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO THE DECISION MAKING 
PROCESS IN THE WATERSHED 
We defined many decision makers who make decisions on environmental issues and 
planning in the Nilüfer watershed in the previous chapter. Moreover, some strategies 
of the decision makers are in conflict with each other and this situation negatively 
affected the environment. In this chapter, the interactive decision making process of 
these actors in the watershed by using a game theoretical approach is going to be 
examined. It is clear that there is a major conflict between industrial development 
and conservation of the environment in the watershed. We would like to reflect this 
dilemma in the application. Therefore, industrial location strategies and 
environmental protection strategies are selected, and two-person, non-cooperative 
games are analyzed.  
The third and fourth hypotheses of this study are explored in this chapter. The third 
hypothesis claims “environmental infrastructure costs are not assessed in location 
decisions of industrial investments and feasibility. The strategy of location of the 
investors changes when environmental infrastructure costs are taken into 
consideration”, and the fourth hypothesis asserts “in the state of cooperation between 
the decision makers. It is possible that the agents acquire optimum profit whereas the 
environment is not damaged”. Two games are modeled to verify these hypotheses. 
The first game (Game I) represents present condition and decision making process, 
and the second game illistruates ideal situation in the Nilüfer Watershed. Games are 
played between the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and a small scale textile 
enterprise.  
5.1 Formulation of the Scenario: Industrial Location Decisions   
The number of decision makers (players) is reduced by using a scenario in this study. 
Decision makers are called players. Although, there are many studies about solution 
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of “n player games” in game theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Nash, 
1950a; Shapley, 1953; Rapoport, 1970), “two player games” are more explanatory 
for our study, because simplification is going to be useful for analyzing the decision 
making process. Scenarios are especially used in experimental studies such as war, 
politics, and economic problems (Shubik, 2002; Thomas, 1966; Fain and Philips, 
1966; O’neill, 1994).  
Different scenarios can be constituted to formalize the conflicts among players. For 
example, a scenario can explore the conflicts about land use decisions between the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality. 
Although, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has the authority to prepare the 
environmental plan for the watershed, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality is the 
most important decision-maker about land use in the watershed. Another scenario 
suggestion can be the agriculture master plan which explores the conflicts between 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality. The water usage problem may be a topic in another scenario where the 
conflict of sharing fresh water among settlement, industry and agriculture is 
explored.  
Municipalities plan new industrial areas, because they would like to increase their 
industrial income, and they provide incentives to investors regarding working permit 
and building permit. Consequently, decisions about industrial location and decisions 
about the environmental protection in the watershed are analyzed in this study. Thus, 
our scenario (game) relates to industrial location and its environmental costs. The 
first player is the Bursa Metropolitan Municipalities who is a leader player in the 
watershed, and the second player is an industrial enterprise who causes water 
pollution. In addition, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality is represented by Player 
A, and industrial enterprise is represented by Player B. Furthermore, we prefer to 
define player A as she, and player B as he. Both players have finite pure strategies. A 
pure strategy is defined in the third chapter as “a specific move or action that a player 
will follow in every possible attainable situation in a game” (www.gametheory.net).  
The results of the case study showed that there is no cooperation and co-ordination 
among players in the watershed. In addition, decision makers do not act 
appropriately according to the environmental legislation; economic development is 
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priority for them. Therefore, our games are non-cooperative games. Games represent 
strategic form (matrix form). Time dimension is omitted, so our games are static 
games. 
Two situations are represented by two games; present situation and ideal situation. 
Players have finite strategies and perfect information, and games are completed 
information games. Nash equilibrium is explored for solutions in both games. 
According to Nash (1951) “a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one 
equilibrium point”, and in a Nash equilibrium each agent plays the best response to 
the equilibrium strategies of the other agents. In other words, Nash equilibrium 
indicates the best decision for every player in non-cooperative situations (Eichberger, 
1992).  
These games are related to location problems, but they are different from Hotelling 
or Webarian location models (Stevens, 1961; Isard, 1967; Gabszewich and Thisse, 
1992; Vega-Redondo, 2003). These location models deal with the best location for 
economy, whereas our model explores the best location for both economy and 
environment.  
5.2 Aims of Games 
Effluent standards and permission process change according to industrial location in 
the watershed. Furthermore, most of the factories have no wastewater treatment 
plant, and public authorities do not close the factories. For that reason, two games are 
modelled. Present condition and decision making process between the Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality and a small industrial enterprise are illustrated in the first 
game (Game I). Players make decisions without considering environmental costs. 
Both players have this information, and each player knows what the other player 
knows. Under these circumstances, land price, infrastructure participation fee and 
permission process are important criteria for industrial enterprise.   
On the other hand, ideal situation is represented in the second game (Game II), so 
players act with consideration of environmental costs. Namely, it is assumed that all 
public authorities apply environmental regulations and act, legally. Therefore, 
payoffs of players in the second game are determined by considering land price, 
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infrastructure participation fee and permission process.  Consequently, payoffs of 
strategies are not the same in Game I and Game II.  
Both players would like to maximize their payoffs according to game theory. Games 
aim to analyze interactive decision making process and to evaluate strategies 
according to payoffs. Which strategies provide high gain payoffs? We are analyzing 
the effects of environmental costs on the behaviour of players, and we are going to 
explore which strategies are the best according to the decision makers. Furthermore, 
certain strategies may be best for a player, but these strategies can negatively impact 
on environment.  Moreover, when players consider environmental costs, they may 
change their decisions. Additionally, the best strategies of Game II can be different 
from Game I.  On the other hand, if players make a bargain, possibilities of 
increasing of payoffs are searched.  The answers to these questions are discussed in 
the results of games. 
5.3 Determination of Strategies and Rules 
5.3.1 Strategies 
The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality (player A), who puts decisions into practice in 
the watershed, makes a decision about land use and environmental infrastructure. On 
the other hand, industrial enterprise is another agent who determines industrial 
development and causes increasing industrial pollution. Industrial enterprises are 
assumed to be footloose small and medium scale textile enterprises which are 
sensitive to costs and control advantages provided by different location.  
Strategic decisions in the Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan (1998) (Table 4.9) and common 
strategies of players (Table 4.10) in the watershed are discussed in the fourth 
cheapter. However, more descriptive and detailed information about these strategies 
are needed. Two basic topics are indicated in the Bursa Strategic Plan; environmental 
protection and economic development. Therefore, these two essential approaches are 
considered to determinate strategies of player A. First, player A would like to 
increase industrial income. Second, she would like to prevent industrial water 
pollution.  
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Definition of strategies proceeds as follow. The planning of newly organized 
industrial districts and industrial areas are suggested in the Bursa 2020 Strategic 
Plan, and the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality would like to increase industrial 
income, so the first strategy of player A (SA1) is determined as “to plan new 
industrial areas in the watershed”.  
The Bursa Strategic Plan (1998) targets environmental protection and the reduction 
of industrial water pollution. In addition, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has 
developed certain protection strategies and projects for surface water pollution. The 
major projects are the improvement of the Bursa sewer system and the municipal 
wastewater treatment plant. Furthermore, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality aims 
to develop a sewerage system outside the metropolitan area (Report of Wastewater 
Master Plan, 2002). Thus, the second strategy (SA2) is determined as “developing 
environmental infrastructure and monitoring-inspection systems in industrial areas in 
the watershed”.  
The Bursa Strategic Plan (1998) proposes to direct industrial investments to 
organized industrial districts, because it has provision to control industrial pollution. 
Therefore, the third strategy ( SA3 ) of player A is determined as “to direct new 
industrial investments to organized industrial districts”. The Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality is also planning to move the industrial (especially the leather and textile 
factories) sector from the central area to the organized industrial districts (Bursa 
Strategic Plan, 1998; Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, 2003). Hence, the forth 
strategy ( SA4 ) of player A is determined as “to move industries from the inner city 
and the Bursa plain direct them to organized industrial districts”. For this reason, a 
newly leather organized industrial district has been built down-stream. However, 
organized industrial districts have not yet solved their environmental infrastructure 
problems. To illustrate, the Bursa Organized Industrial District (BOSAB) was 
constructed in 1961, and the common wastewater treatment plant was built in 1998 
(Bursa Environmental Report, 2000; web site of BOSAB). There are 6 organized 
industrial districts in the watershed, and they do not have a common wastewater 
treatment plant except the Bursa Organized Industrial District.  
On the other hand, most of the factories do not have individual wastewater treatment 
plants. Moreover, most of the factories that have treatment systems do not use them 
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effectively because they have increased production costs (Bursa Environmental 
Report, 2000; Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, 2004). Therefore, the fifth strategy ( 
SA5 ) of player A is defined as “ to cancel working permits of plants which have 
unacceptable effluent standards”.  
Another problem is the spread of pollution into down-stream. The Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality is negatively affected by the up-stream pollution, so 
“preventing a new polluting industry in the up-stream” is emerging as another 
strategy ( SA6). There are four municipalities on the up-stream (Gürsu, Kestel, 
Orhaneli, Keles), and the Municipality of Gürsu and Keles which are located to close 
Bursa city. The Municipalities of Gursu and Keles have targeted industrial 
development within their area. On the other hand, the stream is mainly polluted in 
the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality area, and down-stream settlements (Karacabey 
and Mustafa Kemal Paşa) do not use the stream for domestic purposes or irrigation.  
To sum up, it can be proposed that there is a conflict between up-stream’s 
municipalities and the down-stream’s municipalities about the use of surface water.  
In addition, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry is responsible for “discharge 
permit” outside the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality borders (Regulation of Water 
Pollution Control, 2004). Moreover, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry has 
higher wastewater standards than the standards of the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality do (Regulation of Water Pollution Control, 2004; Regulation of 
Metropolitan Municipalities Wastewater Discharge, 1998). However, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry does not have enough personnel and sufficient budget for 
monitoring and inspection. Under these circumstances, behaviours of municipalities 
gain importance. Municipalities prefer to increase their income; so they are easier on 
handing out permits for industrial investments. Therefore, there is a competition 
among the municipalities in the watershed to enlarge their industrial areas, and 
because of this competition, agricultural areas are being lost.  
In conclusion, 6 pure strategies are determined for player A (Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality);  
SA1 – to plan new industrial areas in the watershed,  
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SA2 - to develop environmental infrastructure and monitoring-inspection systems in 
industrial areas in the watershed,  
SA3  - to direct new industrial investments to organized industrial districts,  
SA4 -to move industries from inner city and Bursa plain and direct them to organized 
industrial districts,  
SA5 – to cancel working permit of plants that have unacceptable effluent standards,  
SA6 – to prevent the up-stream from the polluting industry.   
Indeed, the Metropolitan Municipality has no authority outside of the metropolitan 
borders. However, the Metropolitan Municipality who is the lead player can put 
pressure on the Ministries or the Provincial Government to the planning decisions. 
For instance, in the sixth strategy (SA6), player A has developed the strategy for 
outside the Metropolitan Municipality. The possibility of pressure is assumed in this 
strategy.  
On the other hand, industrial enterprise, which is represented by player B, would like 
to minimize his investment cost and operating expense, so he chooses cheaper land 
that can be permitted easily. Indeed, there are many factors that effect industrial 
location on a macro level (such as proximity of market, proximity of raw material, 
and proximity of labour force, etc.) (Bölen, 2003). However, it is assumed that player 
B evulated these location factors and then he decided to locate in the watershed. 
Thus, industrial location alternatives on a micro level are explored in games. In 
addition, it is certain that infrastructure conditions are the same in all waterhed (such 
as transportation facilities, supplying of electricity and fresh water facilities). Bölen 
(2003) indicates that land price, infrastructure facilities and the provision of local 
incentives gain importance for industrial location on a micro level.  
Conclusionally, industrial location alternatives of a small textile company in the 
watershed are accepted as strategies of player B. Which location alternative is more 
advantageous for industrial enterprise? The answers to these questions are discussed 
below determination of payoffs of player B. Player B (industrial enterprise) has 7 
pure strategies related to location;  
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SB1 –to locate in the organized industrial districts of the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality where the infrastructures are completed,  
SB2 –to locate in the organized industrial districts of the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality where the infrastructures are incomplete,  
SB3  -to locate in the organized industrial districts in the up-stream,  
SB4  -to locate in the organized industrial districts in the down-stream,  
SB5 –to locate in the industrial area in the up-stream district or sub-district 
municipality,  
SB6 –to locate in the industrial area in the down-stream district or sub-district 
municipality,  
SB7 –to locate outside the municipalities of metropolitan and districts in the up-
stream area,  
6 x 7 matrixes are used in both games in this study. Indeed, this matrix size is big for 
an experimental study. Shubik (2002) suggests using 2 x 2 matrixes in experimental 
games. He (p. 2333, 2002) says “the 2 x 2 matrix game has been a major source for 
the provision of didactic examples and experimental games for social scientists with 
interests in game theory”. However, it is clear that some large matrix application. For 
instance, Stevens (1961) uses the 5 x 5 matrix in location model. All basic strategies 
of player A and B are evaluated in our model. Equilibrium points are explored, but 
what is important to us is which strategies are more preferable. On the other hand, a 
large matrix can be used in strategic form with pure strategy. Furthermore, Shubik 
(2002) specifies that if a matrix has considerable regularities (continuous payoff 
functions), the use of a large matrix is suitable. Same player and same strategies are 
used in both games.   
5.3.2 Rules  
Both the games are two-person, non-cooperative games. Player A has 6 strategies, 
and player B has 7 strategies, so the games are finite games. Nash equilibrium is 
explored in the games for solution.  
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There exist uncertainties that affect enterprises’ behaviour. It is possible to have 
hidden goals as well as the obvious ones in the determination of strategies. For 
instance, increasing municipality incomes is a necessity for better service, and 
increasing the income is a dominant strategy. There is another strategy which is more 
dominant, but not spoken aloud, such as collecting more votes in the next election. 
Such hidden goals are considered in the determination of the strategy if they have the 
possibility of leading to important environmental decisions. For example, the 
municipality’s environmental policies can change together with the change of the 
mayor after the next election. Furthermore, the permission process of industrial 
investment can be harder or easirer according to the behaviour of municipalities.  
The second uncertainty is about the effluent standards. The effluent standards change 
according to the location of investment. The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality is the 
authority inside the Metropolitan Municipality borders, and the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry is the authority outside the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality borders. The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has two different 
effluent standard types which are called the pretreatment standards and the standards 
of the disposal in nature (Regulation of Metropolitan Municipalities Wastewater 
Discharge, 1998). There are some differences between discharges in sewer systems 
and natural areas. For example, plants may discharge more polluted wastewater to 
the sewer than to the natural area. On the other hand, some surface waters are 
accepted as a sewer by the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality. If a plant is in the 
organized industrial district, it may discharge more polluted wastewater than it would 
to the sewer of the city because the organized industrial district has common 
wastewater treatment plant.  
Effluent standards are important for industrial enterprise, because of investment and 
operating costs of wastewater treatment plant. Despite the existence of a large body 
of environmental legislation, most of the plants do not have a wastewater treatment 
plant, or if they do, they do not work. This situation creates unjust competition 
among investors. Thus, it is obvious that industrial enterprise makes decisions under 
uncertainy. Municipalities permit industrial investment easily, but if municipalities 
alter their strategies, plants may be closed by municipalities. Therefore, some 
assumptions are accepted in the games, so making a decision under certainty is 
provided. In addition, both games are assumed as perfect information games. Games, 
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in which each player knows exactly what has happened in previous moves, are called 
games with “perfect information” (Gardner, 1995; Ritzberger, 2002; Mycielski, 
1992; Myerson, 1991).  
In Game I, municipalities would like to increase industrial income, so they try to 
extend industrial areas. On the other hand, industrial enterprise has this information. 
Namely, player B knows that his plant will not be closed even if he does not conform 
to the effluent standards. Therefore, industrial enterprise does not consider 
environmental costs, so land price and permission process are the most important 
criteria for player B.  
In Game II, It is all players conform to laws and plans assumed that each of the 
players knows the opponent’s information and rules in both game. If every player 
knows the rules and payoff function of a game, a game is a complete information 
game, so Game I and Game II are “complete information games”. Moreover, the 
main assumption of the non-cooperative game is that it studies games of complete 
information (Vego-Redondo, 2003; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996). Furthermore, a 
strategic form game considers a personal move because of the assumption of 
rationality. In addition, if a strategic form is used, players make decisions, 
simultaneously. Therefore, we accept that players make personal moves and make 
decisions simultaneously and the games are one-shot and static games.  
Game I and Game II are non-zero sum games. In general, non-zero sum games 
represent real life situations better than zero-sum games. In the zero-sum games, one 
player wins and other player loses (Luce and Raiffa, 1967; Ritzberger, 2002). 
However, both of the players may win or lose, at the same time. Furthermore, the 
amount of loss or gain does not need to be equal. Therefore, most games of interest 
in the social sciences are non-zero sum games. 
5.3.3 Payoffs  
Associated with every possible game played there is a certain outcome for each of 
the different players. Payoff magnitudes, which are real numbers, are interpreted as 
utilities (Vega-Renondo, 2003). Generally, in many of the experiments with matrix 
games the payoffs have tended to be money, but some other measurement units are 
also used such as distance unit, time unit. However, in most experimental work, 
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frequently, pre-analysis is made to obtain individual measures before the experiment 
(Shubik, 2002).  
When we have a look over the previous studies, it is observed that money and 
distance units are used symbolically to determine payoffs. For example, Stevens 
(1961) describes a simple linear market, forty units long, with possible locations five 
points spaced equally along it. He explores the best location for each seller who 
would like to decrease transportation costs and extend marketing. Assume that the 
price for both sellers I and II is $1 per unit. In short, Stevens (1961) determined the 
payoffs by money and distance. Maler and Zeeuw (1998) use the values of sulphur 
emit (ton) per year and total area of countries for determination of payoffs. On the 
other hand, in some decision problems, it is not possible to measure payoffs with 
money or distance. Isard and Reiner (1962) discuss that one component of an 
outcome vector might measure profit, another prestige, a third life-expectancy, etc. 
They (1962) suggest adopting a three way classification such as +1, 0, -1 
(satisfactory, neutral and unsatisfactory or win, draw and lose or increased assests, 
unchanged assets and decreased assest). The method of taxonomy is used as another 
technique for measurement of utility. For example, “4” is used for the most desired 
outcome and 1 for the least desired (Shubik, 2002).    
Nijkamp (1980) has analyzed seven alternative plan decisions’ preference for interest 
groups in a cement factory which has important environmental impacts.  He has used 
a “multidimensional scaling method” in his analysis. These alternatives are to be 
judged on the basis of various evaluation criteria. Three main criteria have been 
distinguished, economic, social and environmental and these three main criteria have 
been subdivided into thirteen criteria. These 13 subcriteria were evaluated in one 
matrix for seven decision alternatives, in other matrix they were evaluated from 
interest groups’ point.  Matrix includes only qualitative information based on ordinal 
figures varying from 1 to 4. Element 1 means a high positive impact while element 4 
means a very negative impact. In the last matrix, plan decisions were based on 
ordinal figures varying from 1 to 7. These ordinal numbers reflect the most desirable 
(1) or the least desirable (7) plans.   
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5.4 Data for Determination of Payoffs 
In this study, firstly, a pre-analysis method is used like Shubik’s (2002) taxanomy 
method. Strategies were evaluated by qualitative scores that were measured on a plus 
(+) and minus (-) scale. More plus signs indicate the higher payoff and more minus 
signs the lower payoff. However, we needed a more descriptive method for 
determination of payoffs. Secondly, in our study, Nijkamp’s (1980) qualitative 
evaluation method is used to determine payoffs. For Player A strategies were 
classified as increased assets, unchanged assets and decreased assets, as for Player B 
some values like land prices, environmental costs were assessed to determine which 
would be preferred. Symbolic payoffs were set according to the results. However in 
this study, payoffs change according to the preference of the other player. In other 
words, an interactive decision making process is analyzed.  
5.4.1 Data for Game I 
Land prices in the city centre have risen because of the shortage of industrial areas. 
Therefore, industrial enterprises prefer to locate close to urban areas (Bursa Strategic 
Plan, 1998).  We have interviewed the authorities of organized industrial districts and 
municipalities (2005) in the watershed to determine land prices and infrastructure 
participation fees. Enterprises have to pay infrastructure costs in certain organized 
industrial districts, and these costs affect the decisions of player B. Infrastructure 
participation fees are different from environmental infrastructure cost, they include 
transportation, green areas, common areas etc.  The infrastructure participation fees 
and land prices of industrial areas are shown in Table 5.1.     
As shown in data (Table 5.1), land prices in industrial areas change from 40 $ to 150 
$. The Bursa Organized Industrial District (BOSAB) has the highest infrastructure 
cost, because the BOSAB is unique organized industrial district where the 
infrastructure is completed. The Demirtaş Organized Industrial District (DOSAB), 
which locate outside the border of the Metropolitan Municipalty, has the highest land 
price and it has second high infrastructure costs. Environmental infrastructure has 
developed in the DOSAB.  In addition, the municipalities’ industrial areas are 
cheaper than organized industrial districts because of the competition among 
municipalities and due to the diversity of the land supplied by the municipalities. 
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Table 5.1 Land Prices and Infrastructure Participation Fees in the Watershed  
Industrial areas and year 
of establishment  
Location Common 
wastewater 
treatment 
plant 
Land prices     
($ / m2) 
infrastructure 
participation 
fees   
($ / m2) 
Bursa O.I.D.* (1961) Metropolitan 
Municipality 
Exist  125  34, 54 
Nilüfer O.I.D. (2001) Metropolitan 
Municipality 
Non existent 50-90 5 
Batı O.I.D. (2003) Down-stream  Non existent 40-50 Non existent 
Demirtaş O.I.D. (1990) Up-stream  building 150 10,15 
Ketsel O.I.D. (2004) Up-stream Non existent 80 9 
Gürsu O.I.D. (2001) Up-stream Non existent 80-110 3,54 
Deri O.I.D Down-stream Non existent - Non existent 
Kestel Municipality Up-stream Non existent 80 Non existent 
Karacabey Municipality Down-stream Non existent 60 Non existent 
Unplanned area Up-stream Non existent 40  Non existent 
* O.I.D; Organized Industrial District 
Besides, infrastructure participation fees also vary in this region. In organized 
industrial districts, fees are high but in some industrial terrains there is no fee at all.  
Furthermore, as municipalities are willing to attract industry to their areas, they 
simplify the procedures and keep planning new industrial areas. Organized industrial 
districts in the watershed area are indeed what once district municipalities developed; 
these received an “organized” status later. Moreover, unplanned land around 
organized industrial districts and industrial areas are heavily under the threat of 
industry. On this kind of land, local development plans are valid and industrial plants 
can only be permitted by these. Regarding personal interviews with organized 
industrial district and municipality officials, it became clear that lands within the 
metropolitan municipality borders are more expensive than those either in up-stream 
area or in the watershed. The lowest value for land is on the west side at down-
stream.  
Furthermore, permission process in industrial areas is easier than in organized 
industrial districts. Industrial enterprises are concerned about the abundance of 
bureaucracy in the organized industrial districts. In fact, a similar process is followed 
in other industrial plants but as the municipalities wish to attract industry in their 
areas, they ease the permission process. Unplanned areas (see in Table 5.1) are close  
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to industrial areas of municipalities, but an environmental structure plan (or master 
plan) has not been developed for these areas. Therefore, local planning decisions are 
developed in these areas by municipalities.    
Some of the Organized Industrial Districts and industrial areas in Table 5.1 are used 
as a sampling area for the determination of player B’s payoffs. For example, the 
Bursa Organized Industrial District is chosen for the first strategy (SB1 –to locate in 
the organized industrial districts of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality where the 
infrastructures are completed), and the Nilüfer Organized Industrial Districts are 
selected for the second strategy (SB2 –to locate in the organized industrial districts of 
Bursa Metropolitan Municipality where the infrastructures are incomplete). Gürsu 
Organized Industrial District is used as sampling area to determine the payoffs of the 
third strategy (SB3  -to locate in the organized industrial districts in the up-stream), 
and Batı Organized Industrial District is used as sampling area to define the fourth 
strategy (SB4  -to locate in the organized industrial districts in down-stream).  
All these industrial areas have different land price and infrastructure participation 
fee, and it is assumed that industrial enterprise prefers the cheapest land. These 
criteria are ordered from the least preferable (7) to the most preferable (1) like 
Nijkamp (1980) models (see in Table 5.2). A qualitative preferences index is formed 
to consider land prices, infrastructure participation fees and permission precess. This 
index table is shown to be the initiative preference of player B.  For instance, the 
Bursa Organized Industrial District has the highest land price and infrastructure 
participation fee, so player B does not prefer this district. This situation is 
symbolized as “7”. At tha same time, player B does not alter an Organized Industrial 
Districts because of the permission process (3).  
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Table 5.2 A Qualitative Preference Index for Player B in Game I 
Strategies Location Permission 
process index 
Land price/ 
infrastructure 
participation fee  
index 
Index of 
preferences   
SB1 Bursa Organized  
Industrial District 
3 
(the worst) 
7 
(the worst) 
6 
(the worst) 
SB2 Nilüfer Organized 
Industrial District 
3 
(the worst) 
5 4 
SB3 Gürsu Organized 
Industrial District 
2 
 
6 5 
SB4 Batı Organized  
Industrial District 
2 
 
3 3 
SB5 Up-stream  
municipality area 
1 
(the best) 
4 3 
SB6 Down-stream  
municipality area 
1 
(the best) 
2 2 
SB7 Unplanned area  
in up-stream 
1 
(the best) 
1 
(the best) 
1 
(the best) 
 
Payoffs are determinated according to the index of preferences. For example, 
permission process in municipalities’ industrial areas is easier than organized 
industrial district. When organized industrial districts are the least preferable (3) 
areas, industrial areas are preferable (2) areas for player B. Furthermore, unplanned 
areas are more preferable (1) alternatives according to permission precess. Namely, 
the number 1 indicates the best choice of player B. The Bursa Organized Industrial 
District is the worst choice according to land price, participation fee (7) and 
permission process (3). Gürsu Organized Industrial District follows it according to 
land price and participation fee (6), but permission process is preferable (2). 
Conclusionally, strategies ordered from the most preferable (1) to the least preferable 
(6) strategies in pereferences index in the last column.  
5.4.2 Data for Game II 
In the second game, players will consider both economic benefit and environmental 
cost. The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality would like to increase industrial income, 
but she knows that this choice increase her environmental cost. Similarly, player B 
considers land price, infrastructure participation fee, permission process and 
environmental cost, together. Wastewater treatment costs are considered to determine 
payoffs of player B. Wastewater treatment plant costs change according to the 
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location of administrative units, due to effluent standards. The Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality has two types of effluent standards; pretreatment standard and standard 
of disposal to the nature. For instance, if a factory is inside the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality and its discharges to sewerage, the discharge dose of chemical oxygen 
demand (COD) should not exceed 800 mg/l (Regulation of Metropolitan 
Municipalities Wastewater Discharge, Table 1, 1998).  If a factory discharges to 
stream or is located outside the Metropolitan Municipality, the discharge 
consantration of chemical oxygen demand (COD) should not exceed 350 mg/l for 
textile sector (Regulation of Water Pollution Control, Table 10.1, 2004). 
For example, it is assumed that a small scale textile plant has 1200 m3/day discharge. 
This plant’s wastewater treatment plant construction price is 106 000 € and operating 
price is 20 € /month in the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality. On the other hand, for 
the same plant’s wastewater treatment plant, the construction price is 148 000 € and 
the operating price is 30 € /month outside the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality. If the 
plant is located in the organized industrial districts of the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality, its costs will decrease depending on the chemical oxygen demand 
discharge consantration of general wastewater treatment plant of the organized 
industrial district (Arge, 2004).  
When players consider environmental and development legislation, permission 
process are eaiser in organized industrial district than unplanned areas. Therefore, 
preferences of player B on permission process will change. A qualitative preferences 
index and payoffs of player B are seen in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3 – A Qualitative Preference Index for Player B in Game II 
Strategies Permission 
process index  
Land price and 
infrastructure 
participation fees  
index 
Wastewater 
treatment plant 
cost index  
Index of 
preferences   
SB1 1 7 1 1 
SB2 1 5 2 2 
SB3 1 6 3 3 
SB4 1 3 3 4 
SB5 2 4 4 6 
SB6 2 2 4 5 
SB7 3 1 4 7 
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Three index columns in the Table 5.3 are evaluated to determinate the preferences 
index of player B. The industrial investor’s choices are displayed according to 
wastewater treatment plant costs. Thus in order to minimize environmental 
infrastructure costs, Player B would prefer first strategy (SB1 –to locate in the 
organized industrial districts of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality where the 
infrastructures are completed) then the other strategies. Furthermore, the seventh 
strategy (SB7 –to locate outside the municipalities of metropolitan and districts in the 
up-stream area) is worst strategy for player B. Conclusionally; preferences index is 
determined according to the three indexes for player B. When the first strategy of 
player B is the most preferable (1), the seventh strategy is the least preferable (7) 
according to preferences index.  
5.5 Determination of the Payoffs in Game I 
5.5.1 Payoffs of Player A in Game I 
In Game I, players do not think about environmental costs. For that reason, payoffs 
do not reflect environmental costs. Two basic criteria are evaluated when payoff 
values are determinated. First, the strategy of player A realizes which depends the 
decision of player B. For example, player A plans to direct new industrial 
investments to organized industrial districts (SA3), when player B prefers to locate to 
an organized industrial district (SB1, SB2, SB3, or SB4), the strategy of player A 
realizes. On the other hand, if player B chooses to locate outside of the organized 
industrial district (SB5, SB6 or SB7), the strategy of player A (SB1, SB2, SB3, or SB4) 
does not realize. Second, it is explored which strategy causes an increase or a 
decrease in income. For instance, if player B prefers to locate inside the Metropolitan 
Municipality (SB1 or SB2), the industrial income of player A rises. On the other hand, 
if player B prefers to locate outside the Metropolitan Municipality (SB3, SB4, SB5, SB6, 
or SB7), the industrial income of player A decreases.   
Two criteria and outcomes are shown below in Table 5.4.  Outcomes are arranged 
from maximum to minimum value such as (20), (10), (0), (-10), and (-20) for player 
A. Sum of outcomes gives payoffs.   
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Table 5.4 The Strategies Evaluation Criteria in Game I 
 Criteria Outcomes 
Strategy fulfilled 20  
1 Strategy unfulfilled -20 
Industrial income increased 10 
Industrial income not increased 0 
Industrial income decreased -10 
 
 
2 
 Costs increased -10 
 
Indeed, payoffs may change according to opponent’s choice. For example, the 
strategy of player A may realizes (20), but player A may lose industrial income (-10), 
at the same time. Consequently, the payoff of player A is the calculated sum of the 
outcomes such as (20) + (-10) = 10. The choice of player A and the alternatives of 
player B’s decisions are shown in Table 5.5 for Game I.  
It is illustrated in Table 5.5., when player A chooses her first strategy (SA1 – to plan 
new industrial areas in the watershed), if player B prefers strategy of SB1 and SB2, the 
first strategy of player A (SA1) realizes (20), and the industrial income of player A 
increases (10), so the payoffs of player A will be 30 units.  On the other hand, if 
player B chooses one of the SB3, SB4, SB5, SB6, the strategy of player A (SA1) realizes 
(20), but the industrial income of player A does not increase (0), because player B 
has not chosen an area inside the Metropolitan Municipality, so  the payoffs of player 
A will be 20 units. Otherwise, if player B chooses the SB7, strategy of player A (SA1) 
does not realize (-20), because player A would like to extend the industrial areas in 
the watershed whereas player B has preferred to locate outside the industrial areas. 
Moreover, the industrial income of player A does not increase (0), so the payoffs of 
player A will be -20 units. 
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Table 5.5 Payoffs of Player A in Game I 
Player 
A 
Player 
B 
Realization of 
strategy   
Industrial income, 
increase/decrease  
Increasing cost Payoff 
SB1 20 10 0 30 
SB2 20 10 0 30 
SB3 20 0 0 20 
SB4 20 0 0 20 
SB5 20 0 0 20 
SB6 20 0 0 20 
 
 
 
SA1 
SB7 -20 0 0 -20 
SB1 20 10 -10 20 
SB2 20 10 -10 20 
SB3 20 0 -10 10 
SB4 20 0 -10 10 
SB5 20 0 -10 10 
SB6 20 0 -10 10 
 
 
 
SA2 
SB7 -20 0 0 -20 
SB1 20 10 0 30 
SB2 20 10 0 30 
SB3 20 0 0 20 
SB4 20 0 0 20 
SB5 -20 0 0 -20 
SB6 -20 0 0 -20 
 
 
 
SA3 
SB7 -20 0 0 -20 
SB1 20 10 0 30 
SB2 20 10 0 30 
SB3 20 -10 0 10 
SB4 20 -10 0 10 
SB5 -20 -10 0 -30 
SB6 -20 -10 0 -30 
 
 
 
SA4 
SB7 -20 -10 0 -30 
SB1 -20 0 0 -20 
SB2 -20 0 0 -20 
SB3 -20 0 0 -20 
SB4 -20 0 0 -20 
SB5 -20 0 0 -20 
SB6 -20 0 0 -20 
 
 
 
SA5 
SB7 -20 0 0 -20 
SB1 20 10 0 30 
SB2 20 10 0 30 
SB3 -20 0 0 -20 
SB4 20 0 0 20 
SB5 -20 0 0 -20 
SB6 20 0 0 20 
 
 
 
SA6 
SB7 -20 0 0 -20 
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When player A chooses the second strategy (SA2 - to develop environmental 
infrastructure and monitoring-inspection systems in industrial areas in the 
watershed), the expense of player A rises except outside unplanned areas, because 
player A plans to develop environmental infrastructure only in industrial areas. For 
that reason, when player B chooses the strategy of SB1 and SB2, player A wins (20) 
units, and player B alters the strategy of SB3 and SB4, player A gains (10) units, and 
player B prefers the strategy of SB7, player A loses ( -20) units.  
While player A chooses her third strategy (SA3  - to direct new industrial investments 
to organized industrial districts), if player B selects SB1 and SB2, industrial income of 
player A increases (10), and the goal of player A realizes (20), so the payoff of 
player A will be 30 units. If player B chooses the strategy of SB3, SB4, the industrial 
income of player A does not increase (0), because player B has not chosen an area 
inside the Metropolitan Municipality. However, the goal of player A realizes (20), 
because player B has chosen an organized industrial district, so the payoff of player 
A will be 20 units. On the other side, if player B chooses SB5, SB6, and SB7, the 
industrial income of player A does not increase (0), in addition, the goal of player A 
does not realize (-20), because player B does not prefer to locate in Organized 
Industrial District, so the payoff of player A will be (-20) units.     
After player A chooses her fourth strategy (SA4 -to move industries from the inner 
city and the Bursa plain direct them to Organized Industrial Districts), if player B 
prefers to locate in the Metropolitan Municipality (SB1 and SB2 strategies), the 
industrial income of player A increases (10), and the goal of player A realizes (20), 
so the payoff of player A will be (30) units. When player B chooses to locate in an 
organized industrial districts (SB3 and SB4 strategies), the industrial income of player 
A decreases (-10), because player B moves from the inner city to outside the 
Metropolitan Municipality. However, the goal of player A realizes (20), because 
player B prefers to an organized industrial districts, so the payoff of player A will be 
10 units. If player B selects other strategies (to locate outside an organized industrial 
districts and outside the Metropolitan Municipality, SB5, SB6, and SB7), the industrial 
income of player A decreases (-10), in addition, the goal of player A does not realize 
(-20), so the payoff of player A will be -30 units.     
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Indeed, it is assumed that players do not act legally in Game I, so the factories, which 
have unacceptable effluent standards, will not be closed. Thus, although player A 
defined the fifth strategy (SA5) as “to cancel the working permits of plants that have 
unacceptable effluent standards”, her fifth strategy (SA5) will not realize. Therefore, 
when player A chooses the fifth strategy (SA5), player B decides whatever his 
strategies, income does not change for player A (0), and her strategy does not realize 
(-20), so the payoff of player A will be -20 units 
The sixth strategy (SA6) of player A is determined as “to prevent the up-stream from 
the polluting industry”. When player B chooses the strategies of location in up-
stream (SB3, SB5 and SB7), the factories should be closed. However, players know that 
these factories will be not closed. Namely, if player B chooses the strategies of 
location in up-stream (SB3, SB5 and SB7), player A will not close these factories, so the 
industrial income of player A does not increase or decrease (0), and the goal of 
player A does not realize (-20), consequently the payoff of player A will be -20 units.  
On the other hand, if player B prefers the strategies the location in the Metropolitan 
Municipality (SB1 and SB2), the industrial income of player A increases (10), so the 
payoff of player A will be 30 units. If player B selects the strategies of location in 
down-stream (SB4, SB6), the industrial income of player A does not increase or 
decrease (0), so the payoff of player A will be 20 units. 
5.5.2 Payoffs of Player B in Game I 
Player B and player A make decisions without regard to environmental costs in 
Game I. For that reason, the payoffs of player B are determined according to land 
price, infrastructure patticipation fee and permission process in Game I. To sum up, 
player B prefers the cheapest land and the easiest permission process because of 
maxsimization of payoffs.  
Preferences index of player B is formed in Table 5.2. The payoffs of player B are 
determined according to the index. For instance, the first strategy is the least 
preferable for player B, so the payoff of the first strategy has the lowest value (5). On 
the contrary, the seventh strategy is the most preferable strategy, so the payoff of the 
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seventh strategy has the highest value (30). Payoffs are ordered from “5”, “10”, “15”, 
“20”, 25” to “30”.  
Table 5.6 Payoffs of Player B in Game I 
Strategies Location Index of 
preferences   
Payoff 
SB1 Bursa Organized Industrial District 6 5 
SB2 Nilüfer Organized Industrial District 4 15 
SB3 Gürsu Organized Industrial District 5 10 
SB4 Batı Organized Industrial District 3 20 
SB5 Up-stream municipality area 3 20 
SB6 Down-stream municipality area 2 25 
SB7 Unplanned area in up-stream 1 30 
 
Some of the strategies of player A may cause an increase in land prices. For example, 
when player A directs new industrial investment to organized industrial districts, 
land prices may increase there, or if industrial facilities are forbidden in the up-
stream, land prices may decrease. In spite of the fact that the payoffs of player B are 
assumed constant whatever the strategies of player A are. However, the payoffs of 
player A change according to the choices of player B in Game I. The payoff matrix 
of player A and player B are shown in Table 5.7.  
Table 5.7 Payoff Matrix for Game I   
  Player B 
  SB1 SB2 SB3 SB4 SB5 SB6 SB7 
SA1 30, 5 30, 15 20, 10 20, 20 20, 20 20, 25 -20, 30 
SA2 20, 5 20, 15 10, 10 10, 20 10, 20 10, 25 -20, 30 
SA3 30, 5 30, 15 20, 10 20, 20 -20, 20 -20, 25 -20, 30 
SA4 30, 5 30, 15 10, 10 10, 20 -30, 20 -30, 25 -30, 30 
SA5 -20, 5 -20, 15 -20, 10 -20, 20 -20, 20 -20, 25 -20, 30 
 
 
Player 
A 
SA6 30, 5 30, 15 -20, 10 20, 20 -20, 20 20, 25 -20, 30 
 
Player A’s pure strategies are represented by the rows of the matrix (player A is the 
“row player”) and player B’s pure strategies are represented by the columns of the 
matrix (player B is the “column player”). The left entry is Player A’s pay off and the 
right, player B’s. 
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5.6 Equilibrium of Game I 
Both of the players know each other’s payoffs and they would like to choose the best 
strategy for themselves. Players do not make an agreement before Game I, so Game I 
is a non-cooperative game. Player A makes a decision and after player B chooses his 
stategy.   
Maximum payoffs are the results of the choices that are indicated with bold 
characters in Table 5.8. When player A chooses the SA1 (to plan new industrial areas 
in the watershed), player B will prefer the SB7 (to locate outside the municipalities in 
up-stream) which has maximum payoff, so player B wins “30”, and player A loses “-
20”. While player A chooses the SA2 (to develop environmental infrastructure in the 
watershed), player B selects the SB7 strategy, again, because it maximizes his payoff. 
Thus, player B wins “30” unit whereas player A loses “-20” unit. When player A 
chooses the SA3 (to direct new industrial investments to organized industrial 
districts), player B will prefer the SB7, again. Thus, when player B wins “30” units, 
player A loses “-20” units. When player A chooses the SA4 (to move industries from 
inner city and Bursa plain and direct them to organized industrial districts), player B 
prefers the SB7 strategy, again.  Thus, player B wins “30” but player A will loses “-
30”. After player A chooses her fifth strategy (SA5, to cancel working permits of 
plants that have unacceptable effluent standards), player B prefers his seventh 
strategy (SB7), again. Similarly, when player A chooses her sixth strategy (SA6, to 
prevent the up-stream from the polluting industry), player B prefers his seventh 
strategy (SB7).  
Table 5.8 Nash Equilibriums in Game I. 
  Player B 
  SB1 SB2 SB3 SB4 SB5 SB6 SB7 
SA1 30, 5 30, 15 20, 10 20, 20 20, 20 20, 25 -20, 30 
SA2 20, 5 20, 15 10, 10 10, 20 10, 20 10, 25 -20, 30 
SA3 30, 5 30, 15 20, 10 20, 20 -20, 20 -20, 25 -20, 30 
SA4 30, 5 30, 15 10, 10 10, 20 -30, 20 -30, 25 -30, 30 
SA5 -20, 5 -20, 15 -20, 10 -20, 20 -20, 20 -20, 25 -20, 30 
 
 
Player 
A 
SA6 30, 5 30, 15 -20, 10 20, 20 -20, 20 20, 25 -20, 30 
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The five pairs of strategies (SA1,SB7 ; SA2,SB7 ; SA3,SB7 ; SA5SB7 and SA6SB7) have 
maximum payoffs for both players in a non-cooperative situation. In short, there are 
five Nash equilibriums in Game I, as it is shown in Table 5.7. Player A loses 20 units 
while player B wins 30 units in Nash equilibrium points. Consequently, in Game I, 
whatever strategies player A chooses, she always loses (-20). On the other hand, 
player B wins maximum benefit (30).   
Indeed, if players made an agreement before the game, they would win, together. For 
instance, if player A chose the first strategy (SA1 – to plan new industrial areas in the 
watershed) or sixth strategy (SA6 – to prevent the up-stream from the polluting 
industry), and player B chose the sixth strategy (SB6 –to locate in the industrial area 
in the down-stream district or sub-district municipality), player A would gain “20” 
units instead of “-20”. However, player B won “25” units instead of “30”. 
Furthermore, if location in unplanned areas can be prevented, player A can increase 
her payoff.   
5.7 Determination of the Payoffs in Game II 
In Game II, players consider land price, infrastructure participation fee, permission 
process and environmental cost, together. Namely, the difference between the first 
and the second game is that environmental costs are evaluated as a third criterion in 
the latter. In addition, all polluting companies have to build wastewater treatment 
plants; organized industrial districts have to finish environmental infrastructure in 
accordance with environmental legislation and strategic plan decisions in Game II. 
All players have to consider environmental regulations and standards. Hence, in 
Game II, it is assumed that all authorities and municipalities act legally and they 
apply environmental policies such as discharge standards. Therefore, in Game II, 
environmental costs affect the payoffs of players  
5.7.1 Payoffs of Player A in Game II 
According to the choices of player B, industrial income of player A inceases or 
decreases, and /or environmental costs of player A increases or deceases.  Criteria 
and outcomes are shown below (Table 5.9).  Outcomes are arranged from maximum 
to minimum value such as (20), (10), (0), (-10), and (-20) for player A.    
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Table 5.9 The Strategies Evaluation Criteria in Game II 
 Criteria Outcomes 
Strategy fulfilled  20  
1 Strategy unfulfilled -20 
Industrial income increased 10 
Industrial income not increased 0 
Industrial income decreased -10 
 
 
2 
 Costs increased -10 
Environmental costs increased -10 
Environmental costs not increased 0 
 
3 
Environmental costs decreased 10 
 
First of all, player A makes a decision, after that player B alters his strategy. The 
payoffs of player A are assessed according to Table 5.9. Player A has increased 
industrial income (10), and decreased environmental cost (10), together. The payoffs 
of player A are calculated in Table 5.10.  
As see in Table 5.10, when player A chooses her first strategy (SA1 – to develop new 
industrial areas in the watershed), if player B prefers the strategy of SB1 and SB2, the 
first strategy of player A (SA1) realizes (20), and the industrial income of player A 
increases (10), but the environmental cost also rises (-10), so the payoffs of player A 
will be “20” units. If player B chooses one of the SB3, SB4, SB5, or SB6, the strategy of 
player A (SA1) realizes (20), but the industrial income of player A does not increase 
(0). In addition, the environmental cost of player A increases (-10), if player B 
prefers the strategies SB3, SB5, SB7. Thus, when player B chooses the SB3 and SB5, 
player A wins “10” units. If player B prefers the strategies SB4 or SB6, player A wins 
“20” units. On the other hand, if player B chooses the strategy SB7, player A loses “-
30” units.   
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Table 5.10 Payoffs of Player A in Game II 
Player 
A 
Player 
B 
Realization 
of strategy  
industrial 
income, 
increase/ 
decrease  
Increasing 
cost 
environmenta
l costs, 
increase/ 
decrease 
Payoff 
SB1 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB2 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB3 20 0 0 -10 10 
SB4 20 0 0 0 20 
SB5 20 0 0 -10 10 
SB6 20 0 0 0 20 
 
 
 
SA1 
SB7 -20 0 0 -10 -30 
SB1 20 10 -10 -10 10 
SB2 20 10 -10 -10 10 
SB3 20 0 -10 -10 0 
SB4 20 0 -10 0 10 
SB5 20 0 -10 -10 0 
SB6 20 0 -10 0 10 
 
 
 
SA2 
SB7 -20 0 0 -10 -30 
SB1 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB2 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB3 20 0 0 -10 10 
SB4 20 0 0 0 20 
SB5 -20 0 0 -10 -30 
SB6 -20 0 0 0 -20 
 
 
 
SA3 
SB7 -20 0 0 -10 -30 
SB1 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB2 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB3 20 -10 0 -10 0 
SB4 20 -10 0 0 10 
SB5 -20 -10 0 -10 -40 
SB6 -20 -10 0 0 -30 
 
 
 
SA4 
SB7 -20 -10 0 -10 -40 
SB1 20 -10 0 10 20 
SB2 20 -10 0 10 20 
SB3 20 0 0 10 30 
SB4 20 0 0 0 20 
SB5 20 0 0 10 30 
SB6 20 0 0 0 20 
 
 
 
SA5 
SB7 20 0 0 10 30 
SB1 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB2 20 10 0 -10 20 
SB3 -20 0 0 -10 -30 
SB4 20 0 0 0 20 
SB5 -20 0 0 -10 -30 
SB6 20 0 0 0 20 
 
 
 
SA6 
SB7 -20 0 0 -10 -30 
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After player A chooses her second strategy (SA2 - to develop environmental 
infrastructure and monitoring-inspection systems in industrial areas in the 
watershed), player B decides on any of his strategies except SB7, the expense of 
player A increases (-10). On the other hand, if player B prefers the seventh strategy 
(SB7), the second strategy of player A (SA2) does not realize (-20), because player A 
plans to develop environmental structure only in industrial areas in the second 
strategy (SA2) while player B did not prefer an industrial area as a location. Thus, if 
player B chooses the strategies of SB1 and SB2, player A wins “10” units, if player B 
chooses the SB5 and SB6, player A wins “10” units, if player B chooses the SB3 and 
SB4, player A wins “10” units. On the other hand, if player B prefers the strategy of 
SB7, player A loses “-30” units.   
When player A chooses her third strategy (SA3  - to direct new industrial investments 
to organized industrial districts), if player B selects SB1 and SB2, the industrial income 
and the environmental costs of player A increase, and the goal of player A realizes 
(20), so the payoff of player A will be “20” units. If player B chooses the strategy of 
SB3, the industrial income of player A does not increase (0), but the goal of player A 
realizes (20). However, the environmental cost of player A increases (-10), so the 
payoff of player A will be “10”. If player B chooses the strategy SB4, the industrial 
income and the environmental cost of player A does not increase (0), but the goal of 
player A realizes (20), so the payoff of player A will be “20” units. On the other hand 
player A loses, when player B chooses one of the strategies SB5, SB6, and SB7.  
If player A alters her fourth strategy (SA4 -to move industries from the inner city and 
the Bursa plain and direct them to organized industrial districts), and if player B 
prefers the strategies SB1 and SB2, both the industrial income and the environmental 
cost of player A increases (10; -10), and the goal of player A realizes (20), so the 
payoff of player A will be “20” units. If player B chooses SB3, the industrial income 
of player A decreases (-10), and the environmental cost increases (-10), but the goal 
of player A realizes (20), so the payoff of player A will be “0” units. If player B 
chooses SB4, the industrial income of player A decreases (-10), but the goal of player 
A realizes (20), so the payoff of player A will be “10” units. On the other hand player 
A loses, when player B chooses one of the strategies SB5, SB6, and SB7.  
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When player A chooses her fifth strategy (SA5 – to cancel the working permits of 
plants that have unacceptable discharge standards), if factories close in the 
Metropolitan Municipality, player A would decrease her industrial income (-10), but 
the goal of player A realizes (20), and environmental cost decreases (10), so the 
payoff of player A will be “20” units. If factories close outside the border of the 
Metropolitan Municipaliy, the income of player A does not decrease (0), but the fifth 
strategy of player A realizes (20). Additionally, the environmental costs of player A 
increase, when player B selects one of the strategies SB1, SB2, SB3, SB5, SB7. Hence, 
when player B chooses the strategies SB3, SB5, SB7, the payoffs of player A will be 
“30” units.  
When player A chooses the sixth strategy (SA6 – to prevent the up-stream from the 
polluting industry), if player B prefers the strategies SB1 and SB2, the industrial 
income of player A increases (10), but the environmental cost increases (-10). 
However the sixth strategy of player A realizes (20), so the payoff of player A will 
be “20” units. If player B chooses SB3, SB5, and SB7, the industrial income of player A 
does not increase (0), and the goal of player A does not realize (-20), and the 
environmental cost increases (-10), so the payoff of player A will be “-30” units. If 
player B selects the strategies of SB4, SB6, the industrial income of player A does not 
increase (0). Furthermore the environmental cost of player A does not increase or 
decrease (0), because player B chooses to locate down-stream. Pollution in down-
stream does not effect to player A. therefore, the payoff of player A will be “20” 
units.  
5.7.2 Payoffs of Player B in Game II 
Player B’s payoffs are determined by land price, infrastructure contribution fees and 
the permission process as well as environmental costs in the second game. In Game 
II, the environmental cost of player B, the wastewater treatment plant’s initial 
investment and operating cost were primary concerns. Player B’s environmental 
costs depended upon the chosen land and cost of wastewater treatment plant. The 
cost of wastewater treatment plant differs depending on discharge criteria; discharge 
criteria differ in the watershed, this affects the cost of treatment plant. These criteria 
evaluated, and pereferences index formed in Table 5.3. According to Table 5.3, the 
first strategy is the most preferable strategy (1) for player B whereas the seventh 
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strategy is the least preferable strategy (7). Payoffs of player B are determined in 
Table 5.11 according to preferences index in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.11 Payoffs of Player B in Game II 
Strategies Location Index of 
preferences 
Payoffs 
SB1 Bursa Organized Industrial District 1 30 
SB2 Nilüfer Organized Industrial District 2 25 
SB3 Gürsu Organized Industrial District 3 15 
SB4 Batı Organized Industrial District 4 20 
SB5 Up-stream municipality area 6 7 
SB6 Down-stream municipality area 5 10 
SB7 Unplanned area in up-stream 7 5 
 
In Game II, environmental issues play an important role; industrial plant cannot be 
activated unless the necessary legislative requirements are fulfilled. Therefore 
developing environmental infrastructure becomes more important than land prices 
for Player B in the long term. 
The process would not change because of attitudes of organized industrial district 
administrations or municipalities. The permission process is expected to be shorter in 
organized industrial districts. Establishing industrial plants for unplanned areas by 
local planning decisions would be the most difficult option. Additionally, 
environmental costs also affect player A and B’s payoffs in Game II.  Thus when 
player A enlarges its industrial land, she is also aware that her environmental cost 
will increase. Similar to this is the fact that player B knows he has to act according to 
effluent standards; otherwise the plant will not be permitted to function. Therefore 
environmental costs become important for player B, because they affect long term 
costs. Due to effluent standards, the best option for player B is strategy SB1 in an 
organized industrial district with completed infrastructure within a metropolitan 
municipality area. 
According to Table 5.11, Land price in strategy SB1 -location in an organized 
industrial district which has a completed infrastructure in the Metropolitan 
Municipality- is higher than the other strategies whereas environmental costs are 
lower than the others. On the other hand, if player B chooses the strategy of location 
“outside the municipalities and organized industrial districts in the up-stream” (SB7), 
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land price decreases whereas environmental cost increase. In general, outside the 
planning areas where there are agricultural lands and plants built with a local 
planning decision on a parcel. Effluent standards are determined according to stream 
for this reason environmental costs are high. We believe that if players consider 
environmental law and regulations, the permission process in industrial areas is 
easier than in unplanned areas. Therefore, while the first strategy of player B (SB1) 
has maximum payoff, the seventh strategy of player B (SB7) has minimum payoff.   
The choices of player A affect the payoffs of player B in Game II. For example, 
when player A chooses the second strategy (SA2), she is expected to develop the 
sewerage system in the watershed. Thus, if factories locate outside the Metropolitan 
Municipality, they can discharge into the sewerage system instead of natural areas. In 
consequence, player B reduces environmental costs when he chooses the strategies 
SB3, SB4, SB5, SB6. Player B’s payoffs add up to “5” units.   
On the other hand, when player A selects the fifth strategy (SA5), if player B does not 
conform to effluent standards, his plant will be closed, so the payoffs for player B 
will be “0”. Similarly, when a player chooses the strategy SA6, the plant will be 
closed if player B prefers to locate up-stream and the payoffs will be “0”.  
Payoff matrix of player A and Player B are shown in Table 5.12.  
Table 5.12 Payoff Matrix for Game II   
Player B  
SB1 SB2 SB3 SB4 SB5 SB6 SB7 
SA1 20, 30 20, 25 10, 15 20, 20 10, 7 20, 10 -30, 5 
SA2 10, 30 10, 25 0, 20 10, 25 0, 12 10, 15 -20, 5 
SA3 20, 30 20, 25 10, 15 20, 20 -30, 7 -20, 10 -30, 5 
SA4 20, 30 20, 25 0, 15 10, 20 -40, 7 -30, 10 -40, 5  
SA5 20, 0 20, 0 30, 0 20, 0 30, 0 20, 0 30, 0 
 
Player 
A 
SA6 20, 30 20, 25 -30, 0 20, 20 -30, 0 20, 10 -30, 0 
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5.8 Equilibrium of Game II 
Players, their strategies and rules are the same in both Game I and Game II. Both 
players know each other’s payoffs and they behave rationally so they would like to 
choose the best strategy. Players do not make an agreement before Game II, so Game 
II is a non-cooperative game. Firstly, player A makes a decision and after that player 
B makes a decision.  
If player A chooses the strategy SA1, player B chooses the strategy SB1, because he 
would like to win maksimum payoff, so player A wins “20” and player B wins “30”. 
Namely, player B chooses to locate in the organized industrial district of the 
Metropolitan Municipality where the infrastructures are completed; while the 
industrial incomes of player A increases, so both of them maximize their payoffs.   
When player A chooses the strategy of SA2, player B chooses the strategy of SB1, 
again. Player A wins “20” while player B wins “30”.  If player A chooses the 
strategy SA3, player B chooses the strategy of SB1, again. Player A wins “20” while 
player B wins “30”. Similarly, if player A chooses the strategy of SA4, player B will 
choose the strategy of SB1, so player A wins “20” and player B wins “30”.  
After player A chooses the strategy of SA5, whatever player B chooses, the payoffs 
will be “0”. Therefore, player B may choose one of all the strategies. If player A 
chooses the strategy SA6, player B will choose the strategy SB1, so player A wins 
“20” while player B wins “30”. The preferences of players as indicated in bold 
characters are shown in Table 5.13.  
Table 5.13 Nash Equilibriums in Game II 
Player B  
SB1 SB2 SB3 SB4 SB5 SB6 SB7 
SA1 20, 30 20, 25 10, 15 20, 20 10, 7 20, 10 -30, 5 
SA2 10, 30 10, 25 0, 20 10, 25 0, 12 10, 15 -20, 5 
SA3 20, 30 20, 25 10, 15 20, 20 -30, 7 -20, 10 -30, 5 
SA4 20, 30 20, 25 0, 15 10, 20 -40, 7 -30, 10 -40, 5  
SA5 20, 0 20, 0 30, 0 20, 0 30, 0 20, 0 30, 0 
 
 
Player 
A 
SA6 20, 30 20, 25 -30, 0 20, 20 -30, 0 20, 10 -30, 0 
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There are eleven equilibrium points (Nash equilibrium) in Game II (see in Table 
5.13).  The four pairs of the strategies (SA1,SB1), (SA3,SB1), (SA4,SB1), (SA6,SB1) that 
have maximized their payoffs. When player B chooses a location in an organized 
industrial district which has a completed infrastructure, player B wins the highest 
payoff. The other seven equilibrium points indicate the choices of player B, when 
player A selects the strategy of SA5.   
Seven other equilibrium conditions in Game II happen in case player A chooses to 
cancel working permits of plants that have unacceptable effluent standards (SA5). All 
options are the same for player B. If he does not act according to effluent standards, 
his plant will be closed down. Indeed, ideal situation is modelled in Game II. 
Therefore, the SA5 strategy might not be classified as a strategy as it is information. 
For player A, closing down his industrial plant in up-stream or prevention strategies 
would increase her payoff. Industry in up-stream does not cause to increase the 
industrial income of player A. Furthermore, it causes to increase the environmental 
cost of Player A. Therefore, when the plants are closed down in up-stream, the 
environmental cost of player A decreases. Nevertheless at this point, the 
industrialist’s benefit is zero.  
5.9 Results of Games 
In Game I, present situation is modeled. The players do not consider environmental 
costs in the decision making process. For this reason, environmental costs are 
neglected in the determination of players’ payoffs. Player B’s choices affect Player 
A’s payoffs, but Player A’s choices do not affect Player B’s payoffs in Game I. 
Player B’s payoffs are determined by the price of the chosen land, the contribution 
fee for infrastructure and the permission process. Accordingly, the highest payoff for 
Player B is the strategy of choosing a place outside industrial areas in Game I. For 
this reason, whichever strategy Player A chooses, Player B would choose to locate 
outside the municipalities in the up-stream (SB7).  
Nash equilibrium is sought in both games. There are five Nash equilibriums in the 
first game. In Game I matrix, when player B chooses a place in the Metropolitan 
Municipality area, player A increases its industrial income. As for player B, the best 
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option is choosing land out of industrial areas (SB7) when the participation fee and 
process of receiving permits are considered. The worst option for player B is being 
located in an organized industrial district with full infrastructure within municipality 
borders (SB1). Therefore, in Game I, whichever strategy player A chooses, his choice 
for land is out of industrial areas (SB7). Furthermore, player A always loses (-20) and 
player B always wins (30) under these circumstances. This shows that the 
environmental protection strategies of player A will not be successful. Indeed, Player 
A would not be willing to employ these strategies. For instance, player A would not 
want to develop environmental infrastructure in the entire watershed area because the 
industrial entrepreneur chooses places unplanned areas (outside the organized 
industrial districts and outside industrial areas of municipalities), so Player A cannot 
benefit. It would be more profitable for Player A to develop infrastructure only in her 
area rather than the whole watershed. In the current situation, conflict between two 
players would continue in any case and it creates an unsustainable condition.  
Player A would not want to move industries from inner city, because if Player B 
were to move outside the metropolitan municipality area, her income would 
decrease. Player B, on the other hand, would think that his plant would not be closed, 
thus he will choose a place outside industrial organized districts. Therefore conflicts 
between the industrial investors and the Bursa Municipality arise, countinuously.      
In reality, if players bargained before the game or if player A could barricade 
location at unplanned areas of up-stream, player A could increase her payoffs. For 
example, if player A prefered to develop new industrial areas in the watershed (SA1), 
and player B chose to locate in the industrial area in the down-stream district or sub-
district municipality (SB6), player A would win “-20” units instead of “20” units. 
However, if this arrangment constituted, player B won “25” units instead of “30” 
units. Moreover, when player A prefers to prevent the up-stream from the polluting 
industry (SA6), if player B chooses the sixth strategy (SB6) again, player A wins “-20” 
instead of “20” and player B wins “25” instead of “30”. Additionally, when player A 
chooses the sixt strategy (SA6) and player B chooses the sixth strategy (SB6), the sub-
strategy of the Metropolitan Municipality concerning development on the west side 
will realize. However, player B does not choose an organized industrial district for 
location, he prefers to locate an industrial area of municipalities in down-stream.  
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In Game II, land prices and infrastructure participation fees are the same for player B 
as in Game I. Nevertheless the permission process has changed. As it is presumed 
that all acts according to present laws and legislations, the permission process is the 
same in all industrial areas. In the second game, there are eleven Nash equilibriums. 
In four of these SA1,SB1; SA3,SB1; SA4,SB1; SA6, SB1, both players benefit. When player 
B takes environmental costs into account, the most beneficial strategy for him would 
be to choose a location in an organized industrial district within the Bursa 
municipality area; then his profit would be at its maximum (20). Nevertheless all 
environmental costs will increase for player A together with industrial income as 
player B chooses a place within her territory. For this reason she cannot have 
maximum benefit (30) but she will still benefit. Player A would benefit in any case 
so she appropriates all of the strategies.  
Furthermore, Player A wins much more in Game II than in Game I. This would also 
mean that Player A would also agree with four strategies that are good for 
environmental protection. Both players would benefit if they act according to 
legislation. On the other hand, there is only one organized industrial district with a 
fully completed infrastructure in the watershed. When other organized industrial 
districts’ infrastructures are completed, there will be more choices for Player B.   
5.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the interactive decision making process of players in the watershed 
have been analyzed by the help of game theory. Two non-cooperative and two-player 
games are modelled here in order to evaluate their behaviours thoroughly. Industrial 
development and industrial land use decision are the main problem in the watershed 
according to the Bursa Strategic Plan. Therefore, the environmental protection 
strategies of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and the location strategies of a 
small industrial entrepreneur are analyzed by game theory.  
Cooperation is not observed among the players in the watershed, therefore the 
decision making processes are defined as non-cooperative. In the current situation it 
is clear that players do not consider environmental legislation and plan decisions. 
Thus two game matrices are determined. In other words, as players do not act 
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according to environmental legislation, environmental costs are not taken into 
consideration in the decision making process in Game I. On the other hand, in Game 
II, analysis is based on players’ acting in accordance with environmental legislation 
and according to the plan decisions. Thus in the second game matrix, environmental 
costs are taken into account when players’ payoffs are designated. After these 
assumptions, in both games players make decisions under certainty and they are 
supplied with perfect information. Both games are complete information games. 
Games are non-zero sum games.  
When the best strategy pairs are evaluated in both the games, we see that the best 
strategies of players and payoffs are changed. The Metropolitan Municipality losses 
“-20” units in the first game while she gains “20” units in the second game according 
to Nash equilibriums. This situation confirms the third hypothesis of this study for 
player A. Namely, when players consider environmental cost, they change the 
strategies. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Municipality wins much more, and 
considers environment, at the same time. In addition, the Metropolitan Municipality 
can increase her payoffs by bargaining in the first game. However, sustainable 
development is impossible in Game I. On the other hand, co-ordination and 
cooperation among agents are assumed in the second game. It can be defined this 
assumption as a bargaining or agreement between players. The result of the second 
game indicates players can increase their payoffs and at the same time, sustainability 
is possible. The second game verifies the fourth hypothesis. The fourth hypothesis of 
the study deal with cooperation among decision makers, it claims that if cooperation 
is possible, the agents acquire optimum profit and the environment is not damaged.   
According to the Game II matrix, player A can finish the infrastructures of organized 
industrial districts in her boundaries and can create more options for player B. 
Moreover, with these equilibrium conditions, the environment will be polluted less 
and water pollution can be controlled. If players are convinced to act according to the 
environmental legislation, industrialists demand for an organized industrial district 
with completed infrastructure will increase. Then it will also be possible to protect 
the environment. In short, Game I is more profitable than Game II for player A. 
Moreover, sustainable development is possible in Game II.    
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6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER SUGGESTIONS 
Environmental problems caused by human activities have reached the point of 
threatening the natural balance of the earth. Increasing world population, and 
industrialization cause diminishing natural resources and pollution to the extent of 
endangering human life. In the second part of this study, we have studied economic 
growth its relationship to the environment as well as developing environmental 
policies together with their impacts on Turkey. Besides natural resources being used 
as an input in economic growth, negative externalities show the close relationship 
between the economy and the environment. Environmental economy and 
environment concept have been discussed since the 17th century but increases in 
environmental problems require different approaches to these concepts. In the 20th 
century, environmental science has grown separate from ecology and a system 
approach was introduced to environmental concept. Human desire to dominate nature 
and the hopes of technology solving environmental problems, this human-centric 
approach, is forging its way in environment-centric theories.    
Environmental problems and disasters after the efforts of industrialization in the 
1960s have led to scientific studies; consequently the limits of growth have become 
the issue of debates. It has become an obligation to find a balance between economic 
growth and the protection of the environment. In the 1970s, developed countries 
started to form legislations in order to protect the environment. Conferences and 
agreements, especially with the contributions of UN and other supranational bodies, 
have helped to put the environment on the agenda all around the world. In the 1980s, 
sustainable development policies in balance with environmental protection became a 
significant issue. The sustainability principle was based on “polluter pays principle” 
and also on “anticipation and preventions”. It offers cooperation on social levels and 
voluntary effort. As a result of this principle, methods like the environmental impact 
assessment, strategic planning and strategic environmental impact assessment are 
being developed. These developments on environmental issues have an impact on 
planning science. Planning is an effective tool for obtaining a continuous growth but 
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without efficient management it will not succeed. Water basin planning and its 
management is a worldwide accepted approach in the sustainability of natural water 
resources.  
These developments also have positive impacts in Turkey. Although Turkey set up 
its environmental legislation in the 1980s, environmental legislations still continue to 
be prepared. In fact, there are many laws with effective sanctions about the 
environment and many institutions as decision makers; yet, an influential 
environment management is still not present. The Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry shares many of its authorities with other ministries and organizations; thus it 
cannot function efficiently. Basin planning as a special purposes plan is defined in 
the body of current planning law. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, metropolitan municipalities can plan 
water basins. The management problem cannot be solved with these plans which 
apply only for drinking water. All three of the authorities mentioned above are 
organized at basin level. A water basin can be under the authority of more than one 
ministry or institute. The State Planning Organization is also authorized to prepare 
basin planning, apart from the other three. Their approach is closer to the global one 
in planning but unfortunately, the quantities of the plans they have prepared are only 
a few in number.  
As a result of the second chapter; the necessity of planning on basin scale and 
management for the sustainability of water is inevitable. However, this system is not 
institutionalized in Turkey, yet. Besides, diverse institutions or ministries holding 
power for environment and planning create complicated decision making phases for 
water basin planning. Lack of regional plans and not adopting a strategic approach in 
planning make it difficult to plan and manage water basins.  
In the third chapter, the interactive decision making process among the decision 
makers is evaluated. Game theory approach was used to analyze the decision making 
process of actors in a water basin. The main principles of game theory are examined 
by considering the decision making process in planning. The theory is based on 
conflicting decision makers and their aim in maximizing benefits. It has elements 
like players, strategies, payoffs, information and equilibrium. Although there are 
games with many players; a game with two players reflects the basic form of the 
theory. A game with two players was the most suitable for this study. Despite the fact 
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that there are more players in the decision making process about environment and 
planning; a two-person game was the most convenient in analyzing the attitudes of 
players efficiently. In its broadest sense, each player has numerous strategies and 
there is a value that they would benefit from each strategy. The most important 
assumption in the game is that the players are acting rationally which means that they 
choose their strategies according to what their opponent will choose.  
Game theory is separated into two main branches as; cooperative and non-
cooperative games. The social sciences usually focus on non-cooperative game 
cases. Nevertheless it is expected that players increase their benefits in the case of 
cooperation or bargaining. In Turkey, there are many actors in environmental issues 
and planning and it is well known that these actors do not act in cooperation. As a 
result of this, non- cooperative games are used in modeling. Besides these games are 
non- zero sum games. This means that if a player benefits, the other one does not 
necessarily lose and the amount of benefit and loss need not be equalized. On the 
contrary, the aim is that both players would win. In this sense, a non-sum zero game 
explains the decision making process in planning more explicitly.  
Games are represented in strategic form in our models. Many factors are avoided in 
order to simplify the model. Modelled games in this study and analysis of a static 
situation, where a time period is avoided, and is played only once. Players act 
rationally; personal attitudes are important and there is no luck factor playing role. 
Information players have are important for the decision making process. The process 
of decision making varies due to risk factors and indefinite situations. The decision 
making process is also affected by players’ awareness of the other’s strategies, 
information and benefits. The pair of the best strategy is named as equilibrium in the 
finite game. It is accepted that dominant strategy is the most beneficial strategy for 
players. However each game does not  have a dominant strategy but Nash states that 
a game which has two players, non-cooperative, non-zero sum and finite pure 
strategy has at least one equilibrium. Nash equilibrium shows the best strategy pair 
of players.  
In the fourth chapter, a water basin is determined as a case study for game theory to 
be applied in a real decision making process. Two primary hypotheses are studied in 
the fourth chapter. The first one is on actors and their relationships in the watershed 
area. This hypothesis can be summarized as “water pollution is caused by too many 
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decision making actors, their lack of coordination and cooperation”. Therefore, the 
decision making actors in a water basin, their relations and conflicts with each other, 
the decision making process, strategies developed by each and their role are 
evaluated in this part. The second hypothesis is about the water pollution and the 
usage of water in the watershed. This second hypothesis is explained as “decision 
makers have not been acting properly according to the present regulation of 
discharge, sharing and usage of water is not sustainable as a natural resource.” 
Therefore, natural water resources and their use are researched in along whit this 
hypothesis as well as environmental infrastructure and refinement facilities in the 
watershed area.  
There are districts, towns and villages in the watershed area which are not a part of 
Bursa city. According to the 2000 census, the population in Bursa is more than 2 
million people and immigration to the city continues. An estimated population for 
2020 is 3.3 million. Urbanization results in destroying agricultural areas. The Bursa 
Metropolitan Municipality is working on the necessary infrastructure work and the 
healing of the present system. Furthermore, the city of Bursa has common 
wastewater treatment plant. Although there is a sewerage system in the surrounding 
towns and villages, sewage is dumped directly into the Nilüfer Stream.  
Besides settlements, industrial plants also discharge their wastewater into the Nilüfer 
Stream without treating it first. Organized industrial districts were formed according 
to district municipality decisions; later they became organized industrial districts. 
Therefore they are not as organized as would be expected from organized industrial 
districts and their infrastructure systems are not sufficient. 58.5% of industrial plants 
within the city borders of Bursa discharge their wastewater without treating it. 
Furthermore, there is no environmental inventory on this, thus the discharge amounts 
of industry are not precisely known. Diverse institutions are in charge of planning 
industrial districts, permits and inspection of their discharges. These subjects create 
conflicts between the Metropolitan Municipality, ministries and other local 
authorities.   
When social and economic characteristics of population are the case, there is an 
increase in industry and service sectors while there is a decrease in agriculture. 
Contrary to this agricultural income of the city increases which has always been an 
important income for Bursa. Although agricultural land has been destroyed and the 
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Nilüfer Stream cannot be used for irrigation anymore, an increase in agricultural 
income can be explained by the use of technological facilities and the growth of 
industry based on agriculture.  
Water pollution values were measured in the Nilüfer Stream by the DSI in 1979-
1982 for the first time and later in 1998-1999. These measurements show that the 
stream’s water is completely polluted and cannot be used for any purpose apart from 
the part Doğancı dam stands which supplies Bursa’s drinking water. The main 
problems in the watershed are fresh water supply and conflicts in sharing the water 
apart from water pollution.  This problem has been solved for short term but the 
solution is not sustainable. Doğancı dam is being protected. Ground water reserves 
are allocated for industrial use. Lakes and ponds were formed for agricultural use. 
The Nilüfer Stream is not used and is being polluted.  
The management system in the watershed involves the Bursa Metropolitan 
Municipality, 10 district municipalities, 11 sub-district municipalities. Apart from the 
municipalities, the provincial governor of Bursa, the provincial directors of 
ministries are active in the region.  There are 45 authorities in the watershed. Among 
these are the local environmental council which is appointed for coordination; it 
represents the government and provincial governor. The leading actor in the 
watershed is the Metropolitan Municipality of Bursa. However, especially with the 
master plans, the Metropolitan Municipality is in conflict with the ministries, mainly 
with Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. As for the application of these plans 
the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality conflicts with district municipalities.   
A plan which covers the watershed area has not been prepared but several large 
scaled plans within the Bursa city border were prepared by the Ministry of Public 
Works and Settlement. The Bursa 2020 Strategic Plan, which was approved in 1998, 
is one of the first strategic plan experiences in Turkey. The Bursa Strategic Plan 
which was prepared by the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, the Ministry of Public 
Works and Settlement and the Provincial Governor of Bursa was approved by the 
Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. This plan involves the development of 
industry and the preservation of environment. It also points out that these subjects are 
themes of the major conflicts in the city. Bursa was divided into sub-regions and 
different strategic decisions were made for each sub-region in line with the main  
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strategy. One of the main strategies is to lead industry in organized industrial districts 
in order to control their environmental impacts and to protect agricultural land.    
Bursa is growing towards the west and new industrial areas will be organized here. 
Industry is dense on the up-stream and polluted water is carried down to the 
watershed which creates a major problem. On the other hand, industry trends to 
develop at up-stream areas, because of proximity to Bursa city. The district 
municipalities support and try to attract industry for growth and for more income. 
The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality refuses to take responsibility for the pollution 
in the up-stream area which is carried down to its area by the Nilüfer Stream. For this 
reason planning areas and population in this area are restricted. Similarly, pollution 
from the up-stream and city of Bursa are carried down to agricultural lands in down-
stream. Moreover, the metropolitan area is developed towards this part. This problem 
shows the importance and necessity of basin scaled planning. Water basins are 
ecological systems and decisions for one spot can affect the whole basin. In the 
Strategic Plan, it is assumed that organized industrial districts and individual plants 
will construct their own wastewater treatment plants. Somehow, how this will occur 
is not mentioned. On the other hand, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality plans to 
construct sewerage systems outside its administration area.   
As a result of the case study, lack of coordination among many decision makers in 
the watershed is observed. These official decision makers do not cooperate and 
moreover conflict with each other in the planning and permitting process. Authority 
chaos and competition among these parties cause applications of environmental 
decisions to become impossible. Moreover, the results of water pollution analysis in 
the Nilüfer Stream, which were conducted again after 18 years, show that pollution 
has increased. These results justify the first hypothesis. None of the settlements’ 
domestic wastewater is treated except for Bursa city and many industrial plants 
discharge into the Nilüfer Stream in the watershed area; these show that 
environmental legislations are not applied, discharge standards are not fulfilled. 
These plants, which are not supposed to be functioning, are active and moreover 
what is more disturbing is that not only private industrial plants act but also public 
industrial plants. Water sharing and water pollution causes conflict between them. 
All these results show that sustainable development criteria are not present in the 
watershed area. This supports our second hypothesis.  
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The management and planning systems need to be set in order to solve problems and 
overcome conflicts in the watershed. Strategic decisions need to be made considering 
the watershed basin scale. Authority and responsibility in planning and 
environmental legislations should be redefined and reorganized.  It will be possible 
to enlarge the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality borders but new borders without 
scientific background will not solve problems, on the contrary they can lead to new 
ones.  
In the last chapter of this thesis, the decision making process in the Nilüfer 
Watershed is studied by the game theory. The location choice of a small scale textile 
plant is analyzed versus the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality’s industrial and 
environmental strategies. The result of the case study shows that water pollution as 
an outcome of industrial activity in the watershed stands as an important 
environmental problem. In the Bursa Strategic Plan, planning industrial areas, the 
location choice of entrepreneurs and preventing industrial based water pollution are 
stated. For these reasons, an interactive decision making process between the 
Metropolitan Municipality and an industrial entrepreneur is modelled as a two player 
game.  
In the fifth chapter, last two hypothesis of this thesis are evaluated. It is already 
known that actors do not function according to environmental legislation and 
discharge standards at the moment. The third hypothesis is “actors decide without 
considering the present environmental infrastructure; however if they do their 
strategies would change”. Both players’ most beneficial strategy will change. Two 
games are modelled for demonstration of the third hypothesis. In the first game, the 
first case is when both players decide to neglect the environmental costs and the 
second case is when they decide to consider environmental costs. Their decisions are 
evaluated accordingly. The fourth hypothesis is “in the state of cooperation between 
the decision makers; it is possible that the agents earn optimum profit whereas the 
environment is not damaged”. Therefore, for both players, best strategy pairs are 
analyzed in the sense that whether these are in accordance with environment and at 
the same time, change in their benefits and impact of these on the environment are 
discussed.   
In both games, players’ strategies and the rules of the games are alike. Players decide 
in cases of non-cooperation but they know each other’s strategies and the results of 
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these. The Metropolitan Municipality (player A) has 6 pure strategies and the 
industry investor (player B) has 7 pure strategies. The Metropolitan Municipality’s 
strategies are chosen from the Strategic Plan of Bursa. Investor’s strategies are the 
location alternatives in the watershed. This way, the Bursa Strategic Plan’s 
applicability is also questioned.  
In the modelling stage, strategy payoffs are defined symbolically and separately for 
each game. In the first game, determining payoffs of player A, industry income rise 
or decrease is a criteria; player B’s payoffs are land price, infrastructure participation 
fee and permit supplying process were considered in determination. In the second 
game, environmental costs are added. Environmental costs for the industrial investor 
are defined as construction and operation costs of wastewater treatment plant for a 
textile company. These costs differ according to the chosen location.  
Nash equilibrium was looked for in both games. In the first game, free from the 
Metropolitan Municipality’s strategy, player B always chooses the same strategy 
(SB7). The investor chooses the unplanned areas which are close to industrial areas of 
district municipalities and organized industrial districts. This type of land is cheap, 
she does not have to pay any participation fee and it is easy to obtain a permit. There 
are five Nash equilibrium points with which players gained maximum payoffs. 
However, the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality’s strategies are not beneficial when 
player B chooses SB7. Namely, player A loses “-20” units, while player B wins “30” 
units.   
In short, the Metropolitan Municipality always loses, so that means that strategies of 
the Bursa Strategic Plan will failed. If the Metropolitan Municipality can barricade 
the strategy of location on unplanned areas (or two player made an agreement), 
player B chooses to locate in the industrial area in the down-stream municipalities 
(SB6), player A wins “20” units instead of “-20”, and player B wins “25” units instead 
of “30”. Certainly, the Bursa Strategic Plan consists of the strategy of “local planning 
decisions should not be made about industry and settlement”. Furthermore, 
preference of the strategy of SB6 provides the western expansion of the Bursa 
metropolitan area. Indeed, this choice reflects the present situation. If player B 
prefers to locate down-stream, both agents will win, even if they do not consider 
environmental costs. However, this situation is not sustainable in the long term 
because of environmental degradation.    
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In the second game, the first strategy SB1 (to locate in the organized industrial 
districts of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality where the infrastructures are 
completed) is always beneficial for player B. Because this way he can minimize 
environmental costs and can receive the licence more easily although he will have to 
pay more for the land and for the participation fee. In this game (Game II) player A 
will win “20” units at five of her strategies out of six. Player B would win “30” units 
if he chooses SB1 but unless he fulfils discharge standards his plant will be shut 
down.     
If we evaluate best strategy pairs according to environment in both games, we notice 
that in Game I, the Metropolitan Municipality will not adopt strategies which are 
important to protect the environment; such as directing industry towards organized 
industrial districts, and development of infrastructure as they are not beneficial. 
Besides, an industrial investor is not willing to choose land in industrial areas.  This 
makes it difficult to get environmental issues under control.  
In Game II, player A will benefit if she chooses 5 out of 6 strategies, this means that 
the Metropolitan Municipality will apply the strategies in the Strategic Plan. If the 
industrial investor chooses a location in an organized industrial district with no 
infrastructure problem, she will minimize her contribution to water pollution. Briefly, 
the best strategy pairs in Game II are also positive for the environment. Besides, if 
the industrial investor chooses a place in an organized industrial district with full 
infrastructure, this will set an example and create compatibility so other organized 
industrial districts will speed up completion of their infrastructure systems.  
In short, it is obvious that players choose different strategies when they consider 
environmental costs. When equilibrium points are compared, benefits of players do 
not change in either of the games. Thus, if players take environmental costs into 
consideration they will receive maximum benefit and they will also protect nature. 
This justifies the fourth hypothesis.  
In conclusion, all four hypotheses are justified by case study and modelling study. In 
fact, players’ decisions on acting according to environmental legislation can be 
considered bargaining. As a result of this, it is proven that both players will win and 
industrial impacts on environment can be controlled.  
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The main outcome of the thesis will open new directions in the planning process and 
to open the discussion for the use of game theory in planning. A non-cooperative, 
two-person game is used in this study for an explanation of the decision making 
process. Nevertheless, cooperative games and n person games are also the main 
topics in the game theory. A game theoretic approach will make it easier for the 
agents to cooperate if the conflicts in the planned area are clearly defined. It is 
possible to achieve cooperative bargaining solutions where all agents are winners. 
Actually, this is the goal of planning because sustainable development of the river 
basin depends on bargaining where all agents are winners. Therefore, cooperative 
game with two-person or n-person will be used next studies. Coalition among two 
person/n person is a useful approach for planning discipline and an environmental 
management model. Furthermore, new scenarios will be developed about planning 
and environmental problems. Dynamic and repeated game can be modeled next 
studies.   
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